

BOKO HARAM: CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE IN POLITICAL SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY

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Abstract

This paper examines the largely ignored element in the counterinsurgency debate between those who favour the military response, and the politically-correct fad of one-size-fits-all solution of political settlement. The element in question is justice - to the state, society, and the individuals, who are victims to the violent behaviour of the insurgency. The case in point is the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Our argument takes place in the framework of the Hobbesian conception of justice and liberal utilitarian understanding of punishment; and, to represent the practical incompatibility of political solution and justice, we resort to the background of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations thesis. Our conclusion is that attempts to engineer some political solution to the Boko Haram insurgency would only reward the violent while robbing the victims of a lasting redress of justice which can only come in the punishment of the villain.

Key Words: Insurgency; Counterinsurgency; Justice; Punishment; Social Contract; Clash of Values; Clash of Civilizations.

Introduction

The Biafra insurgency of the 1960's presented the Nigerian state with a sovereign challenge and in a symmetrical war, and the state did not opt for a political solution. The reasons could be found in the fact that it was the 1960's when the cold war was 'raging', and the mantra of 'no military solution to insurgency' either had not been coined or had not gained much currency. And, today, Biafra is not one of the big nightmares to the Nigerian state.

The Niger Delta militancy of the late 20th – early 21st century was a systemic challenge with broad implications/interpretation for sovereign survival. Its presentation was asymmetrical of the guerrilla war strategy. The Nigerian state negotiated a political settlement of sorts, and much of the fires were doused, albeit with some little embers still flickering. These are the days of 'only political solution for insurgency'.

The present challenge of insurgency from Boko Haram represents a learning of sorts for insurgency but not much for counter insurgency as it presents rather a relapse into idealistic revisionism carefully disguised in false/pseudo-realism. The present insurgency marries the sovereign challenge of Biafra with the asymmetrical approach of Niger Delta, and topped it all with terror strategy.

The latest news about prospects of talks between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram (Enientan-Matthews, 2015) apart from its reminiscence with the sense of déjà vu of the

desperation of the Nigerian leadership for a political end to the insurgency brings with it (a sense of) despair for the future. In these circumstances of conflict, life has a certain uncertainty with it, an imminent peace harbours in it an uncertain definiteness to life in which pain would/might fill the void that would be.

Insurgency is often sought to be measured in the numbers of the dead but its effect in each of the living is, in fact, immeasurable. Long after the dead have firmly been lost in the statistics of death toll, the scars in the lives of their survivors would remain open wounds that would defy healing remedies.

In this desperation to end the Boko Haram insurgency, there is a possibility that the personal and social casualties of its insurgent activities might be lost or forgotten in the hurry, and in the end, the end of all insurgencies might result in the peace eluding the people and society in whose interest, ostensibly, the political solution had been achieved/negotiated.

Boko Haram: Objectives and Values/Tactics

The Jama'atu Ahlil Sunna Ludawate wal Jihad, better known as Boko Haram (meaning, Western education is sin) is the greatest threat Nigeria has ever faced. Its utterances, practices and activities are at variance with the good health of state and society. Although it does not have a coherent charter of demands, its strategy deduced from its utterances/proclamations, and confirmed in the ferocity of its tactics, and practices and activities indicate the following objectives:

1. To establish an Islamic caliphate in northern Nigeria and parts of Cameroun, Chad and Niger, under the dominion and power of the insurgent outfit;
2. To eradicate western education, other cultures, religions and civilizations, from the region; and
3. (Lately, they have added and achieved, a third objective) to belong to and, thus, leverage the link with, the ISIS terror caliphate in order to increase its profile and power, for sustenance (for recruitment, finance and arms), and for a potential safe heaven, in the event of increased pressure from the Nigerian state (Zimmerman, 2015).

The Boko Haram has demonstrated a culture that threatens the good health of the Nigerian society, and a value system that is at variance with the accepted norms of civilized behaviour. The class of activities and which constitute its tactics and behaviour include the following:

1. Kidnapping and abduction of women and children ("2,000 – Estimated number of women and girls abducted by Boko Haram since the start of 2014"(Amnesty International, 2015);
2. Bombings and mass murders of civilians and other non-combatants ("5,500 – Minimum number of civilians killed by Boko Haram since the start of 2014" (Amnesty International, 2015));
3. Assassinations ("They were slaughtering them with knives. Two men were doing the killing... they killed 27 people in front of me.");
4. Rape and slavery of girls (Amnesty International, 2015));
5. Sectarian and religious violations ("Whilst Boko Haram has destroyed churches and killed Christians who refused to convert to Islam, they have also targeted moderate Muslims" (Amnesty International, 2015).);

6. Willful destruction of private property and state infrastructure (“Burning and looting: new satellite images of the destruction of Bama. 5,900 – Number of structures in Bama (including a hospital) damaged or destroyed by Boko Haram in January 2015, according to satellite imagery. This represented 70% of the overall town.” (Amnesty International, 2015));
7. Forced evacuations; Ethnic cleansing; internal displacement of persons (Dorsey, 2015, Allen, Lewis and Matfess, 2014);
8. Numerous other atrocities. (“They stone them to death on Fridays. They will gather all the children and ask them to stone. I participated in the stoning... They will dig a hole, bury all the body and stone the head. When the person dies they will leave the stones until the body decays” (Amnesty International, 2015) etc.

The Problematics

The consequences of Boko Haram’s activities include destroyed and disrupted local economies, destroyed social organization and local cultures, refugee and internal displacement of persons, destroyed personal lives, etc. According to Amnesty International’s Secretary General, Salil Shetty,

Men and women, boys and girls, Christians and Muslims, have been killed, abducted and brutalized by Boko Haram during a reign of terror which has affected millions. Recent military successes might spell the beginning of the end for Boko Haram, but there is a huge amount to be done to protect civilians, resolve the humanitarian crisis and begin the healing process (Amnesty International, 2015).

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The abducted must be rescued, war crimes and crimes against humanity must be investigated. Bodies must be disinterred from mass graves, further killings must be prevented and those guilty of inflicting this unspeakable suffering must be brought to justice (Amnesty International, 2015).

What can be done, and how do we go about it? The answer to the first part of the question would seem easy, but the devil is in its indispensable intimacy with the second part. Most scholars and commentators would agree that it should end: but how to end it? This is a position paper critiquing the now popular policy approach that insists that the only solution to insurgency is politically negotiated settlement which accommodates the interests of all parties (Powell, 2011, Campbell, 2011). It is our position that such solution is not in the interest of the people and society, because it is based on the ephemeral of immediate political convenience and which lacks the indispensable condition for genuine and lasting peace, justice. Only the strong arm of the state is possible and can be trusted to guarantee genuine peace (Stephens, 2008). This paper is intended to raise a philosophical controversy in the midst of the debate on policy choices on counterinsurgency, and to challenge the current fad of political correctness that insists on a one-size-fits-all solution that ‘there cannot be a military solution to insurgency’, even when it is terrorism.

The major thrust of our argument is on these questions:

1. Since we all clamour for justice in one way or another – justice for the individual and justice for the state – is political solution really capable of producing justice/ sense of justice?

2. Considering human nature, is sense of justice possible or feasible – should the victim be satisfied to have made sacrifices while the perpetrator gets amnesty/ rehabilitation into the mainstream?

3. Is it possible to have this without the state and society making major compromises to their values and, consequently, neutralizing or deviating from or diluting its own civilization?

Our argument takes place within a framework provided in Thomas Hobbes's concept of justice and the liberal utilitarian theory of punishment, and Huntington's clash of civilization thesis.

Framework of Analysis: Hobbes's Concept of Justice and Huntington's Clash of Civilizations

The Concept of Justice and Theory of Punishment

Thomas Hobbes's conception of justice and injustice come to the fore here. Injustice: "the definition of injustice is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatever is not unjust is just." (Hobbes on Justice p.1, February 27, 2008). Hobbes, borrowing from the Roman law, "the steady and enduring will to render unto everyone his right", accepts justice as "the constant will of giving to every man his own. And therefore where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no justice; and where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust." Propriety refers to possessions, values. And, of all "things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life and limbs; and in the next degree (in most men), those that concern conjugal affection; and after them riches and means of living" (Hobbes p.2).

Here we conceive of justice to be: "giving everyone his due". This by extension means that even when that 'due' is supplanted, restitution and redress are essential parts of the original title.

The concept of justice makes sense only within the accompanying consideration of appurtenant concepts of punishment and aggression, in the absence of which justice becomes merely one side of a 3-D figure – a flat image or caricature, which does not say much. In the absence of aggression, real or imagined, justice would have no meaning, nobody would seek it, and its eventual demise – via disuse - is certain. Punishment (or retribution, which we take here to mean pain or discomfort inflicted through the due process of the law or the ordinary operation or exercise of the sovereignty of the state) is itself the fulfillment of the object and necessity of justice. In the absence of this, frequent aggressions on the "propriety" (of the people) would take place and justice would be destroyed in the flood of such frequency of invasion. Punishment is a natural protection to justice against aggression which is its natural predator. Their common habitation is, therefore, natural.

Punishment by due process of law signifies the "nature and locus of power wielded over criminals by society" (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment#thePun>).

Punishment survives on the fabric of human nature and its own utility. It is human nature to derive satisfaction in the serving of authorized harm on others; and it being a social act and process, its infliction does serve some purpose by enabling its user to achieve some purpose or result.

Punishment is intended to deter future crimes or injustice and victims derive (some sort of) satisfaction in the punishment of the offenders.

Huntington's Clash of Civilizations:

Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of Civilizations (2011) thesis is a worldview that sees the post – Cold War world as not sharing a universal civilization, but different civilizations based of divisive cultural lines – Western, Islamic, Chinese/Confucian, Hindu. Between the West and the East is the former's espousal of such liberal ideals as political pluralism and democracy, individualism, etc which especially the Islamic civilization does not share, and the individualism which the Confucian and the Hindu find particularly unpalatable. These tend to create cultural blocs, consistent in distinct values and which create faultlines that are unbridgeable. These faultlines are themselves fed by the contextual realities of unemployment, repressive regimes of varying ideological and religious persuasions.

(Mobile.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/opinion/04brook.html).

According to Huntington, in the Cold War days, the confrontation line was drawn along the ideological divide, a black and white paradigmic relationship that enabled states pursue their interests within hegemonic spheres, and equipped scholars with workable tools or model to understand that relationship and states actions. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, though ended the Cold War, did not bring about the *unipolar* world of one *hegemon* nor a *multipolar* world realism in which interests drove all relationships. It has ushered in a new world.

In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the super powers is replaced by the clash of civilizations.

In this new world, the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. Violence between states and groups from different civilizations, however, carries with it the potential for escalation as other states and groups from these civilizations rally to the support of their 'kin countries' (Huntington, 2011:20).

For Huntington, ethnic or cultural identity, not ideology or economic class, would dominate both local and international politics; and, due to the difference in values of the different cultures, clashes would occur both at home and abroad. In effect, multicultural states that are not able to evolve a common unifying culture would find themselves in internal conflicts; and abroad, states alliance would be determined by culture defined as interest.

Critical of Huntington, for exaggeration of "both the cultural diversity that exists in the world and the contribution that cultural differences make to violent conflicts, Wendell Bell (2002:1) stands the logic of clash of civilization on its head. He insists that, considering the vast number of universal human values shared, like: respect for life itself and the desire for reciprocal

treatment, capacity for loyalty to the group and a willingness to sacrifice or even kill for the survival of one's group, among others; that there is, in fact, no clash of civilizations that could generate conflict, as the root of conflicts lie not in the supposed clash of civilizations but rather in the operation or dynamics of the shared or similarities of values (Bell, 2002:7).

Both Huntington and Bell make persuasive arguments, and we do not intend, for the time being, to come down on one side or the other. Our position is in the intrinsic values that could constitute civilization for both the individual and the state, the values they would like to sustain, advance, defend and even kill for.

Clash as Social Dynamic

Beyond artifacts and standard of living (quality of life), civilization is essentially a product of norms of behaviour that govern social interactions and that help prevent the relapse of man into the pre-Contract/ pre-society state of nature, precisely of the Hobbesian variety, and which alone enables the environment in which artifacts and life of quality is possible (Hampsher-Monk, 1992: 51-52). These norms are objective standards of behaviour borne out of the collective consciousness, conscience and history of the group and which help to define its character and membership to the outsiders. These are observed in the lores, laws, rules, constitutions, treaties or conventions. This helps set character of membership of family, group, community, clan, tribe, state, etc. and those who consistently align their beliefs and behaviours accordingly are in-group and those who do not are outsiders.

Thoroughly persuaded with the Huntington's thesis of clash of civilizations, the thrust of our present endeavours is in the particularity of it. For us the clash is in any difference in values and the incompatible relationship between the value systems, as reflected in the often zero-sum or exclusivist relationship between them, as demonstrated in the violent clashes or resort to violence between their adherents. These are essentially about the following

1. **Values about Politics as Ends and Means:** What politics (and political power) is; what it should, or should not, do; and how it should go about doing things it ought to do.

2. **Social Values as to those relationships that fall outside the sway of politics,** especially those that come within the values of family and relationships of intimacy; group dynamics; and the values of the community and life within it.

3. **Humanist/Ethical Values as to Life and the Value of it,** as reflected in the sanctity of it; quality of it; and the very right to the inalienability of it.

Between two sides, the cleavage is perceived and interpreted in heavy subjective moral codes of right versus wrong; good versus evil; we right and good, they wrong and intrinsically evil. And, the whole world is perceived as populated by angels and demons. Further, between them, the only value they share is a sense of mission, to right the wrong in the other side. To realize this messianic objective, no sacrifice is too much and no target is sacrosanct, in fact, the higher the sacrifice and the target the more valuable.

For our discussion here, the clash of civilizations is not exactly like that of Huntington's, which sees conflict as resulting from the difference in cultural values of the different groups or peoples

and nations, nor that of Bell's, which sees clash as a product/dynamic of the shared values that compose our cultures, but rather ours is based on the perception of any differences or conflictual relations and their approach or attitudes to such that reflect or accentuate the incompatibility of goals/worldviews that so damages other likely areas of relationship that prospects of resolution are so reduced or disappears completely that there is no common ground to build on or that the only logical prospects of resolution or end to the conflict is not in peace but in the total elimination of one of the parties either as a group or total capitulation and conversion from its worldview or values. This difference is so profound and vast that it becomes a wonder they belonged to the same civilization. Huntington's is: what they were that made the conflict inevitable; but ours is: what they become in the course of the conflict, or, what they perceive the conflict to have made out of them. Huntington describes it as "conflict between groups from differing civilization... tribal conflict on a global scale" (p 207). The multicultural and other diversities of the groups, preclude them from ethnological acceptability as any form of civilizational groups - they are at best intra civilizational groups (see also Bell, 2002:6). Often, it is differences in worldview created by opposed or incompatible ideological platforms.

Clash of Civilizations: Human Life as Value

The lowest common denominator of values as measurement or comparison between civilizations is life and its appurtenances of liberty and freedom, and food and shelter. This consists not in the value of own life of the individual but in the value of the life of other person's life. The value of own life to the self is a purely instinctive thing of self preservation.

This is the value shared with (other) lower animals and some vegetable. This is an animal level existence with limited scope of refinement, mostly only the extent of whether or not the individual retains absolute right over it, or progress has moved the responsibility or some of it to the political community. Conversely, the value of the life of the other person's life is the measure of refinement in the art, sciences, technology and philosophy. This provides the most empirical grounds upon which (culture and) civilization can be evaluated and be compared. All civilizations have developed on and shown progressive increase in the value of (the other person's) life. While we may all be on the same level of value for our own lives (i.e. life, in the first person); we definitely differ in our value of life in the second and third persons. This is the point at which clashes may occur at the interpersonal level of interaction at the inter-group level and across cultures. This is the point at which any discrepancy in evaluation levels may produce a clash between communities, groups, etc because their values differ in an irreconcilable way. However, when there are discrepancies in the values of life in both the first and second (and third) persons, the clash of values is of the magnitude of one between civilizations – between good and evil.

Most primitive civilizations - if they were civilized at all – share the basic denominator of the least value for the "other's life", as demonstrated in human sacrifices and blood sports. **Whither**

The Justice in Political Solution to Insurgency?

Political solution to insurgency refers to a negotiated settlement to insurgency, in which parties seek mutually acceptable solutions to the problem, by accepting to accommodate some of

the concerns of the other side, and by eschewing violence as an option. It is often a situation in which each party claims to be working in the interest of the people and peace. Genuine peace is not attained because justice is never included in the objective.

By its nature political solution misses out on the idea of justice. We shall demonstrate what constitutes justice to the victims: the individual, the state, and the society; and how any such settlement in this particular case results in a clash of values for the Nigerian state, society and citizens.

1. Justice for the Individual (Victims)

St. Augustine in *City of God*, Bk IV: Ch 4, says, “set aside justice and what are kingdoms but enterprises of robbery.”

Justice is not in the rewarding of good but in the punishing of wrongs. And, in the punishing of wrongs good may be rewarded.

The necessity for punishment derives from the necessity for social order and the *raison d'être* of the state. “A liberal justification for punishment would proceed by showing that society needs the threat and practice of punishment because the goal of social order cannot be achieved otherwise and because it is unfair to expect victims of criminal aggression to bear the cost of their victimization” (<https://leibeniz-stanford.edu/friends/provicio/punishment/>).

Not punishing Boko Haram members for the crimes committed against the people would amount to the operation of Hart’s theory of punishment in which ‘we may, on occasion, have to avoid punishing serious offenders while continuing to less serious offenders for utilitarian reasons’ (Kevin Murtagh, 2005). However, according C.L. Ten, “it would be unfair to punish an offender for a lesser offence and yet not punish another offender for a more serious offence” (Murtagh, 2005). In that event, the state loses both moral high ground against criminals and criminal activities, and the utilitarian deterrence that comes with punishment. The state exposes itself both to charges of weakness and actual weakness; and, thus, encourages the most egregious offences to be committed with violence against itself; and, disappoints all those who have had faith in its ability and necessity to impose order through law.

Even those who might argue that one man’s crime has nothing to do with another’s punishment (Murtagh, 2005) must see it that there are real victims here. If the state as a victim chooses to forgive or ignore its own injuries, it would be exercising its own right; but since there are other victims, too (even though therefore its citizens), it would constitute an invasion of their rights, for the state to prevent them from the satisfaction of redress that comes from the punishment of the perpetrators of such crimes, by refusing or failing to inflict the punishment. The state is at the risk of connivance with the Boko Haram, or at such acts of aggression against its own loyal subjects and who expect themselves to be at the centre of its security and protection. Those who have had their lives destroyed or traumatized with abduction, rape and sexual enslavement, physical disabilities, forced evacuation, refugee and internal displacement, destroyed homes and means of livelihood; and having loved one murdered before their eyes, etc, cannot be allowed to bear the burden of their victimization, and more so by seeing or knowing that the perpetrators of their agony have escaped punishment or have even been rewarded by the state with political power. The society would have returned to the state of nature where life was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. In this pre –political society, man would avenge himself.

If he does not; it is not because of any moral or higher disinclination, but till he gets the opportunity of space or resources.

2. Justice for State and Society

Justice for the state consists in its credibility in deterrence of potential violators of its will and actual punishment of actual violators as an expression of “the steady and enduring will to render unto everyone his right”. This comes in the form of habitual fear in the minds of the dominant proportion of the people as shown in their behaviour of avoidance and compliance; and a habitual predisposition of the state to inflict punishment on those who run afoul of its forbearances/ avoidances and compliances. It is this habitualness that sustains the necessity of the state in the social contract that creates the commonwealth. The necessity of the state is in its capacity to deter injustice through fear of punishment, and to deliver justice by actual infliction of punishment for violation of social contract.

The sovereign that habitually fails to punish violations visits injustice on itself as it suffers loss of a “propriety” that is essentially its own life – necessity for the social contract. To re-state, justice to the state consists in its “steady and enduring will to render unto everyone his right” (Hobbes, p.2), the continued enjoyment of credibility in the eyes of the society to enforce contract. And, those who undermine this do injustice to the state.

In a political solution/settlement, the Nigerian state would be able to negotiate an end to the violence in the North East, in exchange for concessions to the demands of the insurgents, which will not exclude some form of guarantee for their lives and a great deal of political accommodation. They will escape punishment for the acts committed in their campaigns against the society and state. It would be naïve to expect complete capitulation at the negotiation table of a group that was not beaten at the battle field. And for the members of the sect, they would earn the aura of magnificence against the state as those who challenged the power of the state without the risk of consequence of punishment. Further, they would enjoy a strange coequality with the state or sovereign for having themselves punished the people who attempted to defy them. The people would have the choice to fear either the state or Boko Haram. A sovereign that accommodates coequality does so at its own peril. If the Nigerian state is incapable of punishing the members of Boko Haram or their activities, which are in breach of the social contract in the laws and values of the Nigerian society, the state does itself a great injustice, and to the society, by continuing to exist where its necessity is impractical. The state would not have earned its keep expressed as the taxes of its citizens, and its demise would be a matter of time.

3. Dilution of Values of Civilization

We would like to reiterate that a negotiated settlement will not liquidate Boko Haram, but would rather weaken, or shrink, the Nigerian state to create some space wherein some power of the Boko Haram, defined as its interest, would be accommodated to hold sway in pockets of the territory where the power of the Nigeria state (represented in its police, army or other servants/officials) would not exercise authority and must yield space to the Boko Haram’s own parallel (state) structures; or some aspects of life or people over which the laws of the Nigerian state would have to yield space or vacate operation to that of the outfit; or both scenarios. Only exuberant idealism would expect otherwise; realism won’t.

In the event of such political settlement that presents a Nigerian state that is ineffectual before Boko Haram, the only thing that prevents the overthrow of that sovereign by the people, or their capitulation to the challenger (Boko Haram) is the dread of the free reign of latter over their (people's) "propriety" - lives, livelihood, property, conjugal affections, etc. And, for a group that has won, respect from the state, it would desire to, at least, share in the state's sovereignty by placing some of its behaviour – past, present and future - above the laws of the state, and promulgate some laws of its own over the same Nigerian citizens. In a matter of time, it would seek to eclipse the power of the state, or the state would seek to redeem itself by redressing the injustice done to itself by the negotiated (political) solution. In whichever case, the conflict would resurfect for a final showdown (as was the case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, Jonas Savimbi in Angola, and others).

In the event of such hideous political scenario, there would be two sovereigns competing to enforce the same social contract, or trying to enforce different contracts over different societies mingling in the same space. While the Nigerian state would be expected to seek to enforce the contract that accepts justice as giving everyman his due based on common values on "propriety" – life and limb, conjugal affections and property and means of livelihood. The overall value of the Nigerian society, as enforced by the state, is that no man shall be denied of his due on his 'propriety' except through the due process of the law (Nigerian Constitution, 1999). This value constitutes, also, the minimum standards upon which the citizens judge the performance of the Nigerian state.

As a competing sovereign, Boko Haram is a different proposition altogether. Its activities propose a different value system far removed from the values of due process of the law. Its activities have been direct attacks on the social contract (sought to be enforced by the state, by imposition of order) by its members in their individual capacities being responsible for, or guilty of, renege on the original social contract by which the society/commonwealth was created in departure from the state of nature. As a group, they have challenged the credibility of the state as guarantor of that contract by attacking its agents and subjects. Directly to the people the Boko Haram has show indignant disrespect to their "propriety" by burning out entire villages, murdering their habitants, abducting their women and children, confiscating and destroying their properties, and destroying their livelihood.

For the state to accept some form of cohabitation with Boko Haram, which is what political solution translates into, it also means that it must accept such acts of group to either not have taken place or to constitute no crimes to its society, and the society will accept them as no offence anymore. Further, the state and society would now have to defend and protect Boko Haram members from charges of war crimes and of crimes against humanity, from the rest of the international community. To do that the Nigerian state and society would have to convince itself that its values till this time have been the wrong ones. And, the international community would be within its rights and duty to put Nigeria in the group of pariah states.

Commonly shared values about the meaning, content and manifestation of Hobbes's "propriety" - life and limbs, conjugal affections, riches and means of living (Hobbes, p.2) – would determine the operations of justice and its appurtenances of aggression and punishment. The specific nuances of this are what we call norm, culture, laws etc. The values demonstrated by Boko Haram puts no stock in the values shared by Nigerian people.

Conclusion: Boko Haram and State-society-individual Relations

Hegel, Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau and other great philosophers in one way or another support the view that between man and society exists a relationship in which the society necessitates creation of expectations (rights) while the state guarantees the protection of such relationship by providing the environment in which both man and society thrive. These expectations include or vary from mere etiquettes, norms, morals, to statutory and constitutional rights. And, the state's guarantee covers the identifications and recognition of such expectations, the determination of controversies based on them and settlement of such between the individual and the society and the exercise of appropriate sanction; and the security and preservation of an environment in which the (offer of) guarantees of another state becomes unnecessary, or even repugnant. A right is a claim (by an individual) upon the (whole) society, recognized by the state (law). The state can withdraw its guarantees by creating the environment in which that relationship stands changed; and the society can deny its acceptance of the state's guarantee by transferring such acceptance to, or accepting the guarantee of another state (see Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, in Iain Hampsher-Monk, 1992).

Boko Haram and its activities threaten the Nigerian state's guarantee to the society and the individual, but without any offer of its own, to the society and the individual. While the relationship between the individual and the society, and the state, is one of exasperation over the latter's capacity to guarantee; with the Boko Haram, it is one of fear and dread. Consequently, the larger number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), as people vote with their feet, away from Boko Haram. That group has shown a pattern of behaviour that leaves no other suggestion than a character of negation of that desired condition in which normal individual-society relations can continue to thrive. Both society and individual find themselves endangered by the pattern of activities of Boko Haram. Therefore, any solution that retains any opportunity for the Boko Haram to continue to be present in any way is fraught with dread to the people, and defeats both morality and politics.

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