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ETHNO – RELIGIOUS CRISES AND CLIMATE CHANGE

BY

PROF. PRINCEWILL I. ALOZIE

ABSTRACT

This paper will argue that Ethno-Religious Crises is a smoke screen for socio-economic mismanagement in the world. Ethnicity, Race, Nationality and politics have always been bound to religious practices directly or indirectly. Even when religion appears to be the deriving force behind social upheaval in society, it is discovered that political motives fuel the upheaval.

Climate change on the other hand could be discussed within the orbit of the Earth sciences, like Geography, Geo-physics, Climatology, Political economy, and political philosophy. The paper is divided into two parts: Part One, discusses Ethno-Religious Crises; while Part Two discusses Climate Change.

PART ONE

ETHNO – RELIGIOUS CRISES

It is a known fact that every person living or dead is a product of the intimate relationship between a man and a woman. From this relationship we eventually have a nuclear family. An aggregation of families gives rise to kindred groups, with cultural traits and languages. Through complex processes, these human beings evolve into nationalities. The physical environment plays roles in the development of the people's culture. Culture in this regard will include Economic, Technological, Educational, Agricultural, Artistic, Religious Activities. Outstanding, laudable qualities of certain individuals in the family, ethnic group or clan will throw up what we know as community leaders. The leader could be a man or a woman. Further economic, technological, scientific, artistic, religious or political activities in hitherto classless societies, will bring about class division. Usually, the dominant class in the society produces the leadership that directs the affairs of the whole society. The nation – state emerges from these processes that are not always peaceful. Individuals and outstanding personalities in society have always speculated about the origin of the universe; and the behavior, nature of living and non-living things. This speculative enterprise gave rise to philosophy, mysticism, religion, science, arts and politics. What these boil down to is that our revered philosophies, sciences, religious practices with their accompanying political and

economic ideas are human made. These concepts, entrenched cultural positions, including science and religion have been shifting their meanings.

A former Roman Catholic Nun, Karen Armstrong, in **Fields of Blood**, clearly stated that “there is no universal way to define religion” (Armstrong, 2014:2). Even the position that the West sees “religion” as a coherent system of obligatory beliefs, institutions and rituals, centering on a supernatural God, whose practice is essentially private and hermetically sealed off from all “Secular” activities, makes room for the inclusion, and not displacement of African religious practice by that of the Europeans and Asians.

The obvious reason for the displacement of Africa’s different religious practices and belief system is also the same reason for reducing the Africans into Chattels, purchasable human cargoes. Given the history of established religious institutions, it could be stated that there is no sharp division between Religion and Social/Political issues. In a theocratic state, the Chief Priest or Theocratic leaders decide the political road to be followed. What is tagged as ethno – religious crises could also be reclassified as socio – political crises. People who are born, educated and live in Muslim society, or in Christian Society, or any other kind of society are very likely to become a prototype of the society that brings them up. The crises that exist in religious circles are products of socio-political crises. Religious institutions are, directly or indirectly, governed by the ruling class of that society. This position helps us understand the various changes and turbulence in religious institutions. An Agrarian or slave-owning ruling class will incorporate the ethnos of Agrarian society, or of slave owning society into the prevalent religion of the geo-political zone. This explains partly why agrarian or slave owning precepts or concepts exist in sacred or holy books of various religious institutions.

I intuitively believe that there is an Almighty force called God, Allah, Olodumare, Chineke, etc, who is responsible for my existence and that of the universe or multiverse. This belief of mine does not necessitate any crises. This belief of mine is personal. However, the ruling class in society manipulates this kind of belief for the purposes of achieving political or economic gain for themselves or for their community.

Some religious leaders who also doubled as political leaders encouraged the trans-Atlantic slave trade; the despoilation of Latin America; Africa; and parts of Asia. The war of the Roses in England; the 100years war between France and England; the war between England and Spain which gave rise to the Spanish Armada; the wars in Germany; the First and second world wars; the cold war; and many other wars were not the result of Ethno –

religious conflicts. Religion is sometimes used as an ideological cover – up for the atrocities committed in God’s name.

Consider the heinous crimes against humanity during “the inquisition” in Europe; the European witch hunt; the devastation of Ireland; the genocide in Namibia; Congo; Kenya and Vietnam were not as a result of Religion or Ethnicity. These dastardly activities have direct bearing on climate change.

The Empire building processes of the United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Spain, China, with collateral damages to people and climate, are not motivated by religion and ethnicity. In Nigeria, there is an open Fulanisation policy that may look like an Ethnic and Religious venture. In truth, this venture is mounted by a political leader who is using Islam as a religious and political ideology; and the rampaging Fulanis from West Africa as the soldiers that will recolonise Nigeria and West Africa. Some of the Empire builders in the world today are aware of the plans of this Fulanisation plans of the Nigerian government, but are only secretly supplying the Fulani warriors with arms, logistics, and strategies for the actualization of the recolonisation agenda. Given the position by Boko Haram that Western Education is evil, implying that science and technology advancement are (HARM) Forbidden, it is obvious that the custodians of superior scientific and technological advancement will be the beneficiaries of the Fulani misadventure in Nigeria. In all these development we should bear in mind that the U.S.A. had predicted that Nigeria will disintegrate before the year 2015. When this happens, there may be the need for another type of “Berlin Conference” like the one that took place in 1884/85. This must be the case because you have to consider the fact that China, Russia, and possibly Iran and North Korea can comfortably neutralize the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Forces. Ethno – Religious Crises do not feature in these calculations. The wars envisaged will have devastating consequences on the Environment and on the Climate generally. We should, in future, be considering the consequences of geopolitical crises on the Environment and Climate.

PART TWO

CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate Change is a multi-disciplinary phenomenon. It bestradles disciplines like the Earth Sciences, Meteorology, Climatology, Geophysical Chemistry, Geomorphology, Oceanography and ocean currents, Astrophysics, Astrobiology, History and Political Economy. In this section, we shall make brief comments concerning the generally accepted causes of climate change. Some vital causes of climate change, which advocates for the

prevention of further deterioration of the world's climate fail to highlight, will be brought forward for examination.

Climate is the atmospheric condition and weather patterns of an area over a long period, like Thirty years. The temperature, air mass, rainfall, sunshine, wind, cloud, including these conditions in the troposphere, stratosphere, mesosphere, thermosphere and exosphere.

When climate change is being considered, the acceptable paradigm is focus on the following as the main cause of climate change:

1. The use of fossil fuel like – coal, oil and gas
2. Deforestation
3. Increase in Greenhouse gases that has increased the Earth's temperature.
4. Intensive agriculture which emits methane and Nitrous oxide.

According to this paradigm, it is advocated that there is need to switch over to renewable, Sustainable Energy sources like SOLAR, WIND, GEOTHERMAL ENERGY, BIOFUELS. It also demanded that people should learn to use energy efficiently. These causes and recommended remedies are laudable. The Paris Agreement on Climate Change in 2015 confirmed all these, and added that emission of offending gases should be monitored to ensure that atmospheric temperature does not exceed 1.5° Celsius.

As laudable as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Change Agreement are not much improvement should be expected to happen positively about Climate Change. This will be the case because the history of climate change is not accurate, the geotectonic, astrobiological, astrophysical, oceanographic aspects that grossly neglected. Furthermore, the political economy with the attendant ideology that fuels the incidence of climate change are rarely addressed. The history of climate change should be tied to our perceived history of the planet Earth: Creationism; Evolutionism; Big Bang Theory with the accompanying idea of “No beginning and No End” championed by the likes of Stephen Hawking and others. Irrespective of the History of the planet Earth chosen, we will observe that climate has been changing all along. Some of the expansive deserts in the world today were heavily forested zones in the past. This explains the presence of coal, oil and gas in those areas. The climate change then were gradual, or rather followed a cosmic rhythm. The formation of Fold mountains, Plateaus, Volcanoes, Tsunamis, impacted on the Earth's climate.

The appearance of Homosapiens, and the ability of human beings to be creative and destructive at the same time rapidly affected the world's climate. Cities and Empires were built and destroyed. Billions of human beings, or rather trillions of human and animal lives were extinguished by human beings. Forests, the outer space were disturbed by human

beings. All these brought about the rapid climate change facing the world today. The narrative by C.F. Volney in the *RUINS OF EMPIRES*, has been complemented by Eduardo Galeano's *OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA*; Michael Parenti's *THE SWORD AND THE DOLLAR*; John Perkins's *THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE*; F. William Engdahl's *GODS OF MONEY*; Peter Maass's *CRUDE WORLD*; and John Ghazvinian's *UNTAPPED: THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA'S OIL*; Tom Zoellner's *URANIUM*, and many more works by concerned citizens of the world.

While the Paris Agreement of 2015 on climate change is still on the table, the technological advanced nations of the world are busy establishing military bases world-wide; distributing nuclear war sub-marines in the oceans and major seas of the world; testing nuclear war arsenals underground the Earth's surface; dispatching space aircrafts to outer-space; moon, and beyond with military intensions; supporting genocidal wars worldwide through chemical warfare, biological warfare, and economic warfare.

The implication of these technological advancement for climate change is scary. There is the need, it appears, to extend the meaning of environment to include outer-space and other planets. This refined definition of Environment is necessitated by the issues dictated by Quantum Non locality. According to Robert Nadeau and Menas Kafatos, "When particles originate under certain conditions, quantum theory predicts that a measurement of one particle will correlate with the state of another particle, even if the distance is millions of light years. And the theory also indicates that even though no signal can travel faster than light, the correlations will occur instantaneously, or in 'NO TIME'. If this prediction held in experiments testing Bell's Theorem, we would be forced to conclude that physical reality is non-local". (Nadeau & Kafatos, 1999, 2-3)

Bell's theorem which was published in 1964, was tested in 1982 in Paris, and in 1997 in Geneva which both confirmed the non-locality of reality. Many physicists hold on to this non-locality paradigm of reality. There are those who do not support this non-locality of reality. Some major physicists who oppose the non-locality world-view with its experiments include Heins Pagels, David Bohm, and Rupert Sheldrake. Indeed Rupert Sheldrake made room for biological space in the discussion of physical reality. Parapsychology was mentioned. These brings us to consider phenomena like: TELEPATHY; CLAIRVOANCE; Extrasensory Perception; Psychokinesis; Hypnotism; etc. what we are pointing out here is that even if physicists and those emersed in mechanistic mindset do not accept the non-locality theorem, parapsychology and related approaches indicate that non-locality is REAL. The point being stressed is that human disturbances in the various continents, outer-space,

ocean floor, under-ground nuclear tests; over-exploitation of the physical and human being's environment do, cumulatively impact climate change negatively.

The major remedies that will bring a speedy reduction of carbon dioxide emission and encourage development of technology for the capture and storage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; and encourage resort to sustainable, renewable Energy sources that will bring stoppage to unquenchable consumerism of goods and services that are nurtured by ruinous economic ideology of capitalism and neo-liberalism.

Democracy in the abstract sense as the equivalence of communism will be the rational approach or medicine for the stoppage of the looming climate change disaster. Ethnicity, Racism, Religion will naturally be taken care of when the appropriate ideology directs human affairs.

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**Corruption and Social Development Fatality: A Perception of Local Government staffs
in Cross River North Senatorial District, Nigeria**

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Abstract

Corruption is one of the greatest challenges confronting modern society with predominance in developing countries. It is an enigma to good governance as it leads to misappropriation of public funds, and limits growth of the economy. This study aimed at finding out the relationship between corruption and development fatalities in Cross River North Senatorial zone, Nigeria. The study utilized the questionnaire to collect the needed data. The Sample size of 400 was computed for the study, using Yamane (1967) formula for deriving sample size from a finite population. Data from the questionnaire was analyse using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) The findings of the study showed that: corruption has played a significant role in determining the level of development in Cross River North Senatorial zone, Nigeria. The study also revealed that the local government staffs of Cross River North Senatorial zone are not satisfied with the role of the EFCC and ICPC in corruption control. The findings also showed that, corruption rate in Cross River North Senatorial zone is on the increase. The study makes recommendations against the backdrop of its findings.

Keywords: Perception, Corruption, Gender, sex, Fatality.

Introduction

Corruption is a universal, complex and multifaceted social phenomena associated with all forms of human organisation (Aidt, 2003). However, the pervasiveness varies as evident from country's scores on corruption perception index. It has been identified as the greatest obstacle to economic and social development since it distorts the rule of law and weakens the

institutional foundations on which economic growth depends (World Bank, 2014). In post-colonial Africa, corruption has been a cause for concern as it diverts already limited funds, undermines social and economic progress and impedes policy changes required for development. Africa presents a typical case of the countries in the world whose development has been undermined and retarded by the menace of corrupt practices. A series of reforms has been carried out in most of the African countries so as to make the system efficient and result oriented. However, the anticipated gains of such efforts or reforms have not been visible due to series of factors which include that of corruption. Moreover, corruption deepens poverty and makes it difficult for ordinary people to earn a living. Different arguments have been put forward to explain the pervasiveness of corruption in Africa and these include poverty, the personalization of public office, the political culture and the instability of leaders to overcome their colonial mentality in respect of their perceptions of public office.

Corruption in Nigeria has been a major concern to all and sundry. The upsurge of this social menace in Nigeria in recent times is disturbing and the damage it has caused to national life cannot be quantified. Corruption existed in the democratic and non-democratic government in Nigeria. Virtually all aspects of the society have a form of corruption or the other in the country. In fact, even religious organisations are also not exempted from corrupt practices (Uma & Eboh, 2013). Every year, a reasonable allocation is made on power, road network, communication, education, among others, but the expected impact of these expenditures is highly dissatisfactory. This may occur because the funds are mostly diverted for personal use. Osimen, Adenegan & Balogun, (2013) stressed that corruption in Nigeria is one of the many unresolved problems that have critically hobbled and skewed social development. It remains a long-term major political and economic challenge for Nigeria. Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published annually by the highly rated Transparency International (TI) shows that corruption is endemic in Nigeria and among the worst rated corrupt countries in the world, underscoring a need for urgent action. (Akinpelu, Ogunseye, Bada, & Agbeyangi, 2013). Corruption and other financial crimes are the bane of Nigeria development efforts. No money is entirely free. Every naira has its legal use, and consequently misuse of any amount will impact negatively on where it should be used. All these crimes constitute hindrances to socio-economic development of Nigeria in no small measure (Ribadu, 2004). Corruption has eaten deep into the Nigeria value system. The society no longer seem to ask questions as to how people acquire their wealth. This mode of financial crime is so rampant and topical in Nigeria that there is no gain-saying the fact that

it is one of the significant factors moving the country towards becoming a failed state (Nenyiaba, 2012).

Falana (2010) noted that facts have continued to emerge daily on huge sums of money that have been either looted, misappropriated, shared, mismanaged or committed into white elephant projects. The emphasis therefore, is the extent to which the law enforcement agencies like the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt Practices and other Offences Commission (ICPC), Transparency International (TI), etc, are observing and meeting the goals and objectives of their establishment in fighting financial corruption and other related matters. This suggest that they are overwhelmed or fighting corruption is being politicised.

According to Chuta (2004), future generations of Nigerians will always attempt to understand the contradiction that stares contemporary Nigeria on the face: how and why a richly endowed nation as Nigeria is nevertheless stuck in the lower ranks of the world's poor nations. The paradox is further highlighted by the exploits of Nigerians outside the country: they are often found as leading scientists and professionals, entrepreneurs, successful businessmen and women in Europe and North America. Thus, Nigeria's underdevelopment does not appear to derive from lack of material resources nor indeed of requisite human capital. The conclusion that may therefore seem in-escapable is that the debilitating potential of corruption to undermine and short circuit a nation's developmental potential and trajectory was most evident in Nigeria and would seem, therefore, unassailable. It is most evidence when it infects the leadership elite, most especially the political class. corruption rank very high as the factor that explains and ultimately is responsible for Nigeria's unenviable but current position of social development and underserved underdevelopment.

However, upon deeper reflection on the development policies of Nigerian government, there is clear indications that Nigerian leaders, past and present has shown fatalistic orientation toward development and lack a sense of personal or group self-efficacy. Consequently, because of corruption, the kind of leadership they provide continue to stall development in the country.

Cross River North Senatorial Zone of Nigeria has its shares of the menace of corruption with many abandon projects such as ground nut oil processing factory, water board project among others. Some of the abandon project was to be the hope of alleviating poverty and reducing unemployment in the Zone. This has created the problem of not only youth restiveness, hardship, insecurity, but also the problem of large armies of unemployed and underemployed youth who utilize both legitimate and illegitimate alternatives in trying to make ends meet.

Thus, there is a need for an empirical study to ascertain the perception of corruption on social development by local government staffs who are responsible in the administration of the councils. This study is therefore designed to examine public perception of effect of corruption on social development using local government staffs in Cross River North Senatorial Zone, Nigeria.

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to ascertain the perception of the effect of corruption on social development. The specific objectives are:

1. To identify the extent of corruption in Cross River North Senatorial Zone, Nigeria.
2. To determine the effect of corruption on social development in Cross River North Senatorial Zone, Nigeria.
3. To identify whether the level of education among citizens affect the way they perceive the effect of corruption on social development in Cross River North Senatorial Zone, Nigeria.
4. To ascertain the relationship between gender and perception of effects of corruption on social development.

Literature review

Concept of Corruption

Corruption as we know has stepped into every nook and cranny of Nigeria's public life, from top to bottom, cutting across almost every office or organization of all governments, local, state or federal. According to Alemika (1983) corruption is an economic crime against the society. Corruption is rampant and committed by persons from all the strata of the society. The monetary value, socio-economic and political consequences associated with the incidence of corruption perpetrated by the powerful and wealthy, are far greater than those economic offences committed by the poor in the society. Corruption appears in diverse ways, such as bribery, fictitious names included in salary vouchers, conversion of proceeds to personal use, kick-backs, political payoff, extortions and demanding/ receiving all kinds of gratifications, unlawful payment for contract either not executed or poorly executed because the pay officer has been induced; illegal enrichment in official position at the expense of the public etc. Khan (2005) put corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for private benefit. The forms, he said, include cronyism and nepotism, political donations and fraud of all kinds. Williams (2005) defined corrupt practices as any immoral, illegal and unethical act to cheat, lie, defraud, etc. Ipuole (2018) observed that corruption covers a wide range of societal behaviours in which various forms of morally questionable deception enable the achievement of wealth, power or prestige as well as much more mundane ambitions.

Concept of Social Development

Social development in human society is not a one sided process rather with broad spectrum. Individuals perceive development as increase in the skill and ability; it is viewed as maximum freedom, the ability to create responsibility. Gbenga (2007), states that social development involves the process of bringing fundamental and suitable change in the society. It comprises growth and embraces the quality of life and social justice, quality of opportunity for all citizens, equitable distribution of income and the democratization of development process. In spite of various concepts, social development is multi-dimensional and is basically about the process of change around spheres of social life. James (1995) has had decisive impact on the international discussion on social development. He conceives it as a “process of planned social change designed to promote the well-being of the population as a whole in conjunction with a dynamic process of economic development”. Social development first attracted wide spread attention through the principles set out in the Millennium Goals of the United Nations in 1995 (The Copenhagen Declaration-world summit for social Development). These revealed how social development should serve to build up egalitarian and solidarity communities and create societies in which human beings can live together in peace and in which their basic rights are guaranteed.

Causes of Corruption

Corruption has been called so many names in Nigerian society. It is not only a hidden social vice, anymore. Corruption in Nigeria seems to have taken a systematic and institutional wave, as it can be found within the low, middle, and upper classes in the society (Adenike, 2013). The causes of corruption in the Nigeria society are inclusive but not exclusive of the following.

Leadership: leadership from the conception in Nigeria has been an issue. The leaders have not been able to control their drive for “greed of self”. This has resulted into weak institutions (political, administration and legal).

Poverty: The Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, (2013) revealed that 122 million Nigerians are living below the poverty level. The World Bank report (2013), further asserted that poverty rate remains high in Nigeria particularly in rural areas.

Workers remunerations: When workers find it difficult to meet their basic need as a result of poor salaries, motivation and low incentives. It exposes them to the risk of collecting bribes and other forms of corrupt practices. It comes as no surprise that the Global Corruption Perception Index, (2013) ranked public servants very highly on the corruption scale.

Public perception: As a wealthy man in the society is a hero to someone already, the source of his/her wealth does not matter. What matters is that the person acquired wealth and immediately gets instant admirers and followers, who are ready to beat the drum whenever the whistle blows. The law enforcement agents don't have a system where they can do a background check on how an individual acquires his or her wealth. The general perception of the populace is that being wealthy means a successful individual. What matters most is the wealth one is able to acquire.

Inability of Government to Sanction Corruption: Shamija (2006) observed that, the seeming reluctance of government to sanction corruption creates the impression of support. Media report shows that government is fond of setting investigation panels and commissions of inquiry whose findings and recommendations are never made public nor implemented. For instance, the move by EFCC and ICPC in fighting corruption has not yielded much results as people expected.

Theoretical framework

Social Learning Theory

The theoretical anchorage of this work is on social learning theory. Social learning theory is a social psychological theory which states that learning is a cognitive process that takes place in a social context and can occur purely through observation or direct instruction (Bandura, 1963). The theory added a social element, arguing that people can learn new information and behaviour by watching other people. The theory expands on traditional behaviour theories, in which behaviour is governed solely by reinforcements, by placing emphasis on the important roles of various internal processes in the individual (Bandura, 1971). A major limitation for this theory is that not all social learning can be directly observed. Because of this it can be difficult to quantify the effect that social cognition has on development (Bundless, 2016). Bandura's social learning theory however can be used to explain the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria. People see one form of corruption or the other on daily basis in Nigeria. In both public and private organizations, employees are daily stared in the face with the realities of "kickbacks" from contracts awarded. This phenomenon is most apparent where even persons that have been indicted of corruption practices are celebrated rather than punished. This therefore made many Nigerians to develop the tendency to corrupt practices because those who enriched themselves through corrupt tendencies were not prosecuted. This theory was adopted because it explains the social psychological factor responsible for the prevalence of

corruption in Nigeria which has unprecedented negative implication on the socio- economic development of the country in general and Cross River North Senatorial Zone in particular

Methodology

This study employed the cross sectional survey research design. This method of research enabled the researcher to get an over-view of all the subjects, a total perception of the situation of things, using a selected sample to describe or analyse a large population at a given point in time.

This study was carried out in Northern Senatorial District of Cross River State. The present day Northern Senatorial District of Cross River State is a metamorphosis of the old Ogoja Province established in 1903 during the colonial era. It comprises five local government areas namely: Ogoja, Yala, Obudu, Bekwarra and Obanliku with several tribes and languages with no significant differences in their origin, arts, culture and linguistic. They are largely agrarian in nature. The people of Northern Cross River are very sociable, highly accommodating and caring. A good number of Northern Cross Riverians are professionals, civil servants and traders.

The population of this study comprised staffs in the 5 local government councils in Cross River North Senatorial Zone of Nigeria. They were considered to be intellectually mature to give information on the study. The staff population in the 5 councils was 5012 (Cross River State local government service commission, 2020). The population is made up of 2605 males and 2407 females.

The sample size was determined using Taro Yamane formula for finite population. The formula is given as:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

Where: n = the sample size

N = the finite population

e = level of significance (or limit of tolerance error)

I = Unit (a constant).

Solution

$$n = \frac{5012}{1 + 5012(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{5012}{5013 \times 0.0025}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \frac{5012}{12.5325} \\
 &= 399.92 \\
 &= 400
 \end{aligned}$$

Sampling Technique

In this study, purposive sampling was used to select Ogoja and Bekwarra Local Government Areas (LGA) among the five council areas that made up the Cross River North Senatorial District. For purpose of comparison, Ogoja was selected because of its urban characteristics, while Bekwarra represent the rural area. On selecting the respondents any identified staffs of the local government council were issued the questionnaire and it continues until the assigned number of respondents in the council is selected through the various departments.

Instrument for Data Collection

The instrument for data collection was the questionnaire. The questionnaire guarantees anonymity. The questionnaire was carefully designed with both close ended and open ended questions to seek the opinions of the respondents and to enable them be more elaborate in their answers. The questionnaire contained two sections, A and B. Section A contained information on personal data while section B elicited information on the substantive issues in the study. The questionnaire was self-administered. However, where the research assistants found out that the respondent could not read and writes properly, then it was other-administered.

Administration of Instrument

To make the data collection easy, five research assistants were recruited and trained by the principal researcher. That is, one research assistant handled one local government secretariat. The reason for this number was for effective management by the researcher in terms of training, funding and supervision. The research assistants were undergraduates from the social sciences of the Cross River State University of Technology, Ogoja campus. One-day training on questionnaire administration was organized by the researcher who supervised the questionnaire administration and collection.

Method of Data Analysis

The data collected from the administered questionnaire, were computed and analysed using statistical package for social sciences (SPSS). This software helped reduce time required for analysing a large number of questionnaires manually and enhance more precise analysis. Basically, descriptive statistics was used to present and analyse the data, including tables and percentages (%). Chi square (χ^2) statistic was used to test the hypotheses of the study. The

hypotheses of the study were tested using chi-square statistical formula because it is considered suitable and thereafter, conclusion was drawn on the basis of the results of the tests.

Testing of hypotheses:

In this section, the stated hypotheses were tested using appropriate statistics

Hypothesis one: Staff who are more educated are more likely to perceive corruption as impeding social development, than the staff with lower educational qualification.

Null Hypothesis: Staff who are more educated are not more likely to perceive corruption as impediment to social development.

This was tested with the questionnaire items 11 & 17 using Chi-square statistic.

Table 1a Cross tabulation of respondents’ levels of educational qualifications by their perception of corruption as impediment to social development

		Distribution of respondents by their level of education.		
Distribution of respondents on whether corruption brings impediment to social development		Low level of education	High level of education.	Total
	Yes		144(50.9%)	139(49.1%)
No		156 (71.9%)	61(28.1%)	217 (100%)
Total		300 (60%)	200 (40%)	500 (100%)

Source: Field Survey, 2021.

According to Table 1a above, among the 283 respondents who indicated that corruption brings impediment to social development, 144 (50.9%) had lower level of education while 139 (49.1%) had higher level of education. Among the 217 respondents who indicated that corruption is not an impediment to social development, 156 (71.9%) had lower level of education while 61 (28.1%) have obtained higher level of education.

Table 1b: Chi-Square Statistic

O	O ²	E	O ² /E
144	20736	119.4	173.7
139	19321	141	137.2
156	24336	144.3	168.7
61	3721	86.5	43.0
			$\Sigma(O^2/E) = 522.6$

Source: Field Survey, 2021.

$X^2 = 22.6$, df 1 P. value = .05, Critical value= 3.841.

Decision: According to the result, the calculated value (22.6) is greater than the tabulated value (3.841); therefore, we accept the alternative hypothesis that staff who are more educated are more likely to perceive corruption as impeding social development, than the staff with lower educational qualification

Hypothesis two: Female staff are more likely to perceive corruption as an impediment to social development than male staff.

Null hypothesis: Female staff are not more likely to perceive corruption as an impediment to social development than male staff.

This was tested with the questionnaire items 1 & 17 using Chi-square statistic.

Table 2a: Cross tabulation of respondents’ sex and their perception of corruption as impediment to social development.

Distribution of respondents on whether corruption brings impediment to social development	Distribution of the respondents by sex.		
	Males staff	Females staff	Total
Yes	128 (45.2%)	155 (54.8%)	283 (100%)
No	133 (61.3%)	84(38.7%)	217 (100%)
Total	261(52.2%)	239(47.8%)	500 (100%)

Source: Field Survey, 2020.

According to Table 2a above, among the 283 respondents who indicated that corruption brings impediment to social development, 128 (45.2%) are males while 155 (54.8%) females. Among the 217 respondents who indicated that corruption is not an impediment to social development, 133 (61.3%) are males while 84 (38.7%) females

Table 2b: Chi-Square Statistic

O	O ²	E	O ² /E
128	16384	213.7	76.7
155	24025	125.6	191.2
133	17689	116	152.5
84	7056	76.4	92.3
			$\Sigma(O^2/E) = 512.7$

Source: Field Survey, 2021.

$\chi^2 = 12.7$, df 1 P.value = .05 Critical value= 3.841

Decision: Since the calculated value (12.7) is greater than the table value (3.841), we accept the alternative hypothesis which states that female staff are more likely to perceive corruption as an impediment to social development than male staff.

Hypothesis three: Staff who have spent longer years in service will perceive corruption as an impediment to social development than staff who have spent lesser years in services.

Null hypothesis: Staff who have spent longer years in service will not perceive corruption as an impediment to social development than staff who have spent lesser years in services.

This was tested with the questionnaire item 14& 17 using Chi-square statistic.

Table 3a Cross tabulation of respondents’ years of service in public service and their perception of corruption as impediment to social development.

		Distribution of respondents by years of service in public service.		
Distribution of respondents on whether corruption brings impediment to social development		Lesser years in service.	Longer level of years in service.	Total
		Yes	108 (38.2%)	175 (61.8%)
No		111(51.2%)	106 (48.8%)	217 (100%)
Total		219 (43.8%)	281(56.2)	500 (100%)

Source: Field Survey, 2021.

According to Table 3a above, among the 283 respondents who indicated that corruption brings impediment to social development, 175 (61.8%) are in the lower years of service while 108 (38.2%) are in the higher level of service. Among the 217 respondents who indicated that corruption is not an impediment to social development, 111 (51.2%) are in the lower level of service while 106 (48.8%).

Table 3b: Chi-Square Statistic

O	O ²	E	O ² /E
108	11664	102.1	114.2
175	30625	155.4	197.0
111	12321	91.7	134.3
106	11236	178.5	62.9

$$\sum(O^2/E) = 508.4$$

Source: Field Survey, 2021.

$X^2 = 508.4$, df 1 P. value = .05, Critical value= 3.841.

Decision: Since the calculated value is (508.4) is greater than the critical value (3.841), we accept the alternative hypothesis the greater the number of years in service the more the respondents perceive corruption as an impediment to social development.

Discussion of Findings

The major findings of this study have shown that there is a significant relationship between educational qualification and perception of corruption as impeding social development in the study areas.

Again the greater the number of years of service of civil servants, the more they perceive corruption as impeding social development in the study area.

There is a significant deference between males and females' perception of corruption. Females are more likely to perceive corruption as impeding social development than their male counterparts.

Conclusion

Corruption is one of the socio-economic phenomena which have affected the lives of the individuals and groups at different degrees in different contexts However with respect to public servants, the phenomenon is yet another issue which is a hindrance to the social development which is bound to be actualized through the service of the civil servants who are in the position of executing government policies in form of projects and other assignments. With a special focus on this segment of the society (the public service) and its relationship with corruption and its implication to the entire society, the study sought to unravel the relationship between some socio-demographic factors such as gender, education and number of years in service, and the perception about corruption and social development. Indeed, the findings showed that all of the factors in focus had a significant relationship with the perception of corruption as impeding social development in the zone under study and by implication, require further observation for more robust approach to corruption.

Recommendations

- The study makes the following recommendations against the back drop of its findings;
- a There is a great need for staffs of the local governments especially the junior one to be trained and retrained to acquire more education to change their perception of corruption in the society through moral education.

- b. Local government staffs who have not attained status of senior staffs should not be given certain responsibility to handle as lent of years of service helps in the perception of corruption within the work environment.
- c. There should be sensitization of both male and female staffs on the danger of corruption in the society to change their perception.

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**POST CONFLICT RESOLUTION, THE CASE OF EKAJU/OSOKOM CONFLICT,
1982 – 2013 IN CROSS RIVER STATE**

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ABSTRACT

The research centers on “Post-conflict resolution of Ekajuk-Osokom conflict, 1982-2013”. The aim of the work is to investigate post-conflict resolution of Ekajuk-Osokom conflict, 1982-2013. This is with a view to finding out why there is lasting peace between Ekajuk and Osokom communities after the bloody conflict of 1982. Second, to provide a better insight into conflict resolution that will be a good example for conflict management at communal level. The multi-disciplinary approach was adopted while carrying out this research. Two major sources of data were used in the conduct of these research namely, primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included oral interview conducted in the field, reports of peace committees and minutes of committee meetings. While secondary sources which included publish works and dissertation were used. The research discovered how useful mechanisms like peace committees setup by two warring communities can actually lead to lasting peace. I therefore recommend the practice of setting up peace committees as a preventive measure against outbreak of conflict and post-conflict resolution strategy to restore peace to communities involve in conflict.

KEY WORDS

Post, Conflict, Resolution, Ekajuk, Osokom and Resolution

INTRODUCTION

Ekajuk is one of the four clans that constitute the present day Ogoja Local Government Area, namely: Nkum, Nkim, Mbube and Ekajuk. It is also one of the eight clans that make up Bakor ethnic group in Cross River State. In the case of Ekajuk, "Ekajuk lies between latitude 6°29" and 6°33" North and between longitude 8°33" and S°36" East. The 2006 census put the population at about 59,000 people. The Ekajuk people occupy about 170sq mile territory (State Geography Information Centre). The Ekajuk people are bounded

in the North by Yala, Nkum and the Nkim people, in the East by Boki, in the West by Ukelle and in the South by Abanyom and Nnam people.

The Osokom people are unit of Boki people who lived in western Boki and abounded in the West by Ekajuk, in the north by Kakagom in the south by Abayom, in the east Boji. On April 3, 1982, a territorial boundary dispute between Ekajuk and their Osokomneighbours climaxed in a communal conflict that led to the loss of lives and wanton destruction of property (Nshum, 2015: Oral interview). The Ekajuk and Osokom people had been close neighbours for several years and their boundary evolved through migration (Mrs, Obia, 2013: Oral interview). The conflict lasted for eight days before it was brought under control by the Nigerian police force. A number of factors, both remote and immediate contributed to the outbreak of hostilities between both communities.

Remote Causes

One of the factors that contributed immensely to the outbreak of conflict was the issue of migration. Migration was highly fundamental to the conflict. Migration is seen as "the collective movement or progressive infiltration of a people into or out of a given habitat. In general, it is known that people are compelled to migrate from one place to another for a number of reasons" (Nyam, 2011).

The people of Ekajuk and Osokom are believed to have migrated from Western Cameroon. The Ekajuk people were the first to occupy the territory presently inhabited by the Osokom people. This position is well attested to by both the Ekajuk and the Osokom informants. For instance, Ekajuk in justifying this position during the presentation of their case before the Peace Committee of 1982 stated clearly "Ekajuk moved from East to West". They settled in areas like Nsanaraganti, 'EltalNkim', that has now come to be known as 'Boki Hill, they moved to AnyoNdim, Ntamanti and then to Ekpulokwu and to Ekpugrinya. It should be noted that the Boki people called the Ekajuk people 'Ndim' and so most of the villages established in Boki by Ekajuk people bear the prefix 'Ndim, e.g. 'NdimAro', 'AnyoNdenr, etc. The westwards and so Ekajuk territory expanded westwards to include grassland areas and good sources of drinking water.

The extract above shows clearly that the Ekajuk people still calculated their territory to include areas they previously occupied which they abandoned in the course of migration. Some of these areas were firmly inhabited by the Osokom people as they migrated into those former Ekajuk villages thereby filling the vacuum created by the exit of Ekajuk through migration, of all the ancient villages of Ekajuk only two were not occupied by the Osokom.

They were Ekpulokwu and Ekpugrinya. Ekpulokwu was closer to Ntamanti and it was still inhabited by one Mr. MontuiAdi of Ekajuk

Another remote cause of the conflict was dispute over farmlands at individual level between Ekajuk and Osokom persons. One constant source of friction between the two communities was the struggle over farmlands. The Ekajuk villages of Mbok, Mbok I, Ekpugrinya, Akomaye, MojabeEkabe, Eshinjock, Nwang 2 and EgojaNdim were close to the boundary between Osokom and Ekajuk. The Osokom villages of Ntamanti, Nk'im and Agba shared boundary with the Ekajuk villages listed above. The area inhabited by the Osokom was entirely a thick forest while that forest extended to Ekpulokwu and Ekpugrinya. Both the Ekajuk and the Osokom inhabitants were exploiting this forest. The Ekajuk who felt that their boundary was between Ekpulokwu and Ntamanti continued to exploit the area for farming. The Osokom people on the other hand calculated their territory to include Ekpulokwu and Ekpugrinya also were involved in clearing the forest area for farming. This attitude on both sides brought them into conflict with one another. In some cases, the conflict resulted in fight between some farmers and their counterparts from other tribe at individual level. Some of these cases went up to the police. The situation became so tense and unbearable in the 1960s. This prompted the leadership of both Osokom and Ekajuk to constitute Ekajuk - Osokom Liaison Committee of 1965 that was popularly called The 1965 Liaison Committee.

Apart from struggle over farmlands, the most fondly remembered remote cause of the Ekajuk-Osokom conflict 1982, was the road construction of 1978. In 1978, the Federal Government through the RCC Construction Company began the construction of a trunk road from Ikom through the Ekajuk villages of Mbok, Mbok I, MojabeEkabe, Akomaye, Eshinjock, Nwang 2 and through EgojaNdim to Katsina Alia. Before 1978, there were speculations on the exact location where the road construction would pass through. Some Osokom people enthused that the road would pass through Nkarasi linking Esaubendegh to Okundi, through Kwakwagom to Ogoja Junction.

This dream remained still born as in 1978 when actual road construction began; it was being constructed through Ekajuk territory. This brought about suspicion on the part of Osokom as some people began pointing accusing fingers on the Ekajuk that the Ekajuk may have influenced the diversion of the road through their territory. As unfounded as this allegation was, it did not go down well with some Osokom people. This was because, the road construction provided the Ekajuk with abundant opportunities attached to the highway leaving them hinterland dwellers (Ayambim, 2013: Oral interview). Coincidentally, the government of Cross River State also began the construction of a road from a place called

Akogbe along the Trunk A road linking Ekpugrinya, Ekpulokwu, Ntamante to Okundi. The construction of this road followed the traditional trade route that linked Boki with Ekajuk. The road from Akogbe to Boki made that place a junction that later came to be known as Ekpugrinya Junction. That means that there was an existing road that was undergoing full construction by 1978. This road construction heightened tension between the two communities. The desire to have a stronghold on the highway propelled the Osokom people to begin expansion towards the highway (Ayambim, 2013: Oral interview). The 1965 Liaison Committee was dissolved before 1978.

As a result of the desire to share in the spoils of the prospect of the construction of a trunk "A" road, the Osokom people proposed the formation of the 1978 Land Allocation Committee to allocate land at Ekpugrinya, The Ekajuk people stated this in their presentation as "the 1978 Allocation Committee". In 1978, the Boki people suggested the formation of an allocation committee to allocate land at Ekpugrinya junction. While they were eager to see the committee formed, the Ekajuk people rejected the idea based on the believe that they did not need the Osokom people to form an allocation committee to allocate Ekajuk land. Ekajuk people therefore formed their Allocation Committee as of right (Minute of peace meeting, 4th May 1982).

The joint land allocation committee was proposed to ensure that land was allocated to both Ekajuk and Osokom people at Ekpugrinya junction. This was a demonstration of the extent to which the Osokom people desired to have a presence on the highway. The Ekajuk people who were suspicious of the motive behind this idea rejected it in its entirety. Their rejection of the formation of Allocation Committee angered the Osokom people so much. The clan Head of Osokom, Mr. Afu alluded to this when he accused Ekajuk of preventing the Osokom people from having a share of the highway while testifying before the Peace Committee of 1982.

It should be noted that road construction is a social amenity that is considered vital for the development of a place. Access to good road provides a good opportunity for people to engage in commercial activities. It also removes some of the difficulties associated with selling perishable agricultural products. Moreso, it attracts investors who want to engage in trade to settle in a particular place for economic activities. This in turn leads to economic prosperity of a people. He accused Ekajuk clan of refusing to attend the committee meeting that was set up to allocate plots at the Ekpugrinya junction but rather went ahead and started developing the place with houses (Minute of peace meeting, 4th May 1982). To make matters

worse, the Ekajuk people claimed compensation on the disputed land from the construction companies even up to Ekpulokwu.

The Osokom people mounted a sign board at the newly constructed junction written, "Okundi Junction", but it was removed and replaced by the Ekajuk with the one written "Ekpugrinya Junction". Even oral evidence from the two belligerent neighbours showed that it was the road construction of 1978 that instituted series of events that culminated in the fight. Words of some of the informants who attested to this fact were as follows:

Madam Monica Otu had this to say, "I think the remote cause of the problem was fear of who would own that area when the new road was completed. This fear was from both sides-that is, Ekajuk and Osokom. They were only looking for an outlet" (Madam Monica, 2013: Oral Interview).

For Mr. Maurice BoyepOtu, the remote cause was "the opening up of the road through that area by the government which made both the Osokom people and Ekajuk to start nursing the hope of advancing towards it for economic benefits. This I think is the sole reason, because before now, they had all along been co-existing without problem (Otu: 2013: Oral interview).

According to Mr. Francis Obia, "the prospect of a federal road cutting across the boundary area was the cause of the conflict. When this dream of a road finally came to light, it raised anxiety from both sides and they became eager to map out land extends. All that was needed now was a kick started for trouble".¹²⁰ All these evidences point to the fact that the 1978 road construction by the federal government was instrumental to the eruption of the Ekajuk-Osokom conflict of 1982.

Immediate Causes of the Conflict

As the dust generated by the road construction of 1978 was yet to settle, another remarkable incident happened in 1980. On June 8, 1980, a certain Mr. Gerald Tawo began erection of building at the Ekajuk village of Ekpulokwu. This action rose tempers to the highest level. It must be remembered that the road construction of 1978 had already prepared the way for the outbreak of a fight between the two communities. It must be remembered that the dream of the Osokom people to make a successful presence on the highway was rendered futile and remained stillborn when the Ekajuk rejected the proposal by the Osokom people to form a joint land allocation committee to allocate land at Ekpugrinya Junction.

As if that was not enough, the Ekajuk people moved enmass and occupied the land thereby denying the Osokom people the share of the highway permanently. It must also be

remembered that the relationship between these two communities had remained completely strained following these developments. That was why when on June 8, 1980, Mr. Gerald Tawo began the construction of a house at the village of Ekpulokwu, the Ekajuk people wasted no time in calling him to order by summoning a meeting of Ekajuk and Osokom people on June 27, 1980.

The meeting was well attended by both clans but deliberations were not concluded. So, the meeting was adjourned to July 5, 1980 (Mobibi, 2013: Oral interview). This meeting was well attended and a decision was reached. Both Ekajuk and Osokom agreed to place a suspension order on the construction work of Mr. Gerald Tawo and caused him to sign an undertaking that he should stop work until when a committee had been jointly setup to look into the issue. The content of the agreement was as follows:

Mr. Gerald Tawo of Ntamante willingly hereby declare and promise to abide by the decision of the Ekajuk and Boki communities to suspend any work on the disputed area between Ekajuk and Boki until a committee of Ekajuk and Boki is formed. That any action can be taken against me by the above on any attempt on violation of the above decision (Acceptance of suspension order from Ekajuk and Boki community).

Indeed, Mr. Gerald Tawo having signed an undertaking to suspend work, actually suspended the building of the house. This agreement which was designed to forestall breakdown of law and order merely postponed the conflict. Events of 1982 clearly demonstrated that the agreement which was supposed to have been conceived in good faith was pregnant with conflict as both communities were not ready to make any concessions on the disputed land.

This was because for the Ekajuk, allowing the Osokom to occupy their previous settlements of Ntamante, AnyoNdim and several other villages was enough sacrifice made to the Osokom people, so, enough was enough as any further attempt to expand the territory of Osokom to the village of Ekpulokwu could not be tolerated any longer. The Ekajuk believed that observance of their traditional boundary which was the spot between Osokom village of Oshekase (Ntamante) and Ekpulokwu which was called EbgbaMongan and EwongMongan in its just and purest terms was the only way that could bring about peace.

Therefore, anything humanly possible must be done to maintain the boundary. On the part of Osokom people, the refusal of the Ekajuk to allow them share the other side the road particularly part of Ekpugrinya junction was unbearable. Even if Ekpugrinya junction was by 1980 effectively occupied by the Ekajuk people, according to their calculation, their boundary was on the newly constructed Trunk A road at a spot known as Mile 7. For the

Osokom, the protest against the erection of the building by Mr. Gerald Tawo by Ekajuk was an unwarranted provocation and as such the protest would not stand.

These were the feelings on both sides as the Ekajuk and Boki Committee that was agreed to be formed following the suspension order to look into the construction of Mr. Gerald Tawo's building was never formed after a period of two years. The refusal by both Osokom and Ekajuk to form the committee earlier agreed upon was a clear demonstration of the extreme position that was taken by both communities. The period from July 7, 1980-March 1982 did not witness any form of traditional diplomacy between the two communities. This meant that any provocative incident between the two communities was bound to cause conflict.

The straw that broke the camel's back was the resumption of construction work on the disputed land on April 1, 1982. Following the action of Mr. Gerald Tawo, the Ekajuk people at Ekpugrinya mobilized to site on April 2, 1982 to stop Mr. Gerald Tawo from continuing to build the house. They ended up demolishing the house.¹²⁷ When Mr. Gerald Tawo ran home to Ntamante to inform his community that the Ekajuk had demolished his house and beaten him up, Ntamante people also mobilized to site. Available evidence from both Osokom and Ekajuk showed that it was the women from both communities that started the violence that ruptured into a total tribal conflict. According to Mrs. NkatuAbiji, "we heard news that something was happening at Ekpulokwu and so we women mobilized and rushed down to the scene. On getting there, women started throwing stones at each other and a woman from Ntamante stoned me on the eye and inured me. As blood began flowing from my eye, I was taken to Maternity Hospital, Ogoja for treatment.

A 40 years old man Augustine MogbukEgar who was also at the scene of the I incident said he accompanied his parents to site and narrated what he saw to the researcher as follows:

May be, war would not have happened if not because of women. It was the women that started throwing stones at each other and a woman from Ntamante eventually stoned Mrs. NkatuAbiji on the eye and injured her. This was what aggravated the situation (Mogbuk, 2013: Oral interview). One thing is clear from all these testimonies, the fact that the Ekpugrinya peplemobilized to site to stop Mr. Gerald Tawo from building. When Mr. Gerald Tawo ranto Ntamante to inform his people, the people of Ntamante also mobilized to site.

The stone throwing incident by women of both communities that led to injuryof Mrs. NkatuAbiji on the eye created the spark that led to conflict. After the stone throwing incident,

both communities retreated to their homes. The tension between the two communities was outburst. The Ekpugrinya people reported the incident to the Police Divisional Headquarters in Ogoja. In spite of the complaint by Ekajuk to the Police, both Osokom and Ekajuk . began total mobilization for violent conflict. It is said that a troop of policemen was sent to Ekpugrinya Junction on the night of April 2, 1982. In the night of that same day, both Ntamante and Ekpugrinya villages withdrew all their children and women from their respective villages. It was alleged that the policemen on guard may have left Mr Ekpugrinya junction in the night when there was no fight. At around 4am in the morning of April 3rd, 1982. two houses were burnt down at Ekpugrinya by people suspected to be Osokom people. In early hours of the morning of April 3, 1982, as at day break gunshots were heard from Osokom and the Ekajuk people responded with gunshots signaling the beginning of the dark days (conflict) between the two communities.

Government Mediation Efforts

As it has been the case with several other conflicts, the Ekajuk/Osokom conflict of 1982 which began on April 3, 1982 and ended on April 11, 1982, brought in its wake horror, terror, anguish and hunger (Minute of 22nd April 1982). This followed the loss of lives and the wanton destruction of property occasioned by the outbreak of hostilities. As the conflict continued to take its toll on the two communities, it became clear that only a government intervention through its security forces could lead to the cessation of hostilities and a potential ceasefire.

Therefore, on the 8th April, 1982, a troop of Nigerian Police Force sent from Calabar (the State headquarters) and complemented by troops from Ikom and Ogoja Divisional headquarters descended on the theatre of conflict. Three days later, the two warring communities completely retreated to the bush (war zone). This marked the first intervention efforts made by the State government. Informants from both warring communities corroborated this position. Below are some of the extracts of the statements of some of these informants.

"The government made a quick response by sending police to stop that fight" Another informant stated as follows:

"The government tried by sending police to stop the fight" (Maria, 2013: Oral Interview

Further, another informant stated as follows: "It was the government that stopped the fight with the use of policemen".

Apart from sending the police to stop the fight, one of the most remarkable, laudable and very successful steps taken by the Cross River State Government was the setting up of a Peace Committee. The formation of peace committee was very unusual and unprecedented in the history of boundary dispute resolution in Cross River because, previous tribal wars have always been accompanied by panels of enquiries rather than Peace Committees.

The state government constituted a 40 member peace committee comprising twenty officials representing the government and ten representatives each from the two belligerent communities. It was called Ekajuk/Osokom Peace Committee. Members of this committee were as follows: (a)

Officials:

S/N	Name	Title
1	Munen O. N. Egbe	Ag. Paramount Ruler, Ikom- Paramount Chairman Ruler, Ogoja
2	Chief B. P. Bue	Paramount Ruler, Ogoja
3	Mr. Nkang N. Nkang	Ministry of Rural Development, Ikom
4	Mr. NjockNkor	Governor's Office, Calabar
5	Elder E. Oyama	Secretary, Abi Local Government
6	Mr. Okoi I. Ewa	Secretary, Ogoja Local Government
7	Mrs. S. Ewa	Asst. Secretary, Ogoja Local Government
8	Mr. Achor O. Achor	Chairman, Abi Local Caretaker Government Committee
9	Mr. S. O. Egbe	Member, Ogoja Local Caretaker Government Committee
10	Mr. I. C. Odi	Member, Ogoja Local Caretaker Government Committee
11	Mr. P. A. Abua	Member, Ogoja Local Caretaker Government Committee

(c) Representatives from Osokom (Boki):

1. Mr. P. O. Abang
2. Mr. P. O. Bisong
3. Mr. E. O, Obi Akachak
4. Mr. P. E. Tawo
5. Chief J. A. Osang
6. Chief M. O. Bedebe

7. Chief B. Asu
8. Chief David Nkang
9. Mr. JariathAkam
10. Chief G. O. Afu- Clan Head, Osokom

A comprehensive examination of the committee showed that the Ekajuk/Osokom Peace Committee as it was called was constituted to handle the issue in a traditional way. That is why members had to be drawn from both Ekajuk and Osokom. The Peace Committee was headed by Munen O. N. Egba (the Acting Paramount Ruler of Ikom Local Government Area) and Mr. Okache A. Egbanabo (Assistant Secretary of Ikom Local Government Area) was the secretary of the Committee. The Committee was supervised by the Commissioner of Police through the two Divisional Police Officers of Ikom and Ogoja. The mandate of the Committee was as follows:

1. The restoration of peace and order between the two clans
2. To verify the true owners of the disputed land through traditional methods of enquiry.
3. To determine the true boundary between the two communities.
4. Peaceful and amicable resolution of the dispute (Minute of 4th May, 1982).

The first meeting of the committee brought leaders from both clans together for the first time after the war. Leaders of the two clans sued for peace and familiarized themselves with the official members of the Committee. After the inaugural meeting of the Committee on April 21, 1982, another meeting was scheduled to take place at the scene of the war on the 28th April, 1982. On the 28th April, 1982, members of the Committee visited the disputed territory and assessed the destruction caused by the war. They moved from Ekpugrinya Junction to Ntamante and finally held their meeting at Ekpugrinya Junction.

On Tuesday, 4th May, 1982, the third meeting of the Committee was held at Ikom Local Government Council Hall. It was in this meeting that the Committee listened to testimonies on both sides on what was the actual cause of the conflict. Representatives from both clans were asked to be very truthful in their submissions. The Divisional Police Officer for Ogoja warned that this matter be handled traditionally and not turn to a court case. He then cautioned that "if the matter cannot be treated traditionally, it should then be left for the legal court or panel appointed by the government of Cross River State to decide" (Minute of April 21 1982).

On the side of Ekajuk, the clan head of Ekajuk, Chief Francis AdigbaMajuk explained that he called a Joint Peace meeting of the two clans to identify the traditional boundaries between them but Osokom clan refused to turn up; and as a result he went with his men into

Ntamante to protest why Tawo was trying to build a house on the disputed land despite his effort of trying to summon a meeting of the two clans to try to identify the traditional boundary between them. He further explained that he requested his colleagues, the clan head of Osokom to prevail on Mr. Tawo to stop building but to no avail (Minute of April 21 1982).

Mr. Philip Abang, the spokesperson for Osokom explained that the land under dispute belonged to Osokom. It was at this point that the Acting Paramount Ruler of Ikom, Munen O. Egbe asked Mr. Philip Abang why he allowed Mr. Gerald NkuTawoofBoki to sign an agreement in 1980 with the Ekajuk clan to suspend building a house on the disputed land when he had been able to trace the history of the disputed land as far back as 1980 as Boki land. At this juncture, the Ag. Paramount Ruler, read the agreement before the Committee and requested to know what Mr. Abang did when this agreement was being signed. It was at this juncture that the clan head of Osokom accused the Ekajuk clan of refusing to attend the Committee meeting that was set up to allocate plots at Ekpugrinya Junction but rather went ahead and started developing the place with houses; as such the Bokis asked Mr. Tawo to start building the demolished house.¹⁴⁰ He further stated that in 1920, one Ngbebu cut an iroko tree on the disputed land belonging to his father; when the case went to court it was decided in his father's favour. He again stated that "the Ekajuk brought people from all over Ekajuk clan to come and live on the land they were not living before.

The clan head of Ekajuk told the Committee that "they have a stream where they purify themselves, coupled with sacred stones and shrines all there in Ekpugrinya forest which he can take the Committee to see" (Minute of April 21 1982). At the close of submissions of Ekajuk and Osokom clans, the Committee accepted the suggestion by Mr. Ogbidi F. O. to inspect more lands on the next meeting : to verify the authenticity of the claims of the two parties. They advised that both parties should do a lot of consultation with their people before the next meeting day which was slated for 12th May, 1982. The Chairman of the Committee explained that members of the Committee were strangers to this disputed land and so would need to do a lot of homework before coming to concrete solutions and decisions. He therefore made the next meeting the final search for everlasting peace between the Ekajuk and Osokom clans (Minute of 4th May, 1982).

On 12th May, 1982, all the forty members of the Committee arrived the disputed land and declared their meeting open at 11.55am. They first moved to an Ekajuk village called Akogbe where Mr. P. O. Abang showed the Committee both the house and the timber shed he owns at Akogbe. The Committee found out that Mr. Abang bought the house from an Ekajuk man called EgarMbum, and the house was the only one owned by a Boki man at

Akogbe village. The Committee also saw Mile 7 at Akogbe which Mr. Afu had earlier said was their boundary. The Committee insisted that mile was installed by government administration and asked Mr. Abang to show them the traditional boundary between Ekajuk and Osokom. Mr. Abang informed them that their traditional boundary was the forest. The Committee also saw all the Ekajuk houses in that village. The Committee found out that the Ekajuk people owned all the economic trees at Akogbe and were the ones who sold all trees that Mr. Abang sawed in the forest he claimed was their own to him for his timber business (Minute of 4th May, 1932). Before concluding the verification at Akogbe (now renamed Ekpugrinya junction), Mr. Abang of Osokom made a significant demand as he said "the Ekajuk can now own their own side of the Junction while the other side goes to Boki".

At the end of the verification exercise at Akogbe, Committee members moved to Ekpulokwu which was the one man village inhabited by Mr. MontuIAdi of Ekajuk and it was the spot where Mr. Gerald Tawo attempts to build a house which ignited the conflict. While in Ekpulokwu, the Committee saw Mr. MontuIAdi's house and it was locked with padlock. Mr. MontuIAdi was cross-examined by members of the Committee to establish the true owners of that village. He showed them a fig tree, cocoa trees and pears. He also explained that "the founders of this village were Late AkongEgar, Late NshorMonjock, Late MonjockAya and my late father AdiNsoro". He added that he was born in that village and his father AdiNsoro asked him to stay there.

They then departed Mr. MontuIAdi's house after visiting his shrines to Ekajuk- Boki boundary. At the alleged boundary Mr. Peter Molang showed raffia palms and an iroko tree which he claimed was the boundary between Ekajuk and Osokom. He further explained that the raffia palms belonged to MonjockAyack from Ekajuk and that it is now inherited by Montul Moshe (Minute of 4th May, 1932). The Osokom strongly objected his submission and after cross-examination, the Committee went to rest at 2.25pm. It was decided that the Committee only should meet at 11,00am on 21st May, 1982 at Ikom Local Government Council to consider and prepare a final recommendation.

The Decision of the Peace Committee

The Peace Committee set up by the State government resolve and follows:

1. That the boundary between Ekajuk and Osokom cannot be fixed by the Committee since Ekajuk is in Ogoja Local Government Area and Osokom is in Ikom Local Government. That the boundary between these two local governments should serve as the boundary between the two communities.

2. That the last house at Ntamante should serve as the last house towards Ekpugrinya and the last house from Ekpugrinya towards Ntamante should serve as the last house from Ekpugrinya towards Ntamante.
3. That both communities can continue to farm the disputed land since it was the issue of building a house that led to the conflict.
4. That the two communities should jointly celebrate New Yam Festivals of Boki and Bako to foster unity.
5. That both communities should jointly bury their loved ones as a mark of solidarity.
6. That both communities should intermarry.

The recommendation of the peace committee received fillip when the ex-servicemen of the two communities formed Ekajuk - Osokom Ex-servicemen Association that began holding meetings and burying their members to foster unity.

The next of action taken by the Committee was the organization of a get-together (Jamboree) at Ekpugrinya Junction for both the Osokom and the Ekajuk people . to attend enmass, young or old, male or female to celebrate peace and signalled the fact that conflict was over. This jamboree was significant in many ways: it was a way of building confidence among the people that they can still live together as brothers and sisters.

Secondly, it was also to remove the fear associated with the conflict and provide a new platform where people could move freely from one place to another without fear of being killed as reappraisal. On the said day of the jamboree, people from all works of life from Ekajuk, Boki and their neighbours attended it with fun and fanfare. Women from Ekajuk and Osokom jointly prepared food for the occasion and also jointly served the guests.

They agreed that members of the two warring communities should stroll in a convoy into Ekajuk heartland to confirm the fact that peace had returned to both communities. This was done as both communities strolled to Ekajuk and Boki heartland up to Boje without any sign of molestation from either side. There was a lot of merry makings on that day as people who fought themselves drank and ate together.

The Committee recommended several measures which they thought would bring about lasting peace to the people as follows:

1. That people from both communities should intermarry with one another. (Dagom, 2013).
2. Erection of a police

Post at Ekpugrinya in 1982 to maintain peace and security on the disputed area. Members of the 1993 Ekajuk/Osokom Peace Committee were as follows:

Ekajuk Members:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------|
| 1. Felix Eyu (Egbung) | Vice Chairman |
| 2. Prince Nakutu (Mbok) | Member |
| 3. Prince FridaleneNneji (Nwang) | Member |
| 4. Prince Declan Ebi (Eshinjock) | Secretary |
| 5. Gregory Aganyi (Nwang) | member |
| 6. MatikiMonkap (Ekpugrinya) | member |
| 7. Benjamin Amap (Egbung) | member |

Osokom Members:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------|
| 1. Richard TawoAsu (late) | Chairman |
| 2. Patrick Ogim (Ntamante) | member |
| 3. Chief Cosmas Etta (Ntamante) | member |
| 4. Eider Fidelis Agabi (Duala) | member |
| 5. Chief Cosmas Ofum (Ntamante) | member |
| 6. Chief Michael Ngare (Ntamante) | member |
| 7. Ben Akan (NkimOsokom) | member |

This Committee continued work till 2005 when it was dissolved. The committee was jointly funded by both Local Government Areas.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is clear that Ekajuk and Osokom have been strong neighbours from history; that the causes of the conflict that began in 1965 and climaxed in 1982 are both remote and immediate; that a combination of factors culminated in the conflict of 1982; that the two Peace Committees which carried out their work relentlessly largely contributed to lasting peace which have survived for more than three decades.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Cross River State and indeed Nigeria is face with the challenge of conflict management. Some of these conflicts like the Obudu-Mbadugu Conflict which began in 1906 are yet to be successfully resolve while new ones have continued to linger. This situation is quite different from the post-conflict Resolution of Ekajuk – Osokom conflict which has never re-occurred since it was settled in 1982. This was due to the success of the two peace committees that manage the conflict. Therefore, in line with the definition of conflict management by Aja (2007), that “conflict management represent the operational and

implementation mechanism process”. It is therefore necessary to recommend the setting up of peace committees between the various communities in Cross River State as a preventive mechanism against outbreak of communal conflicts and post-conflict resolution since it has proved to be very successful in the case of Ekajuk-Osokom Conflict. It proved to be effective in the pre-conflict years when they set up Ekajuk-Osokom Liaison Committee of 1965 which was dissolved in 1978; violent conflict broke out between the two communities only four years later in 1982 and its re-enactment after the conflict that has brought lasting peace.

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PRIMARY SOURCES

- Interview with Mr. Mathias Nshum Ebor, a retired teacher, age 75 years by 3pm in his compound at Mojabekabe village near Ekpugrinya.
- Interview with Mrs. MarilineObia, farmer, 22 of July 2013, at 6pm at Oshekace, Ntamante, age 78 years.
- Interview with Papa Brian Ayambim, age 88 years, a farmer, at Ogep by 1pm on 9th July, 2013.
- Interview with Mr. Maurice BoyepOtu, teacher, age 45 years old on 3rd July, 2013 in his compound by 2pm
- Interview with Mr. Francis B. Obia, teacher, 52 years, on 8th July, 2013 by 3.30pm, in his resident at Ntamanta.
- Interview with Mr. Fidelis Mobibi, farmer, age 75 years at his resident on May 28, 2013 by 4pm.
- See the document titled: Acceptance of Suspension Order from Ekajuk and Boki Communities.
- Interview with Mrs. NkatuAbiji, farmer, age 75 years, by 6pm on 20th May, 2013, in her compound at Akpugrinya village.
- Interview with Mr. Augustine MogbukEgar, trader, age 40 years by 3.30pm on 8th April, 2013 at the resident of NshorMonkperMonkpuk at Eshinjock.
- Interview with Mrs. Maria Otu, farmer, age 55 years at 3pm on 8th July, 2013 in her compound, Ntamante.
- Minutes of the Peace Committee meeting of 4th May, 1982, p. 4
- See minutes of Peace between Ekajuk and Osokom clans on Boundary Dispute between them and the ensuing fight which has erupted held on the Disputed land on Wednesday 12th May, 1982, p. 1
- The final report of the peace committee on Ekajuk-Osokom conflict of 1982.

HIGHLIGHT OF INDIGENOUS TECHNIQUES IN CAKE AND DAWADAWA
PRODUCTION FROM PARKIA BIGLOBOSA (LOCUST BEAN) FRUIT: A CASE
STUDY OF KUDENDAN, CHIKUN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, KADUNA STATE,
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Abstract

Fruits of certain species of indigenous trees are harvested and consumed directly while others are processed into consumable goods to add value and for preservation. The study assessed the traditional processes of cake and dawadawa production from pulp and seeds of *Parkia biglobosa* (locust bean). Data on processes of extraction of pulp and seeds from matured and dry locust bean fruits and stages of production of cake and dawadawa were generated through field observations while the socio-economic uses of the products were generated from group of processors through discussions. The stages of dawadawa production starts with harvesting of matured and dry fruits from locust bean tree, removal of pulp containing seeds from the fruits, washing of pulp from the seeds, and boiling of the seeds to soften the testa and cotyledon for ease of separation. The cotyledon was kept in air-tight container to ferment, and

finally compacted into dawadawa ready for soup making. For cake production, the pulp containing seeds was pounded: the powdered pulp was sieved and mixed with potable water, the solution was allowed to solidify and ferment to form cake. The study suggests wise harvesting of locust bean fruit and conservation of *Parkia biglobosa* species for sustainable development

Key words

Locust bean; seeds; pulp; traditional industry; dawadawa; cake

Introduction

The natural vegetation is very useful to humans especially to those who have a direct access to it. Some native woody plants provide man with useful native food materials such as vegetables, roots, fruits and seeds and oils (Nanzip, 2020; Hlaing, Kamiyama and Saito, 2017). Indigenous food manufacturing industry depends significantly on local woody plants products like fruits, nuts and grains found within the localities, though it may be supplemented with imported material when necessary. The skills could be restricted to members of the communities (Eshameh, 2016).

The development of local industry from products of indigenous tree species as an alternative source of livelihood for peasant populace in diverse socio-economic conditions is an interesting issue in developing countries (Ndayambaje, Heijman and Mohren, 2013). In Nigeria, there is continuous utilization of indigenous vegetal products like fruits, nuts and seeds to meet socio-economic needs of the populace (Nanzip, 2020). Results of some studies indicate that fruits, nuts and seeds serve as raw materials for indigenous industries (National Academy of Science, 2021). Therefore, there is a need for continuous research to identify the local industries that depend on indigenous plant parts.

This study is conceived from the observation that fruits and seeds of some indigenous tree species are harvested for production of consumable goods like pomade from mahogany seed, and butter (fat) from shea tree nuts. The study is embarked upon to highlight the stages of traditional production processes of cake and dawadawa from pulp and seeds of locust bean.

Olaoye (2010) highlighted the needs for machinery processing procedures for production of local bean seeds in Nigeria. National Academy of Science (2021) maintained that the pulp of locust bean is eaten raw, mixed with water and made into a refreshing drink while the seeds are used for production of dawadawa with savory taste that is used in traditional soup. Likewise, the dietary value of locust bean contains about 30% protein, 20%

fat, 12% sugar, 15% starch and 12% fibre, as well as vitamins and minerals such as calcium and iron (National Academy of Science, 2021). None of these studies was carried out in Kudendan, Chikun Local Government Area of Kaduna State neither identified the developmental stages of locust bean fruit from flower to matured fruit nor presented the stages of traditional processes of cake and dawadawa production. In view of these, the study was embarked upon to highlight the traditional processes of cake and dawadawa production from locust bean pulp and seeds.

Parkia biglobosa is an angiosperm (flowering plant) in which the ovule is fertilized and develops into a seed (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015). The angiosperms are the most important source of food for birds and mammals, and are the most economically important group of green plants because they produce essential food materials like pulp and seeds (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2015). *Parkia biglobosa* is a deciduous and spermatophytic (seed producing) tree that is found in a wide range of vegetation zones of Africa (Wikipedia, 2021). Botanists named the plant genus *Parkia* in honor of Mungo Park, one of the first Europeans who made remarkable journeys of exploration into the interior of West Africa and record the plant (National Academy of Sciences, 2021; Owolarafe, Adetan, Olatunde, Ajayi and Okoh, 2013). The species requires a mean annual rainfall of between 400-700mm and a mean annual temperature of about 24-28⁰C. It prefers a well-drained, thick clay soils, but can also be found on shallow and thin sandy soils (Wikipedia, 2021).

The aim of the study is to identify the traditional procedures for cake and dawadawa production from locust bean pulp and seeds. The objectives include: to identify the stages of development from flower to matured and dry fruits in locust bean; to highlight the processes of extraction of pulp and seeds from fruits; to identify the stages involved in production of locust bean cake and dawadawa; and to highlight environmental issues associated with dawadawa production. The scope is to highlight the traditional processes of cake and dawadawa production from locust bean pulp and seed in 2021. Cake and dawadawa production were adopted because of their demand among the residents of Kudendan settlement, and the indigenous technology involved in production.

The study is significant by highlighting the processes of locust bean cake and dawadawa production adopted in Kudendan, Chikun Local Government Area which could be used by researchers for comparative study elsewhere. The study could be beneficial to policy makers by highlighting the indigenous technology of dawadawa production which could be modified into modern technological system. It could be useful to individual by appreciating the products and financial benefits derived from traditional industry. By appreciating the

importance of locust bean fruits, community members and individual could embark on protection of the species against unwise cutting.

Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

From the concept of environmental quality and resources, the environment provides diverse resources that are exploited by man to support his livelihood (Environmental Encyclopedia, 2020; European Environmental Agency, 2012). Some woody plant species provide man with useful materials such as fruits, nuts, seeds and pulp that are used as food materials and serve as raw material for indigenous industries (Nanzip, 2020). *Parkia biglobosa* is an indigenous tree that provide fruit containing pulp and seeds that are processed into food materials like cake and dawadaw using indigenous technology. Therefore, it is essential to present the processes and stages involved in cake and dawadawa production adopted in Kudendan settlement.

Olaoye (2010) stated that harvesting, decorticating, depulping and drying up of locust bean seeds are the major processes involved in locust bean seeds for food processing. According to [Owolarafe](#), [Adetan](#), [Olatunde](#), [Ajayi](#) and [Okoh](#) (2013) processing of locust beans involves shelling of matured pods, boiling, dehulling, separation of the hull from the beans and fermentation into various forms of condiments. The boiling process is aimed at creating good dehulling characteristics which is achieved by the weakening of the bond between the testa and the cotyledons.

Result of study on dietary value of locust bean indicate that it contains about 30% protein, 20% fat, 12% sugar, 15% starch and 12% fibre, as well as vitamins and minerals such as calcium and iron (National Academy of Sciences, 2021). Likewise, the fermented bean pulp contains 11.75% protein, 15.86% ash, 21.55% crude fibre, 32.14% starch, 93.5% dry matter and 6.5% moisture while the unfermented pulp contained 10.13% protein, 14.14% ash content, 22.63% crude fibre, 28.20% starch, 92.5% dry matter and 7.5% moisture (Olaoye, 2010).

In Nigeria, especially in savanna vegetation zone, it is observed that *Parkia biglobosa* is the most common indigenous tree species that produce valuable fruits on which traditional industries are established at family and individual levels to process components of the fruits (Wikipedia, 2021). *Parkia biglobosa* produce seeds and pulp that are traditionally processed into cake and dawadawa. By adopting indigenous processing industry like conversion of pulp and seeds into native food ingredients have helped to suit regional need, improves local resources, and provide employment to the household members.

Materials and Methods

The types of data required for the study include: the stages of development of locust bean fruit from flowering to maturity; processes of extracting the pulp and seeds from the matured and dry fruits; and stages and process of cake and dawadawa production from pulp and seeds. The sets of data were used to highlight the stages of locust bean fruit development, process of producing the pulp and seeds, and the stages and process of cake and dawadawa production. The required data were generated through field observations, for example, the stages of development from flower to matured and dry fruit was generated by identifying tree stands that has the required stage; and the stages of processing of the cake and dawadawa were generated using group discussions from selected household where dawadawa is processed.

Using oral discussions, the respondents (processors) provide information on reasons for the various stages and importance of the cake and dawadawa. Purposive sampling technique was used to identify tree stands that have the required stage of development in locust bean from flower to matured and dry fruits. The geometrics of the tree stands were identified using GPS. The sets of data generated from the field and respondents were presented using simple descriptive and pictorial techniques.

Results and Discussions

Parkia biglobosa is an indigenous tree species whose pulp and seeds extracted from fruit are used as ingredients for production of cake and dawadawa. The development of the fruit from flower to maturity is in stages. The fruit is harvested when matured and dried for extraction of pulp and seeds. The seed is raw material for production of dawadawa while the pulp is used for cake making. The cotyledon is removed from the testa by boiling, pounding and washing with water. The soft and moist cotyledon is boiled again and kept in a well-covered container for fermentation, after which it is compacted into round shape and sold out as dawadawa.

Stages of Development of Locust Bean Fruits

Plate I shows the stages of development in locust bean from flower to matured fruits.




Plate I: Stages of Development in *Parkia biglobosa* Fruit

The first stage is flowering as shown on Plate I (a). The flowers appear as clusters of circular bright red and brown colour hanging on long stalks. The brown colour flowers indicate the initial stage of flowering that gradually develops into a bright red colour which is the stage of fertilization as shown on Plate I (a). After fertilization, the red colour shed off and very young tender fruits appear in bunch and eventually develop into immature fruits as shown on Plate I (b). The immature fruits that is usually green or yellow matures by changing colour to brown and dry up as shown on Plate I(c). The fully matured and dry fruit containing seeds and pulp as shown on Plate I (d) is harvested, peeled and used for production of cake or dawadawa. However, the time taken for the changes in stages of development from flower to maturity of fruits is not assessed neither the factors responsible for the changes nor agents of pollination.

Procedure for Removing Pulp and Seeds from Matured Pod

The pulp is removed from the matured and dry pod by hand peeling. This practice is slow, laborious and suitable only for small quantity of pods. The pulp is disunited from the seeds by threshing using mortar and pestle or flail. Simultaneously, the powdery yellow pulp is separated from the seeds by winnowing. This technique is adopted for separation of large quantity of seeds from pulp for dawadawa production. However, where water is available, the pulp is washed out from the seeds and sprayed to be dried by solar energy.

Procedures for Production of Locust Bean Cake

Plate II shows stages involved in the production of locust bean cake




Plate II: Stages of Production of Locust Bean Cake

The dry pulp is removed or peeled from the pod or fruit using handas shown on Plate II (a). The adoption of hand to peel the pod prevents adulteration of the pulp with fruit cuticle (cover) which is irritating. The pulp containing seeds as shown on Plate I (a) is powdered

using mortar and pestle to ensure sanitary pounding, proper crushing and to avoid wastage of the pulp. For cake production, it is only the clean powdery pulp that is required. Hence, the seeds and other particles are sieved from the powdery pulp as shown on Plate II (b). The powdery pulp is mixed with clean water and kept in a clean container for a period of about 24 hours to solidify and ferment as shown on Plate II (c). After solidification as shown on Plate II (d) and (e), the cake is consumed as refreshing material.

Procedures for Production of Dawadawa from Locust Bean Seeds

Cotyledon is the only material required for dawadawa production. The major stages involved in dawadawa production are categorized into six. For more emphases, the categories are highlighted below.

Stage 1: The locust bean seeds (removed from the pulp) as shown on Plate III (a) are thoroughly washed to remove particles of the pulp. This is to avoid sticking and slippery of the boiled seeds.

Plate III shows stages of cotyledon processing for dawadawa production




Plate III: Stages of Dawadawa Production

Stage 2: The seeds are boiled for a period of about 5 to 7 hours as shown on Plate III (b). The boiling softens the hard testa for ease separation from the cotyledon. After boiling, the seeds are allowed to cool down.

Stage 3: The boiled seeds are pounded using mortar and pestle to enable squeezing out of the cotyledon from testa as shown on Plate III (c).

Stage 4: The pounded seeds are thoroughly washed to remove the testa (waste product) from the cotyledon using sieve and water as shown on Plate III (d). The washed cotyledon is boiled for a period of about ten (10) minutes to neutralize and clean out the foul odour, and to properly soften the cotyledon.

Stage 5: The boiled cotyledon is hermetically sealed for two days to ferment as shown on Plate III (f). The fermentation prevents dawadawa from further decay, softens the cotyledon for ease of compaction and improves flavor.

Stage 6: The fermented cotyledon (dawadawa) is compacted or molded using hands as shown on Plate III (g) and (h) that is dried using solar energy.

Environmental Issues Associated with Dawadawa Production

The production of dawadawa requires clean water to wash the pulp from the seeds, and to wash the testa from the cotyledon. More importantly, it requires significant matured stems of fuelwood that have higher carbon content to generate significant energy to boil the seeds. The demand for fuelwood could cause deforestation while the requirement of water for washing the pulp from seeds, and washing the cotyledon from testa could cause scarcity and pollution of water. More importantly, the testa (waste product) and waste water are discarded into accessible open space which cause foul odour and contamination of water and land at a local level. Apart from the environmental issues, lack of adequate sunshine during drying of the compacted cotyledon could lead to coloration (blackish) of the dawadawa.

Conclusion

The raw material required for dawadawa production is the cotyledons that are extracted from the fruits and seeds through various processes while the pulp is for cake production. Likewise, dawadawa production is laborious, time consuming; and generates waste water and pulp that are discarded into the environment.

The cake and dawadawa making is significant by producing cake and soup ingredients that are produced using local technology and materials obtained from *Parkia biglobosa*. The food materials and income generated improves quality of life of the inhabitants.

Recommendations

The indigenous tree species like locust beans that is useful to man and adapted to the environment should be brought to cultivation especially on farmlands that are abandoned due to exhaustion of soil fertility. This will help in vegetation conservation, protect the surface from erosion and increase species diversity and distribution of trees.

Policy makers based on research findings should embark on enlightenment campaigns to the dawadawa producers on the adoption of environmentally friendly methods of

discarding the waste water and testa that arise from the production. Likewise, policy makers should localize the dawadawa industry so as to provide sources of energy like electricity to safeguard trees species that are harvested for fuelwood.

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RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND COMMUNITY VIGILANTE: A STUDY OF FULANI HERDSMEN INCURSIONS IN BENUE STATE, NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The current security challenges in Nigeria in which lives and properties worth billions of naira were destroyed were believed to be instigated by Islamic fundamentalists. One of the state that was most hit was Benue State which security situation equally degenerated to suicide bombings, terrorism, kidnappings for ransom and several attempts to Fulanize or Islamize the state. Despite the fact that government had invested resources and efforts to stop this offensive nothing seems to have a head way. This paper utilizes the qualitative method, depending on published data only. The literatures reviewed were in line with the direction of the study. This paper therefore concludes that community vigilante system is a potent security strategy that can effectively wade off external aggressions like that of Islamic fundamentalists, if institutionalized and given legal backing. This paper recommends that community vigilantes should be given legal backing to operate and should be institutionalized and established in every community in the state. The police force should be decentralized so that each state government will own and control its force, as this will give impetus for community vigilante to operate effectively. More so, the vigilantes should be properly empowered, equipped with fighting equipments and security infrastructures. **Word count:** 200

Key words: Banditry, Christianity, Community vigilante, Fulani herdsmen, Religious crisis, Islamic fundamentalist, Muslims. Religious fundamentalism

INTRODUCTION

In spite of the fact that the Nigerian constitution declared the country a secular state, some Islamic fundamentalists continue to abuse the right and freedom of worshippers of other

religion. Thus, we continue to experience religious violence, religious intolerance, religious fanaticism and terrorism with all its counter-productive consequences in the country. This scenario no doubt affects the human psyche as well as the physical, social and cultural relationships among the citizenry, tribes and religious sects in Nigeria. This also affect the way government is run, including political and economic decisions, appointments, revenue sharing formula and politics among others. It is apparent that the federal government had done enough in equipping the police and military with modern sophisticated weapons, training and retraining of security officials and the use of foreign security experts to abate Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria. Despite all these, religious crises continued unabated, becoming complicated with new perspectives. Most worrisome is the fact that government actions and inactions have generated negative controversies, protests and reactions from different quarters.

Currently, an Islamic fundamentalist movement known as Boko Haram is wrecking havoc in the North East and North Central part of Nigeria. On its heels are Fulani herdsmen, bandits and unknown gun men causing insecurity on these parts of the country. According to Obilor (2020) Boko Haram had displaced more than 3000 persons from their homes, 2500 lost their lives and property worth billions of naira destroyed. Communities were ransacked, farmlands destroyed, and many persons were kidnapped for ransom. Properties destroyed included churches, mosques, police stations, school buildings, public institutions and private homes. For example, in April, 2014, the Boko Haram sect invaded the Federal Girls School, Chibok, and kidnapped 276 female students (Obilor, 2020). In Benue State, Islamic fundamentalists and their herdsmen invaded and attacked Katsina Ala, Gwer west, Shikaa, Mbagena and Kpav, killing and maiming innocent people. The same thing occurred in Jos, Plateau State, where some Islamic fundamentalist under the guise of bandits and herdsmen attacked and killed farmers, kidnapped and displaced many from their homes.

The activities of these Islamic fundamentalist tend to have reverberating consequences on the nation at large. In other words, Islamic fundamentalists' activities had some spillover effect on other parts of the country. Example, the formation of Freedom fighters led by Sunday Igboho was to curtail the incursion of Fulani herdsmen and their cattle grazing activities in Yoruba land. Also, due to the constant security threats and fear of a jihad that may be staged to Islamize the country had prompted State Governors to outlaw open grazing in their states. Open grazing was seen as avenue through which Islamic fundamentalists can have easy access and commit shenanigans in these states.

In spite of government efforts to curtail Islamic fundamentalism, the problem persist with increasing vigor and the federal government had indeed failed to find solution to the impending

conflict. Gabriel (2018) let loose his anger when he accused the security agencies in Nigeria such as the military and the police government to be culprits to the crisis, claiming that they have compromised to Islamize the country. The failure of government to act decisively and fight these Islamic terrorists like the Boko Haram, bandits and Fulani herdsmen had attracted the condemnation of many scholars. Azele & Hardy (2012) accused the government of masterminding, instigating, mobilizing, and sponsoring the Boko Haram insurgencies. They also accused some politicians, elites, and technocrats as culpable in the crime. According to Azele & Hardy (2012) sponsors of Boko Haram insurgency are in government and they are never apprehended. In a country where the government cannot be trusted and hold into confidence by the ordinary citizen, it will be apt and justifiable to consider an alternative measure that can protect the citizens from the violent activities of religious extremists and fundamentalists.

It is in this regard that the community vigilante is proposed as the best option in the present circumstance the country finds itself. Community vigilante is an aged long security control measure practiced in many African communities. For some times, the media was awash with opinions that the police force should be decentralized to allow each state of the federation to own and control its police force. Consequent upon this, many state governors started forming vigilante groups in their respective states. In South Western States of Nigeria, states' governors instituted a vigilante group known as "Amotekun". In South East of Nigeria, the "Forest guards" or "EbubeAgu" was also instituted.

Moreover, with the security threats from these Islamic fundamentalists, various communities set up vigilante groups comprising volunteer members and hunters to watch over and protect their communities. Examples abound in the Eastern States of Ebonyi and Abia where Fulani herdsmen and bandits were intercepted with arms and ammunitions in their attempt to invade some communities. Another case was the interventions of community vigilante in Katsina-ala Local Government Area of Benue State who succeeded to stop the killing of Christians in the area. Now, every community in Jos and Benue States has community vigilantes, sponsored by the state government to resist incursions of Islamic terrorist groups. It is against this background that this paper is articulated to investigate Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies and the impact of community vigilante in resolving the conflicts in Benue State, Nigeria.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Religious Fundamentalism in Nigeria

The religiously instigated fundamentalisms in Nigeria have degenerated to suicide bombings, terrorism, kidnappings for ransom and several attempts to Islamize the entire country.

robbery, drug trafficking, rapes among others. Adamolekun (2012) asserts that religious fundamentalism in Nigeria have been endemic since the 1970s, and were perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists. According to him, the first inter religious conflict between Christians and Muslims started in 1979 during the National Constituent Assemble, when the issue of Sharia was debated whether it should be enshrined in the Nigeria constitution or not. Whereas the Muslims wanted it in the constitution, the Christians opposed it, which thus generated acrimony between the two religious groups. The registration of Nigeria as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986, by the Babangida regime, was another episode that almost fuelled religious crises, but was effectively contained. This is in spite of the fact that Christians from far wide, condemned the move on grounds that Nigeria as a secular state shouldn't be a member of OIC, the government still went ahead with the registration.

However, the first Islamic fundamentalist group that set the pace for religious violence was Maitatsine. The Maitatsine uprising which started in Kano in 1980, was between the Maitatsine and Orthodox Muslims. According to Uka, (2012) the Maitatsine sect were migrants from North Africa, Cameroon or Chad Republic, who on arrival started teaching strange doctrines which within a short period polarized the Islamic religion and also replicated in other northern states, such as Bulunkutu, Jimeta, Yola, Gombe and Funtua. The crisis eventually culminated into the "Maitatsine riot" which occurred between 18-29 December, 1980, and led to the death of more than 500 persons and property worth several millions of naira were destroyed (Uka, 2012).

Another Islamic fundamentalist group that instigated religious crisis in Kano was the Shiite (Balogun, 2018). The Shiite group was based in Zaria but have adherents in all the northern part of Nigeria. Like the Maitatsine, they felt Islam had been adulterated and therefore wanted it purified according to strict Islamic laws. The Shiite riot which occurred in 1996 and 1997 in Kano led to the killing of not only non-Shiite adherents but also Christians in their number (Balogun, 2018).

The religious crisis that is most volatile and widespread in all parts of northern Nigeria was the "Fagge" crises in 1982, masterminded by Islamic fundamentalists. It started when a Christian church was built close to a Mosque in the city of Kano. Adamolekun (2012) reported that over 3000 Christians lost their lives and properties worth millions of naira were destroyed, while many Christians relocated to the south.

The next religious crisis that took place in 1991 was provoked by Islamic fundamentalists who planned to stop a crusade organized by the Charismatic Movement in Kano. The crusade was to be addressed by a German Preacher and Evangelist, Reinhard Bonke, and was

therefore followed with intensive publicity. This generated the anger of the Muslim faithful who felt the crusade must not hold in Kano, being an Islamic state. The attack from the Islamic fundamentalists triggered a counter-attack from the Christian faithful and the casualties from both sides were monumental. Ademolekun (2012) reported that modern fire arms were used in the attacks with over 650 people recorded dead and properties worth billions of naira destroyed. The imbroglio which lasted for three weeks was attended by killings and bloodshed (Ademolekun, 2012).

Currently, activities of Islamic fundamentalist had made the security situation in northern parts of the country become tense. In the North East of Nigeria, the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa had over the years been experiencing security challenges. Omonia (2021) reported that the Boko Haram terrorists have killed more than 10,000 helpless persons, and rendered more than 3000 persons homeless. In April, 2014, the Boko Haram terrorists invaded the Federal Girls School, Chibok and kidnapped 276 female students (Omonia, 2021; Gwamna, (2011)). Benue and Plateau States were not spared by Fulani herdsmen and bandits who killed 42 persons in Katsina Ala and Gwer west local Government Areas of Benue State and 102 persons in Jos, Capital of Plateau State. Shikaan, Mbagena and Kpav communities were invaded by bandits and killed more than 1000 lives (Punch Newspaper, April 14).

The Ahmadu Bello University elections of June, 1988 witnessed yet another religious fundamentalism in Nigeria. Ajero (2011) reported that riots erupted in the university and on the streets of Zaria when a Christian won election as President of the Student Union Government for the first time, since the institution was established. Both Christians and Muslims went out of control and began fighting each other, leading to the death of students from either side of the religious flank. In the year 2000, the executive governor of Zamfara State, Ahmed Yerima, introduced the Sharia legal system as instrument of governance in the state. The attendant consequences were riots, bloodshed, loss of lives and properties which spilled over to other states in the north.

Also, the cartoon with the image of Prophet Mohammed made by a Danish cartoonist raised uproar in Islamic world, culminating in a religious fundamentalism with more than 100 persons, believed to be non-Muslims living in northern states of the country losing their lives.

Benue State Killings

Benue state is described as the “Food basket of the nation” because of her fertile soil, abundant food production and is blessed with rich mineral resources. The state has three main ethnic/languages, namely: Tiv, Idoma and Igede. The land is generally fertile for

agricultural activities and is also rich in aquatic resources. The state is also rich with biodiversities. The mineral resources found in the state include clay; salt; limestone; kaolin; barite; and quartzes. The state is also blessed with tourism potentials such as the statute of the legendary Ogbiloko; Historic open fire furnace; the sacred Utyo; Sacred Ipinu-Igede, a forest believed to be the dwelling place of ancestors, waterfalls of Andibilla, Uchenyim, Ohuma hills, the seven tributaries of Oyongo river and the Ilene lake. The state harbors both urban and rural centers with 75 per cent of the people living in rural areas.

Basically for her rich potentials, people from other tribes, including Hausas and Fulani reside in the state, doing one business or the other. Of recent, the state began to experience incessant invasions and attacks by some Fulani herdsmen, bandits, local militias and cattle rustlers. () believed that these invaders are offshoot of Bokoharam insurgency in the north eastern part of the country. The purpose of these invasions is not only to gain control of the communal lands for open grazing of their cattle, but also to ensure proper Islamization of the state. () lent support to this view when he said that the invasion of Benue state is nothing short of “Jihad attempts”. This was further supported by () when he claimed that most of the invaders were nomads from the north and West African countries of Guinea, Niger, Cameroun and Chad. However, () assert that open cattle grazing has been the bone of contention, mainly due to the banning of open cattle grazing by the state government. For the past six months, there was insecurity in the state, occasioned by incessant attacks, destruction of crops, slaughtering, kidnappings, raping and all forms of atrocities.

The official government report stated that over one million internally displaced persons were in IDP camps in Abagana and Makurdi (). In one of such invasions, seven (7) IDPs were slaughtered in Abagana camp. In February 2016, herdsmen brutally massacred 500 persons in the state, which prompted the state government to enact a law banning open cattle grazing. The massacre and killings were overwhelming. Example of such murderous cases in the year 2020 include: over 100 hundred people were killed in Katsina-Ala Local Government Area; Over 150 people killed in Shikaan, Shitile, Mbagena and Kpav communities; 23 were killed in Ado Local Government Area; 70 persons were murdered in cold blood in Logo Local Government Area. () estimated the total number of persons that lost their lives in the state from 2016 to 2021 to be over 1.3 million and properties destroyed to be worth 50 million naira.

Community Vigilante in Developed Countries

In the United States of America, community vigilante is an aspect of community policing described as: “Community watch” or “Homeland security”. Bohn & Haley (2012) affirmed that Homeland security in the United States carry out functions such as intelligence gathering, mapping and analysis, information sharing, security assessments and surveillance and feed the police with information to act upon. They also involve in territorial reinforcement and encourage informal control of the community. The Homeland security was set up to mobilize human and material resources that would assist the police in carrying out its assign duties. The members are usually trained and empowered by the police to deal with security challenges and disaster cases (Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, 2014). The primary responsibility is to help local communities know how to respond to disasters or emergency cases anytime they occur (Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014). Craig (2017) opined that in European countries such as Belgium, Mexico, France and Japan, community vigilante is sometimes referred to as: “Community watch” “Neighborhood watch” or “Home watch”. It is effectively functional and consists of trained volunteers who are mobilized to manage disasters and security challenges. In some of these countries like Japan, community policing is managed and funded by the residents in each neighborhood. Craig also stated that the neighborhood watch provide support services to disaster victims and organize neighborhood awareness programs for neighborhoods on how to respond to emergency or disaster cases. In France and Belgium, the homeland security deals with emergency and non-emergency cases as far as they help to guarantee the safety of citizens (Scheider, Chapman & Seelman, 2013; Patterson, 2017).

Generally, in all Arab countries, community vigilante watch over the community and serve as spies to security agencies like the police. It feed police with information about criminal activities in the neighborhood. Members of community policing are trained to complement the police in fighting crimes (Frank & Straub, 2020).

Carrol-Buracker & Associates (2017) reported that in the autonomous communities of Murcia, Spain, the insecurity that bedeviled communities in the countryside were reduced to manageable level as a result of the commitment of home security guards. The capacity of the home security guards to manage emergency cases of insecurity was attributed to the spying strategy used to pass information to the police to act on. In countries such as India, China and Yugoslavia, the vigilantes are trained in the use of fire arms and for combat readiness.

Community Vigilante in African Countries

Charrier, Shlomi & Mike (2018) reported in their study that vigilante groups in all the communities in Ghana were registered with the municipal councils and are tasked to respond to terrorist attacks. They are prepared to provide security information to the police and initiate strategies that would protect community members from insecurity and also assist the police in implementing necessary actions in any security threat. Macdonald (2013) reported that vigilante groups and the police in Kenya communities usually enter into joint security operations to fight insecurities. It also reported that the vigilante groups pursue similar goals with that of the police.

The community vigilantes in Ethiopia were able to bring down crime rate in communities known to have high rate of crimes to 12 per cent (Musa, Umar, Girei & Mohammed, 2016). Both the police and vigilante groups carried out joint operations to restore normalcy in the regions. In Johannesburg South Africa, Jose (2015) reported that the mining communities came up with the idea of establishing community vigilante to forestall crime rate in the area, but the outcome was disappointing and hazardous. Many of the volunteers met their deaths and some sustained injuries during a fight with a gang of criminals. Palmiotto (2010) conducted a study to assess the effectiveness of vigilante groups towards resolving internal security challenges in Nairobi, Kenya and it was reported that 58 per cent of the participants had skill deficiencies which render them incapable of resolving the Pretoria of security challenges in the rural communities. Adler, Gerharo & Williams (2018) stated that each community in Central African Republic of Congo has a cultural group of hunters who assigned the responsibility to protect and secure the community from external aggressors. Only trusted and brave members of the community are initiated in the group. Sometimes, members are made to take sacred oaths and other ritualistic obligations to qualify to be a member.

Community Vigilante in Nigeria

In the rural communities of Nigeria, community vigilante use both micro and macro level strategies to fight crime and manage security challenges. Its primary role is to protect or secure the lives and property of community members. According to Dambazau (2017) community vigilante consist of volunteers mobilized to provide optimal security measures that will safeguard lives and properties in the communities. Generally, community vigilante report suspicious activities to the police, strengthened and secure communities from external aggressions as well as organize training programs for members. In a study to assess the role of vigilante in community policing in Nigeria, Nye (2018) reported that the community vigilante

is an integral part of community policing that strategically fight insecurity and terrorists' activities at the community levels. The vigilante groups serve to activate police's efforts towards fighting crime and insecurity.

Different communities adopt different or divergent strategies to manage insecurities. Some of the alternative ways include: use of force, reprisals, violence, arrests, litigations, and killings, retreat, accepting defeat or surrender, compromise, peaceful settlement, etcetera. Trender & Shuwa (2012) assert that community vigilante had been used in Yoruba land to reduce the crime rates in the various communities. Example, the incursion of fundamentalist groups into the forests and parts of Yoruba land in South West of Nigeria led to the formation of a vigilante outfit, called "Amotekun". Reiner (2012) also noted that with the Boko Haram insurgencies, banditry, kidnappings, and herdsman clashes, every community in Yoruba land maintain community vigilante. It is the same case in South-South Nigeria where community vigilantes are formed in all the communities. Similarly, criminal activities and insecurities have been curtailed by community vigilantes in many rural communities.

In Nigeria, community vigilantes operate as informal groups with no legal backing and are not registered by government. They exist and operate as cultural groups or associations, e.g., "Association of hunters". Some are backed by customary laws and usages while in some communities, they are backed by ground rules, which in most cases are on ad-hoc basis.

In the rural communities of Yakurr, members of vigilantes are drawn from age grades, in which case, members of a particular age grade carry out vigilante task for a set period of time. At the end of that period, the next age grade takes over the assignment. Indeed, community watch is rotational among age grades. Most of the vigilantes are untrained and they work with spears, charms, machetes, amulets, and local guns.

An advantage with community vigilante is that it has vast knowledge of the environment it operates in, such that they could easily spot out crime zones within the community. Harrison (2013) argued that vigilante groups alone cannot quell religious crises since they use crude and local weapons compared to Islamic fundamentalists who have been seen with modern weapons. According to him, the use of vigilante groups against Islamic terrorists would bring about more casualties on the side of the communities. Rahim (2012) argued that community vigilantes can only fight insurgencies if they are well trained and equipped with modern arms.

A study was conducted in Akure, Nigeria by Abiodun & Akwa (2016) reported that the police depend mostly on feedback or information from vigilantes to discharge their duties. The information enables appropriate preparedness and planned strategy to build the needed competency required of a police force. In another study carried out by Cordner (2019) to assess the impact of vigilante groups on community policing, it was found that the vigilante groups had helped the police and other security apparatus with information that guided the decision making processes as well as meeting the security needs of the communities.

The Challenges of Community Vigilantes in Nigeria

The major challenge facing community vigilante and which had rendered them ineffective has been the lack of attention given to it by the government. In most cases, government had opposed their operations and even banned some from operating. A case in point is when the government of President Buhari refused to recognize the Amotekun as a vigilante community policing among the South Western States (Abdullahi & Odundo, 2019).

Another challenge had been the use of volunteer community members who are not skilled in the art of counter terrorist operations. According to Abdullahi & Odundo (2019) members of vigilante groups in Nigerian communities are not trained on modern warfare, compared to Islamic fundamentalist like Boko Haram fighters, instead, we find uneducated and ill equipped persons who rely on traditional weapons and local guns to cope with the complex and complicated security challenges they encountered.

Community vigilante in most communities is non-functional due to poor or absence of security infrastructures. Usually, vigilante groups should have enough fighting equipments to be able to wade off aggressions whenever they occur. Community vigilante had also suffered neglect due to the continuous centralization of the police force. In some communities, we find the police being antagonistic to the vigilante groups such that members became less inclined to cooperate with the police, resulting to clashes between the two groups (Abdullahi & Odundo, 2019).

Gaines & Cordner (2019) stated that although community vigilante is value-laden, sometimes some members are accused of committing crimes. The complaints about community vigilante are conundrum in nature, and not able to address the root issues of crimes in the community.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the analysis of this paper, the Participatory Rural Appraisal model by Robert Chamber (1992) is adopted as its background. The participatory rural appraisal model was formulated by Chamber (1992). The model assumed that the knowledge and opinions of rural people

should be considered when planning and managing any developmental projects and programs that concern them. It is believed that the input of the people is necessary for the successful accomplishment of community development projects. According to Luigi (nd) the model aimed at strengthening the capacity of community members to plan, make decisions and to take action towards improving their own conditions. The model emphasizes a bottom-up approach instead of a top-down approach in the process of planning and execution of community projects.

The model also assumed that the experiences of rural members are fundamental to managing a community project or resources. It further assumed that local people are creative and have the capability to analyze, plan and implement their projects. In essence, the local people should not be excluded from participating in a community project. The key thrusts of this model are decentralization and empowerment. Luigi (nd) explain decentralization to mean the devolution of resources and discretions in such a way that powers are shared to reach the rural people while empowerment implies that the local people are made and provided with the resources that would enable them take more control of their lives. The five key principles guiding the participatory appraisal model include: participation, flexibility, team work, information gathering and systematic analysis.

The Participatory Appraisal method is relevant to this paper. For effective resolution of religious fundamentalism, particularly the havoc currently wrecked in Benue State by the Islamic fundamentalists such as Fulani herdsmen, religious bandits, Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in other parts of Nigeria, a high level of citizen participation must be present. It means that the knowledge and skill of community members through community vigilantes must be incorporated in the fight against these Islamic fundamentalists and terrorists. Decentralization as a key component of the Participatory Rural Appraisal model, implies that the Nigeria police force should be decentralized, and community policing given proper recognition in resolving security challenges in the country. More so, community vigilantes should be sufficiently empowered with modern security infrastructures and resources to cope and withstand all forms of religious fundamentalism in Benue State.

With the decentralization of the Nigeria police force, the allegations leveled against the federal government and security agencies such as the military and police, by Governor Orthom of Benue State and other critics that they have compromised and are supporting or secretly funding Islamic fundamentalism would cease. It would then give the ordinary persons the opportunity to come together to proffer solution to their problems instead of depending on the government alone.

This model also highlights the need for collaborative and consultative approach between the authority and the local people in resolving religious crisis in the communities. Thus, all the stakeholders particularly the police and community members had to be consulted in the fight against religious fundamentalism. For instance, the police and vigilante members should learn to work together and always dialogue, consult and share ideas to bring about constructive strategy on how to confront religious fundamentalism.

Method

The qualitative method which depended on published data was adopted. In other words, literatures were thoroughly reviewed, using PubMed and bibliographic databases. The review covered various studies, articles and reports with focus on religious fundamentalism, religious extremism, religious fanaticism, as well as community policing and community vigilantes. The reviewed literatures also used inclusion criteria to draw 21 peer-reviewed articles drawn online and 10 reports from published and unpublished materials.

Discussion

The incursions of Islamic fundamentalists under the guise of Fulani herdsmen, banditry and local militia into communities in Benue State had degenerated to destruction of lives and properties. The local governments worst hit by these invasions were Gwer west, Guma, Logo, Ushongo, Olu and Katsina-ala. Due to the current regressive security system in the state, many people felt the federal government is a complicit to what is happening, especially that the Buhari government had failed to act decisively on the matter, especially that it did not even arrest or prosecute any Fulani herdsman, militia or bandit since the imbroglio started.

From the security breaches confronting the people of Benue State, it then dawn on the state government and the people to protect themselves from the Fulani herdsmen and banditry insurgencies. Consequently, through the support of the state government, the different communities started to mobilize volunteers for a local vigilante system.

The system is such that each of the autonomous community has a vigilante group but they work collaboratively with other communities whenever there is an attack. For example, some of these attacks usually occur suddenly and take community members by surprise, and when it does occur, farming and economic activities come to a standstill, but from the period the vigilante system was reinforced in each community, they succeeded to repel 13 groups of bandits and herdsmen invasions through the combined efforts of vigilantes from adjoining communities.

There is no gainsaying that the state government had invested sufficient resources and efforts to encourage the community vigilante system. Thus, community vigilante in each hamlet, village or community be it in the city or urban became strategically positioned to wade of these invaders. The inter-collaborative efforts of the vigilante groups from adjoining communities also complemented the state police command by feeding it with information that assist in the fight.

The advantage of the community vigilante is that every community knows her own people (indigenes) and can easily identify stranger elements, and is able to identify crime zones and where they may be coming from better than the police. It was therefore easy for vigilantes to gather such information and give them to the police to act upon. With the current centralized status of the police, it is difficult for police officers who are not from a particular geographical area or community to identify and apprehend any criminal without the active involvement of a community member (s). Indeed, the relative peace the Benue people are enjoying now is attributed to the reinforcement of the community vigilantes.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The incessant invasions and attacks of communities in Benue State were perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists under the guise of Fulani herdsmen, religious bandits, cattle rustlers and local militias fighting for communal control and fulanization of these communities. Each time there is attack or invasion by these Islamic extremists, lives and property worth billions of naira would be lost. The atmosphere would be laden with insecurity occasioned by hostility, kidnappings, acrimony and destruction of lives and property. Moreover, socio-economic activities including farming, trading and other businesses usually come to a standstill.

However, with the formation and reinforcement of the vigilante system in every community in Benue State, there has been relative peace in the state. The state government ensured that all the communities in the state were reinforced with community vigilantes. Not only were they equipped with modern fighting arms but were also trained on their use. However, this paper recommends that community vigilantes should be given legal backing to operate and should be institutionalized and established in communities that does not have and by extension in all communities in the country. The police force should be decentralized so that each state government will own and control its force. This development would give impetus for community vigilante to operate effectively.

In a system where many people have the notion that it is the responsibility of the government via the military and the police to provide security for the citizenry, makes many of them to

relax and do nothing to help themselves. But with the formation of community vigilante, with adequate orientation, sensitization, awareness creation, advocacy campaigns and enlightenment programs, the people would be able to do the needful when the need for them to protect themselves arises. It is also recommended that the vigilantes should be properly empowered, equipped with fighting equipments and security infrastructures. Both the state and local governments in collaboration with the various communities should interface to fund community vigilantes. The training and retraining of community vigilantes in the use of modern security equipments should equally be given top priority. Besides, the Federal Government should without delay come up with a legislature that will ban open cattle grazing, which Fulani herdsmen and bandits use as excuse to invade the people of Benue people.

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COMMUNITY POLICING AS AN OPTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

National development is a function of critical infrastructure provision and security management. In recent times Nigeria is experiencing eminent security challenges and hardly a day that passes without scores of people being killed and properties destroyed across the country. These escalating tensions has promoted fear and decline in investment atmosphere as many people, companies and corporations are unwilling to stake their resources in an unstable and unsecured atmosphere thus widening inflationary margins and unsustainable development. Nigeria was once ranked as the world poverty capital and currently as the third most deadly country in the world to live or do business after Afghanistan and Iraq. These ranking is likely a drawback to national cohesion and development and puts Nigeria In perilous state. Community policing as an option for national security and development requires a consideration of many factors such as poor community policing mechanism, lack of government commitment, corruption, unchecked infiltration of immigrants from neighbouring states, proliferation of small arms and ethnic chauvinism. The current security challenges and corruption are militating against national cohesion and development, and weakens the security architecture of the nation. This paper is a descriptive study that discusses the issues of insecurity, community policing as an option for national security development and recommend a collaborating partnership as well as strategies and tactics for achieving sustainable national development in Nigeria.

Key words: Insecurity, Community Policing, sustainable and national development

Words: 176

Introduction

In recent times, Nigeria is bedeviled by accelerating insecurity, terrorism, regional agitation for cessation, ethnic and minority rights struggles, banditry, kidnapping, cybercrimes, human trafficking, advance fee fraud and a host of other social vices and challenges. These

challenges are partly derived from a general discontent with the leadership and such magnitude of mistrust in the affairs of the nation. Corruption and unbalanced distribution of resources are socioeconomic risks that plague the process of development of Nigeria. These insecurity challenges have a bandwagon and multiplier effect on the growth and development of the nation. The situation has affected food security and sufficiency which are the main stay and driving wheels of the economy, considering the population spread of Nigeria where about 70% are living below poverty line and in rural communities. Nigeria has suffered from series and alarming rates of insecurity and general system failure in addressing these grievous and escalating security challenges, inadvertently compounding the issues. Regional agitations and ethnic sentiments and religious intolerance further aggravate the already existing tensions. The exceeding failure and the lopsided handling of the security challenges and the orgy of killings by bandits, terrorists groups, herdsmen, definitely challenges the function of the police and other security agencies, as well as the sovereignty of the nation, (The Guardian, July 12th 2018). The continuous ethnic agitations from the Yorubas', the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP), the Niger Delta Avengers, Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Boko Haram and other militant groups dread much fear on the citizenry and investment climate thus affecting national security and development. For any meaningful development to take place and be sustained, the investment climate and human cognate resources must be scaled in a free and enabling environment. Where there is security challenges, there are bound to be increasing loss of investments and opportunities, mistrust and general systems failure and collapse. The pervasive and continued insecurity have indeed resulted to high and increase in budgetary allocation and resources to expand the national security architecture in Nigeria thus causing government to neglect other sustaining sectors. These vault of allocations would have been channeled to agriculture, social and economic infrastructural development. Nigeria according to a number of media commentaries is diving demographically to anarchy and a failed state occasioned by widespread destruction of lives and properties in almost every corner of the country on daily basis. This is accentuated to by Obadiah Mailafia on the 30th of August 2021 in his discuss "*Is Nigeria a failed state?*" Nigeria was designated a failed state in a joint article in Foreign Affairs by political scientist Robert Rotberg and former Ambassador to Nigeria John Campbell in their article "*the Giants of African is Falling*" (May 31, 2021). They declare according to Obadiah that, if a state's first obligation to those it governs is to provide for their security and maintain a monopoly on the use of violence, then Nigeria has failed, even if some other aspects of the state still functions. Also Ogonnaya in Bassey (2019 ed.), noted that, in recent times there have been enormous threats to internal security in Nigeria; threats that

comes from both organized cross borders and trans-border crime and home groom criminal gangs and groups. These criminal gangs operate across the length and breadth of the country. These threats and security challenges poses a great danger and threaten human and food safety.

An over view of the phenomenon

Terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, ritual killings and herdsmen killings has thrown Nigeria as one of the most terrorized country in the world as reported by the 2018 Global index on terrorism (GIT) following Iraq, and Afghanistan. The global index on terrorism indicated that terrorism increased from 6.3 index in 2018 to 8.31 index in 2020, at an average range of 3.69%. This increase is indicative of government inability to quell the situation giving rise to poor investment climate and uncontrollable inflationary trends in the country as Naira continue to fall all-time low of ₦525 against US dollar (\$1), at parallel market,,(Punch Newspaper Headline 30th August 2021 and Economic confidential.com retrieved August 31th 2021). In the same vein the Channels television on the 15th June 2021, reported that not less than 12 persons were killed by the unknown gunmen in Plateau State and the following week about 35 were killed. These reprisal attacks and killings has continued unabated as scores are being killed daily. Also over 1,409 students were abducted and 16 killed within one year of 2020 (Akeliciousnet. Oct 4 2021). The orgy of killings and bloodshed over the past years between 2015 -2021 in Nigeria is disturbingly alarming.

Briggs (1998) noted that, the recent security challenges in the country threatens the socio economic and political equilibrium of the state. The current realities in the country has shown that government generally have deviated from the primary purpose of ensuring the security and welfare of citizens as contained in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Government of Nigeria (as amended). Security agencies like the police who are primary law enforcement agents and the gateway to internal security management and crime prevention are seriously lacking in their operations. These can be attributed to a number of factors ranging from poor welfare of staff, poor and inadequate statutory funding, poor information management, corruption and sabotage, lack of political will, poor partnership and collaboration with sister agencies, and host communities. The police is first and foremost on apparatus of the state whose duty is but not exclusively to ensure that, there exist law and order within the state.

The essence of internal security apparatus is containment of domestic threats to the security of the country. Briggs therefore defined internal security as a concept that connotes a perception of

anything or steps for curtailing any activity that disturb or threatens the socio-economic and political equilibrium of the state.

Again, the current rate of unemployment and increased insecurity are indeed time bomb that are already exploding with unpleasant circumstances across the nations as scores of people are being killed and wanton destruction of properties daily. The operational failure of security agencies to cope with these paralyzing situation reveals a country with raptured national security architecture (Bassey 2019). This inability of the government and security agencies to meet the increasing demands in security surveillance and operations has given rise to the formation of vigilante groups and regional security outfits like, the Amotekoun(South West), Easter Security Network (ESN), the South East securityEbubeAgwu).These regional security surveillance groups if not managed properly can result to ethnic Militia groups, like Ombatse, Egbesu boys, and other criminal gangs. The recent call by the Governors of Zamfara, Plateau and Benue states for self-defense in the mixt of insecurities can explode the already compromised security architecture and the proliferation of small arms in the country. The gains can be better imagined.

Bassey (2019) observed that a survey of conflicts development and manifest threats to the survival of the Nigerian state reveals a disturbing spectrum of accelerated use in the intensity or scale of violence, a demographic explosion,social fragmentation and decay, sectarian upheavals, commercialization of political practice, catastrophic balance between ethnic groups, economic and political issues and suppression and articulation of primordial class interest, (Azar and Moon 1984). As a response to these unbaiting security situation, community policing as an option has been advocated for, as a direct means to address these biting security issues. Therefore, community policing evolved almost every where as a response to the proven weakness and deficiency of traditional policing and crime management. Nigeria has witnessed unprecedented closure, folding and movement of a number multi- national companies and businesses as a result of these security challenges and investors are skeptical in investing in Nigeria for the fear of attacks and unfavorable investment conditions.

Other factors causing insecurities are foreign interference and global economic and political interest and their epicurean manipulations by foreign countries with zero emotional investment in the country. Ethnicity and religious conflicts exacerbates our differences and plants seed of disabling fissiparity that holds us back all for their conveniences. The systemic exclusion from the orbit of governance and profound alienation, loss of faith in government promises and

consistency at which government uses of violence to tamp down legitimate expression of dissent in the form of peaceful protests equally increases insecurities

Community policing as an option for national development

Nigeria faces a number of internal security threats and challenges that largely reflect and at the same time compound the crisis of development, democratization and nation building. The activities of bandits, herdsmen, criminal elements and some of these ethno-religious and ethnic groups, like Ombatse, Boko Haram, Niger Delta groups, IPOB issues etc., contributes to the heightened security challenges in Nigeria. The activities of these groups are as a result to violent extremism and generates tension and conflict among the lines of religion and ethnicity, and usually the resultant effect is poor investment and development especially as many businesses begin to fold up because of unfavourable and devastating conditions.

Community policing refers to the cooperation and interactions between the police and the community. The international criminal police organization (Interpol) view community policing (CP) as the provision of a conducive atmosphere in which the police and the law abiding citizens can work with each other to solve problems, share resources, promote inter agency collaboration, prevent crime reduce conflict, bring offenders to justice and improve the overall quality of community life, (SadiqueAbubaka in C.D. Basseyand Ogbannaya M. 2019 ed. P. 293). Resource and information sharing and management is germane to successful curtailment of insurrections.

Community policing is not new to literatures, before now the concept and practice of community policing was carried out by “informants” with hidden identity. This formed basic approach to surveillance, intelligence and information gathering and management which yielded effective and efficient positive outcome. Community Policing is a critical pathway to foster interagency collaboration and the law abiding citizens using community based approach to identity, and manage insecurity relying on external linkages with police and other security organization. Therefore it involves systematic approach to coordinating policing activities within the communities to enhance even development and growth of the economy. Community policing is anchored on three primary drives: (I) geographic information system, (ii) problem solving information system and (iii) external information system. These three drivers are essential to security management because they are information based drivers that provide enabling parameters for crime prevention, prosecution and management relying on the information from the community people, neighborhood and building on the nexus of information and communication technology (ICTs). One key characteristic of community policing is that, it make use of informal

and formal security actors, villages, community and religious leaders, customary and native authorities, ritual groups, martial arts groups as security providers because they are closer or groups and root actors who understands the communities, peculiarities, and can identify criminal elements amongst them, thus strengthening security network operations.

The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 Constituting (as amended), specifically states that, the security and welfare of the people shall be primary purpose of government. This implies that the Nigerian government has the constitutional responsibility of providing a secured and safe environment for lives and property and the conduct of business and economic activities. This forms the bone of national discuss considering the negative impact of aggravating escalating security challenges to the socio-economic growth and development of the nation. Over time, this statutory responsibility of government have been negated as there are increasing number of violent extremism and attacks, killing, kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, ritual killing, and destruction of life and properties and a host of other social vices and criminality across the country.

Ikuleyiyi in Bassey (2019 ed. P.883), noted that no part of the country is spared from insecurity. For instance Boko Haram, cattle rustling, kidnapping and mass abduction of school children are predominant in the Northern Nigeria; while the South hold sway to baby factories syndrome, trafficking in persons, pipe line vandalism, crude oil theft, ritual killings and civil unrest. The south also houses the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), the Bakassi freedom fighters (BFF), Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) etc. The West is bedeviled with advanced fee fraud (419), and cyber criminality, politically motivated assassinations, ritual killings, internet fraud among others. The activities of Boko Haram ,the killer herdsmen and kidnapers in the North (Borno, Zamfara, Yobe, Bauchi, Kaduna, Benue, Plateau, Niger States); in the South East, (Enugu, Imo, Abia, Anambra, and South South(AkwaIbom, Edo, Cross River, Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa states) are infested den for rituals, kidnapping, banditry activities, in fact no part of the country is spared. Thus the uncontrollable activities of these gangs are what make it ever more imperative for community policing as a veritable option to national security management, more so a complementary approached to assist the over stretched security agencies.

Philosophy of Community Policing

Crime according to sociologists is a function and a creation of the society. This assertion sees the society as being responsible for promoting criminality overtly or covertly because of its failure to maintain homoethesis and equilibrium in resource distribution and management. The

underlining philosophy for community policing is to maintain a balance in society; a balance that promote both social cohesion and economic development by providing enabling and peaceful environment for investments and businesses to thrive. Therefore, it promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnership and problem solving techniques to practically address conditions that cause crime, social disorder and disorganization. Considering the magnitude and intensity of insecurities and criminality in Nigeria, community policing is emerging approach to contemporary security monitoring and crime prevention because of its dynamic and inelastic approach.

This systematic community partnership approach has been tested as an effective strategy in security management in Europe, North America, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa. Cox and Fitzgerald (1992) noted that, the re-emergence of community policing is the revitalization of traditional philosophical, organizational and operational approach to policing. This approach wages and relies much on the partnership and integration of surveillance and information gathering and management to promote and coordinate effective policing. The approach draws support from Gordon Alport (1997) in Giddens (2006) participating theory which gives every community member opportunity to participate in the processes and delivery of set goals. It places the security of the community on the hands of every community member and groups in the community. Thus creating a buy-in, in all decisions and processes to produce positive set goals and outcome that guarantees safety of life and property, and effective resource distribution in the society. Scholars have argued that the current security situation in Nigeria begs for attention and the only viable option to addressing it is through community policing partnership with the security agencies especially the police in identifying and proffering solutions and management of local crimes and disorders in society. The critical question then lies on the ability of the police and security agencies in managing the information without compromises and exposing the informant.

Tactics employed for community policing to enhance national security

Development generally is a product of cross and multi-faced factors and principle. Chiefly amongst them are conducive and peaceful environment and security. There are a number and various methods and factors that are employed to carry out effective community policing and engagement for optimal performance in the society. These tactics includes:

- i. Park and walk to foot patrol of all agencies and community watch dogs.

- ii. Engagement and maintenance of information and communication corridors and feedbacks mechanism in the community for traffic and tracking information.
- iii. Providing surveillance and monitoring within and around the community.
- iv. Prompt reporting of identified crimes and potential offenders.
- v. Community network neighborhood surveillance and door to door identification of residents
- vi. Maintain whistle blowing and undisclosed identity of informants and community actors.

Between 2009-2015 activities of terrorist groups and Boko Haram among others have claimed the lives of over 30,000 persons and over 1.6 million people displaced. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBC), reported that in 2019, Boko Haram, banditry and other terrorist groups have killed over 37,510 persons and about 2.4 million displaced. And between, 2019-2021 more than 1 million persons have been killed by these terrorist groups and ethnic militias, even though the number are under reported. The current position by the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), banning broadcasting houses from reporting the number of lives and properties destroyed by activities of these terrorist groups are a great danger to business climate and sustained socio economic development and a disservice to the citizenry. The United Nation (UN) in 2021 noted that, more than 3 million people are internally displaced across the country. This indices is an off-goal for development to take Place. Activities of these terrorist groups and bandits actually threatens our collective existence as a nation and on daily basis people are living the country in fear of being killed and farmlands abandoned. The public infrastructures are decaying, there is continuous migration and brain drain especially of medical personnel to other countries for greener pastures. These ugly incidences are affecting social, economic life of the people; it threatens food sufficiency and security, and equally undermines political authority, corporate existence, sovereignty and territoriality of the Nigerian State. Community policing is different from community vigilante because it involved whistleblowing and community partnership with security outfits while vigilante involved uncoordinated use of locales for crime control.

The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland Police Reform (1998) Report, noted that, the community policing do not include vigilante groups policing as often being misconstrued by the public. Most often, people confuse community policing to vigilante and police. Community policing is different from the conventional policing because it adopts strategies and approaches that differ with the vigilante. It focuses on using community people in maintenance of law and order and providing information for crime detection and management. And usually the outcome of the community security is central to its development

sustainability. Where security challenges in any country is heightened, the level of poverty, food insufficiently and related impediments, thus increasing inequitable distribution of resources, rising unemployment, criminality and fear in the investment climate. The overriding result is usually mass inflation and other social maladies, showing that development can only take place or achieved when the citizens are gainfully employed and there is food sufficiently and security as well as safe and peaceful business environment.

Insecurity and development:

Generally, the word and concept “development” may mean different things to different people. Development in economic terms mean the capacity of a national economy whose initial condition has been more or less static for a long time to generate and sustain an amount increase in its gross national income (GNI) usually at the rate of 5%-7% or more (Todaro and Smith 2009). Every Nation’s development is weighed according to the native economic index which uses the rates of growth of income perception to take into account of the ability of the nation to expand its output at a rate faster than the growth rate of its populations. Given the above, development is a function of many integrating indices and invariably affect the GDP and GDI and indirectly accruable revenue lost.

The driving force for successful and sustained development rest on ability of any society to promote inclusiveness and participation in the socio-economic life of the nation. And also participating in the investment drive by providing conducive environment and mechanism that promote growth, expansion and development; environment devoid of security challenges. The plethora of security challenges however, one looks at it, have significant effect on the development of the economy, human capital development and effective resources distribution vehicles and channels across the country. The unsurmountable nature of these problems have overarching effects to the sustainability of the socio-economic, political and environmental development of the nation. No investor wants to invest in any country that is experiencing insecurities; where lives and properties safety are not guaranteed by the government. The destruction of social and economic infrastructure and amenities heightens and contributes to the failing business climate in Nigeria. The End Special Anti-Robbery Squad (Police-EndSARS) protest of October 2020 across the country of Nigeria is a critical case in focus. In Cross River State, it was a holocaust of destruction; the Newspaper cooperation complex, the state Emergency management Agency warehouse, Psychiatry Hospital, the TINAPA Business Resort, the Internal Conference Centre, Federal Neuro psychiatric hospital, Doctor

Lawrence Memorial hospital which was a model laboratory for Covid-19 testing and infectious Diseases unit, The University of Calabar Conference Centre and hotel, the Federal Inland Revenue Service complex, West African Examination Council building, NDDC Niger Development Commission (NDDC) office, National Identity Management (*NIMC*) office complex, state Ministry of works office complex, First bank and Union banks offices along Murtala Mohammed high way, and many private shops and businesses were looted and destroyed and a number of lives lost during the protest. In AkwaIbom state United Bank for Africa (UBA), and personal effects of people were destroyed recklessly. There were extrajudicial killings in Lagos state, Kaduna, Katsina, Zamara, Rivers states etc. that later necessitated the setting of Judicial Panel of Enquiry across the country.

Community and Police partnership largely depend on the amount of trust and commitment that exist in such relationship. Trust characteristically connects various components of community partnership and problem solving and generate enduring opportunities for effective monitoring and policing activities. It is this trust and commitment that can open up and allow close relationship as well as the ability to open up effective and efficient lines in communication between the police and the community. This partnership equally drives on policing accountability and values, transparent and open operation, timely response and discharge quality.

Peterside(2014), noted that the unsurmountable nature of the internal security leads to the inevitable involvement of the military in internal security of the country. The essence of military intervention is to ensure the restoration of peace and order and to fast track business development. However this military intervention later turns to military incursion further exacerbating the problems.

Policing is not an end in itself, therefore community policing focuses on constructive engagement with the people who are the end users of the police services and renegotiate the contract between the people and the police. Thus making the community co-producers of justice and a quality policing services, (Okeshola and Mudiare 2013).

What Are The Three Core Values Of Development?

Every society is said to be developing where it primary characteristics are been changed to accommodate new patterns of growth that are not primary to them. These changes directly or indirectly affects their pre-capital, general well-being and standard of living. Development

connects a standard elevation of an entire society and social system towards a “better” or more humane life. Development is hinged on basic and fundamental core values that determine the functionality and practical guidelines for understanding the inner meaning of development. These core values are; (i) security(ii) Sustenance (iii) Self-esteem (iv) Freedom.

Security: Every individual and group want to operate in a safe environment. One cardinal focus for investors is the level of security and peace in a given society. Where security is compromised, values and norms are abused and government policies are not observed, people are not satisfied. In such circumstances there is bound to be anarchy. Investment and business opportunities are challenged as no investor want to invest in an environment polluted by insecurities.

Sustenance: refers to something that provides support or nourishment, the ability to meet basic needs and basic demands. This core value is a derivative of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, which posits that every individual have certain basic needs to meet without which life would be unbearable. Our choices and needs and ability to meet them generate a sense of worth and encourages one to do more thus increasing the development potentials.

According to Maslow, these life sustaining basic human and felt needs include, food, shelter, clothing, health, recreation, protection and security. However, protection include protection from threat, loss of life and property and insecurity. It involves maintaining a social space that promote both social and economic development. Once life and properties are not protected and enabling environment not achieved or guaranteed, then development is seen asnot taken place. In such situation, these needs are not achieved or they are absent or in short supply,it result to conditions of absolute underdevelopment and is detrimental to both social, religious political andeconomic stability.

The core values of development are integral components of Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs; physiological safety, live and belonging, esteem and self-actualization. For any meaningful development to take place it must address and fulfil these basic elements of development. Because the core values dovetail to the quality of life that is sustained and continues for both economic and social progress at the level of individual (percapita), and societiesgross domestic index growth, the realization of potentials and where the needs are not met development would not be possible and will build social apathy and

disillusionment. Therefore, expanding opportunities and reducing inequalities, unemployment constitute the necessary condition for development and maintaining security.

Self-esteem: Development have certain characteristics that guide its course. These according to Maslow's theory, represent the fourth level in of hierarchy of needs (respect, self-esteem, identity, recognition, strength and status, dignity, sense of worth). The ability to usefully apply "self" and maintain the sanity of life and avoiding being used by interlopers and people of weird identity to use you to meet or advance their own ends, oppression and subjugation of others. The use of self, according to development scholars should advance equality and equity, and equality in resources distribution. In this way, it would promote and heighten development and reduce insecurity etc. Self here in development studies applies to individuals, groups and as sub-systems, corporations that are used for the sustenance and improvement of the society.

Human Freedom: For development to take place, we must recognize the fact that every individual is born as a free being and has the potentials to excel and develop when given the enabling atmosphere and opportunity. The society and its sub system are trim-taps which injects a cultural and belief system, creed, race and colour, in the cockpit of development agenda. These differentiating characteristics are limiting indices of development and progress of the society.

Freedom here refers to a sense of emancipation from alienating material conditions of life and from social and economic servitude, oppressive institutions, misery, dogmatic belief and poverty. Todaro and Smith (2009) observed that, freedom involves expanded range of choices for society and their members and minimization of external constraints and control in pursuit of some social goals. Class distinction and social categorization are society's ways of assessing the worth of an individual and growth dimensions. Clipping individuals' freedom results to tensions and conflicts within the society and breeds disillusionment, and promotes ethnic and racial chauvinism. Therefore, any impediment such as insecurity as we now have it in Nigeria, challenges and affects development naturally because freedom not only increase our choices, potentials and wealth but it increases our participation in social, economic, political and religious development. It promotes the rule of law, expression and equality. It guarantees synergy among committed development partners and society.

Options for sustainable development

The above core values are apparent warehouse for development objectives. Todera and Smith (2009) identified key objectives for development to occur. These includes:

Increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life sustaining goods and services such as food, shelter, health and protection.

Raise levels of living including addition of the provision of more jobs, employment opportunities, better education, greater attention to cultural and human values, thus generates greater individuals and national esteem.

Expand the range of economic and social choices available to individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people and nation state, but also to focus on ignorance and human misery.

Enhance integrative security management for individual investors and nations to provide food security, human freedom and safety of life and properties.

Others includes:

Provide effective and efficient information and communication pathways that promote inclusiveness.

Develop and coordinate quick interventions and responses mechanism to mitigate and manage insecurities that are likely to threaten national cohesion and development.

Strengthen linkages that build and promote viable material resources and human development.

Ensure the welfare of security agencies and personnel to motivate the staff performance

Mutual community engagement and partnership should be hinged on trust, commitment and accountability to further integration and encourage investors.

Conclusion

Sustainable Development is critical and essential to the sustenance and growth of any nation. This requires a committed approach of community policing, Government interventions, stakeholders' participation towards ensuring that insecurity issues are reduced to the barest level for investment, political and religious activities to drive for national security and

development of the country. Generally any environment that is infested and polluted with criminality as observed in Nigeria today reduces the potentials for investment opportunities and promote disillusionment. The primary responsibility of government is the welfare and security of life and properties, where observed otherwise development will be affected as investors will refuse to invest on musky and unsecured environment. In Nigeria the police and other security agencies are being overwhelmed by the activities of these bandits and terrorist groups, thus necessitating community policing as an option to complement the police services in the country.

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ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CRISIS ASYMMETRISM AND NATIONAL COHESION IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic nation with three major religions, African Traditional Religion (ATR), Christianity and Islam, with sociocultural differences. Nigeria has more than 400 ethnic groups and over 500 languages spoken across the country. The quest for identity and the creation of boundaries in human interactions has not only produced shocks and imbalances, but has resulted to crisis and conflict in society and in such instances, cohesion becomes elusive. Religion and ethnicity are parallel forces that have continued to drive and polarize integration and cohesion of the Nigerian state. Religion and ethnicity are two contending forces that evokes emotive sentiments and are crises laden in many senses of our collective existence more than anything else. These have given rise to a number of crises and violence of different dimension, magnitude, effects and consequences and have continued to plague the integration and cohesion of Nigeria despite efforts by various Governments. Africa and indeed Nigeria, are deeply religious and the existence of God is no doubt, and therefore, we hold that God or the unknown god is capable of and will definitely defend and punish evil. Yet it is also a trite axiom that the same set of people and believers commit the most evil in the world. Various alters, be it in African Traditional Religion, Christianity, Islam and others are variously used to promote ethno-religious sentiments, crisis and

criminality. These crises further impoverishes the people and widen the poverty gaps, thus, eroding and decoupling our national ethos to the point that employment, job placement, inter marriages, and even communication are not spared as they are carried out along ethno-religious lines. Religion and ethnicity had become a national balance and a deciding factor to accessing benefits, human and material resource distribution in Nigeria. Since independence there had been a catalogue of ethno-religious crises that has resulted in an estimated loss of over five million lives and unquantifiable loss of properties. This Paper attempts to descriptively examine the asymmetric causes, effect and consequences of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria and possible ways to bridge the gap for continuous peaceful coexistence and national cohesion.

Key Words: Religion, Ethnicity, Assymmetrism, National Cohesion and Integration

Words: 336

Introduction

Man is deeply first a religious and ethnic being living in a religious society, and religion and ethnicity play a dominant role in his world views. Every African nay Nigerian is deeply religious. Nigeria is synonymous with deep division which causes major political and social issues and are vigorously and violently contested along the lines of intricate ethnic, religious and regional divisions, (Oludaro 2010, Ekundayo, 2013). Ethno-religious crises are asymmetric in nature, dimension, magnitude and effect. They present a cause and effect dynamic relationship with no single factor isolated as the root cause of the ethno-religious crises in Nigeria. Nigeria before the amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates in 1914 and even after her independence in 1960 had always been a multi-ethnic, cultural and religio-linguistic entity, with three dominant religions of African Traditional Religion (ATR), Christianity and Islam. Nigeria has not witnessed such crises as it is now witnessing and hardly a day that passes without the news of banditry, kidnapping, herdsmen and terrorist activities, senseless killings and accentuated by regional agitation and ethnic identity struggles. Ethnicity and religious intolerance have led to incessant and recurrence of ethno-religious crises and conflicts which undoubtedly has given birth to ethnic militias like the O'odwua People Congress (OPC); the Bakassi Boys; the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF); the Egbesu Boys; the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC); the Arewa People Congress (APC); the Islamic State of West African (ISWA); Boko Haram; MiyettiAlah and Fulani herdsmen: the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB); and

OhanaezeN'digbo and others within the sovereign state of Nigeria. All these ethnic militias are used to advance and propagate ethnic sentiments and conflicts especially of religious origin at the slightest misunderstanding and the resultant effects are usually devastating and bloody and unimaginable. Apart from these ethnic militia it has birthed the Eastern Security Network of the south East; the Yoruba-AmotekunSecurity Network;

Ethnicity and Religion are emotive issues in Nigerian society and ultimately a force in its politics, economic and social life. Current happening in Nigeria points to the fact that religion and ethnicity are key issues in the stormy national in question. This concerns according to Agi(1998) is heightened by the fact that violence both overt and covert, has been the crudest and most pervasive of mechanisms of religious feud in Nigeria. Scholars had noted that men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious and ethnic convictions. Almost all religious and ethnic or tribal wars are fought within the lines of ethnicity and Religion. Onaiyekan in Agi (1998) maintained that religion is one of the mysteries of human nature, that the most atrocious activities can coexist with the most sublime and refined system of religion.

Religion therefore is defined as beliefs, values and actions based on ultimate concern. The meaning ultimate concern according to Tillich P. (1978) refers to "power". Power in the sense of the ultimate meaning or the central values of a society or a sub-group of it, and power in the sense of ultimate sacred or supernatural power which starts behind these values. Religion and ethnicity are two components that are ignitable like explosives. There are many religious creed and doctrines which are sometimes conflicting and are frightful, and can generate misunderstandings and wars if not managed carefully. There have been massacres and some of the most unbelievable human cruelties have been practiced by ethnicity and religion. Religion has evoked animosity, hatred, unhealthy rivalry, wicked acts, unnecessary and avoidable wars, and bloodshed are all conspicuously revealed. As Agi (1998), Haralombos (2003) and many scholars like Karl Marx noted, religion has contributed to the creation and exacerbation of social and political tension as well as increased the intolerance ability of people.

Herbert Macaulay wrote in the Lagos daily news of 31 January, 1934 as follows;

"As Africans, we have been split almost into Smithereens by what we call religion in West Africa, where men and women tangle for religion, write for it, fight for it and perhaps even die for it, and may do anything but live for it". 87 years now after this assertion was made by Herbert Macaulay, no one would have believed that those words could still be true and forcefully too; Devotion to one's religion".

The emotive nature of religion and ethnicity evokes a sense of violence, riot and even killing at slightest disagreement, provocation or action. Religion and ethnicity has polarized us to the point of “our” and “their”, and decisions, actions of government are interpreted along that lines. For example when Economic Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), the Police or Independent and Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) arrest any offender who is a Muslim, almost all the Muslim and Northerners will rise up for his defense; likewise if an Ijaw man is arrested, all Ijaw people and South South would rise up for his defense, creating a circle of mistrust and suspicion. This has upbraided the country to the point of collapse. Because of the violent nature of ethno-religious crises which often takes the form of riot, sabotage, armed struggle, assassination, guerrilla warfare and secession in Nigeria the no doubt have impact and effect on social, economic, political development and national cohesion. Ortom also maintained that Statistical Research Department in its January 2021 reports stated that the Jihadist Fulani herdsmen activities in Nigeria in 2015-2020 led to the killing of over 7400 Christians particularly in the Northern region and over 5 million people were displaced and properties destroyed. He further asserted that between January and August 2021, there are more than 3,000,000 killings across the country by killer herdsmen and bandits. There is absolutely no headway that Nigeria can attain national cohesion with this government insensitivity of to the yearnings and aspirations of the citizenry.

Ethnicity is a derivative of the interactions and interrelationship among members of diverse ethnic groups. It has been defined variously as “perception of common origin, historical memories, ties and aspirations” (Nnoli 1998). To appreciate the position of ethnicity and national integration is to understand historical analysis, contributions and the services of ethnic groups in the process and making of Nigeria state. Ihejiamazu & Egbe (2001) observed that, to view the phenomenon from a dysfunctional point of view is to acknowledge and understand the contradictions in the Nigeria Polity that obviously hinder loyalty, commitment and feeling of belongingness to the Nigerian state.

Discussing on religion and ethnicity, Mbiti (1969) noted that, Africans are notoriously religious and each people have their own religious system with set of beliefs and practices. Religion and ethnicity permeates into the facets and departments of life so fully that it is not easy or possible to always isolate them. In Africa there are about 1000 different ethnic groups and this make it comparatively complex to isolate religion from ethnic tribes, and almost each tribe has its own religious system and its exert a great influence upon the thinking and living of the people concerned.

Religion is wittingly written everywhere in the life of each community and permeates, and determines people and community's reactions and behaviors as it affects them. Mbiti (1969) noted that, to be human is to belong to the whole community, and doing so involves participating in the belief, ceremonies, rituals and festivals of that community. A person cannot detach himself from the religion of his group for to do so, is to be severed from his roots, his foundations, his context of security, his kinships and the entire group of those who make him aware of his own existence. It is important to note that religious systems and beliefs are beyond the confinement to a church or mosque building as the case may be but it is and takes on the force of life.

A greater number of beliefs and practices are found in every African society. Though these practices are not systematically formulated as a set of dogmas which a person is expected to accept. These beliefs and practices are held and observed by families and communities from generation to generation. There is absolutely no unicity in such beliefs, idea and practices.

Devotion to Ethnicity and Religion: the bane for ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria

Ethno-religious crises refers to a situation in which the relationship between members of one ethnic or religious group and another of such group in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion, mistrust, fear, discrimination and tendency towards violent confrontations. In a multi-ethnic and religious society like Nigeria with more than 500 linguistic fragmentations, language assertion, cultural autonomy and religious superiority to demand for local political autonomy and self-determination sometime leads to some contextual discrimination of members of one ethnic or religious group against the another on the basis of differential systems and socio-cultural symbols and religion, (Salawu 2010).

Prior to the amalgamation of the north and southern protectorates, in 1914, Nigeria existed as empires, kingdoms, ethnic nationalities, tribes, and life was relatively peaceful with minimal conflicts. These forced marriage was carried out along ethnic and religious ties without corresponding collection of understanding amongst the cooperating ethnic nationalities. Thus, Nigeria is fraught with strife because of many ethnic and religious doctrines, dogmas and practices as it was partitioned along the corridors of ethnicity and religious lines. The sharia law designed in 1970, 1980 and the continued propagation of Organization of Islamic countries (OIC), movement and the forceful introduction of sharia law in Zamfara state ShettimaYerimain 1999 are a critical examples. The current struggle for collection of Value Added tax (VAT) by the Rivers and Lagos states and stopping the Federal Inland Revenue

Service for collecting the tax and the Power shift from the north has been greeted by the Northern Governors and Traditional Leaders by religious and ethnic sense, (Vanguard Newspaper, Leadership Newspaper and the Daily Times Newspaper of 28th September, 2021). While in the south, there are interdenominational conflicts between Protestants and orthodox churches especially against the Catholic church, all of which produce regrettable conflicts and results.

The long exacerbated mistrust, discrimination, fear, domination, marginalization, mutual suspicion, prejudices, bias and lack of cordiality among these ethnic and religious groups are reoccurring decimal and explains why ethno-religious crises are reoccurring in Nigeria as a permanent feature. However there is no particular date in history to consider as the date ethno-religious crises started in Nigeria, and this paper is not intended to give historical account, but attempt will be made to give a brief account of some of the crises.

Before the amalgamation in 1914 and attainment of independence of Nigeria in 1960, there has been ethno-religious crises and conflicts across the ethnic states making up Nigeria. The Various wars and conquests by irredentists and warriors like Queen Amina of (Zazzau) Zaria (1533-1610), the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio (1754-1817) 18 century, the King Jaja of Opobo (1821-1891), Oba Ovonramwen (Oba of Benin) who died in exile in Calabar in 1914 Oba of Benin, the ObolEkpo- Obollopon of Ekoriyako 18 century, the OOni of Ile-Ife the progenitor of various independent royal dynasties in Yoruba land and others, all fought ethnic and tribal wars to secure their sovereignty and expand their empires and kingdoms (Wikipedia). These wars and conquests has continued still now. Within the Islamic folk, there are buttoned up and unresolved conflicts among the Tarigas, the Qadiriyya, and Tijaniyya; shi'itts, Izala and the amadyia, Agi (1998). The kanomaitasine riot and Maiduguri 1980s, Jimeta –Yola religious crisis (1984), the ZangoKataf, 1976, 1992, & 2021, the kafanchan College of Education Muslim Christian riots; and 2021 Plateau, Benue states incessant killing of villagers are all pointers to this facts. 1980 and 1982 Miatasine riots Kano Muslim student society (MSS) Riots 1992, Maitatsine riot in Yola 1984, 1985 in Gombe, Bauchi; 1986 Palm Sunday riot in Kwara, Illorin; 1986, university of Sokoto riot MSS Rampage; 1986, Bauchi government secondary second riot; 1987 Kafanchan Religious riot; 1988 Zuru-Sokoto state sectarian clash; 1991 Katsina, Bauchi and Kano religious riots, 1991 Shiite Jihad in Katsina state; 1991, ReihardBonke religious riot in Kano; 1992 ZangonKataf crises; 1993 Hadjia - Jigawa state riot; 1993Kwara state polytechnic clash; 1994 Kaduna religious crises; 1994, 2019, and the unabated Kaduna attacks in 2020 and 2021. 1974 PotiskumYobe state disturbance, the 1999 Oro Cultists crisis between a Hausa woman who was outside the street

when the cultists were displaying and in Sagamu Ogun State; In the Kano 1994 decapitation and spiking of the head of Gideon Akaluka Sokoto; 1995 Christian Azabuibe mobbing attack. Also in the south, the 1999 2000 Kano-Enugu crisis following the introduction of Sharia in Zamfara; 1985 Roman Catholic versus Assemblies of God conflict in Akamkpa LGA and the Brotherhood of the Cross and Star (BCC) and the Apostolic Church Crisis 1986 in Cross River State, IziAbakiliki and Yala Cross River state Crisis; the OquiBokuAkwalbom and IkotOffiong Cross River 2019 crisis, Lagos Idi-Araba/Oko-Oba crisis in 2020 and Kano mayhem following the use of a convenience by a Hausa resident and the Yorubas resulting in wanton destruction of lives and properties; and a host and pockets of tribal conflicts abound in Nigeria (Agi, 1998; Salawu 2010; Wikipedia). The new wave of brazen attack within 2021 alone by Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria especially in Benue, Taraba, Niger, Kaduna, Plateau, Adamawa states etc. is sparking fears of genocide.

From the foregoing brief account above, it means that ethno-religious crises are not new to the Nigerian soil. Salawu (2010) noted that the Kano-Enugu riots present some features that are similar to the 1960-1967 civil war. Note, in attempt to provide solution to the incessant ethnic religious crises in Nigeria, Muamar Ghaddafi of Lybia in 1995 advocated for the division of Nigeria into two nations on religious lines hitherto to reduce the religious and ethnic tensions and conflicts. The prolonged sense of alienation, loss of faith in the promises of the country and systemic exclusion from the orbit of governance and the marginalization, suppression etc. produces secessionist agitations and tensions within ethnic and religious lines.

Ethnicity, National cohesion and integration

In recent times, the word “ethnic” “tribe” has increasingly acquired semi-bad connotations. Nigeria is not mainly a pluri-ethnic society, it is also one made up of diverse religions and sects within the religion (Adrendt 1984). The dominant religious groups in Nigeria are African Traditional Religion (ATR), Christianity and Islam. Therefore, the problems of ethno-religious crises and violence in Nigeria are very complex. There are both inter and intra-religious or sectarian violence, across the length and breadth of the country. But notably these violence are common among the Islam movement in the Northern Nigeria with variants in the south. These violence are usually openly between the Muslim and African Traditional Religion (ATR); Muslim and Christianity; Christians and A.T.R; Muslim, Christians and others.

National cohesion and integration are prime drivers for national development and the nation building project. Where a nation is characterized by avalanche of crises, suspicion and

mistrust, fear, subjugation, marginalization and suppression, there is usually bound to be polarized and inconsistencies in interactions and relationship among the ethnic and religious groups and it affects national cohesion and integration. This problem is articulated in the resurgence and frequency of violent conflicts, tensions and destruction of life and properties (Ihejihamazu&Egbe 2001).

Imperialism and colonial administration and anti-imperialist movement and decolonization process democratic processes were driven on the wheels of ethnicity and religious sentiments. For example all the political formations and parties in Nigeria has ethnic and religious coloration from 1960 independence to now. The Northern People Congress (NPC), Action Group (AG) in the south west; National Council of Nigeria and Citizens (NCNC) South East and South South; Also Alliance Congress (AC), South West, All Peoples Congress (APC) in the North, People Democratic Party, (PDP) South South; All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) South East, to mention but a few.

In that dysfunctional theses many ethnic groups and movements advocate for egalitarian society, justice, liberty and equity in political and socioeconomic life of all citizenry as well as justice for the subjugation, suppression and oppression of their members especially of the minorities. The recent cases of agitations for self-determination by NnandiKanu of the Igbo extraction and Sunday Igogbo of O'odwua extraction in 2021 are fresh examples of ethnic suppression and subjugation orchestrated by the government's failure and insensitivity to the plights of the people. These agitations have attracted extensive support from the ethnic nationalities and foreign nations who plants seeds of conflicts and epicurean interested to take the advantage of the crises to exploit the country, thus making it even more difficult to address the problem.

From the foregoing therefore, one will be right to say that the Nigerian democratic journey has been the result of the mobilization of ethnic groups and populations. Nigeria electoral democratization processes and support are delivered through ethnic lines, bigotry and chauvinism. Also extensive look at the recent happenings in Nigeria, the lopsided appointment by the Federal Government of Nigeria especially of the security architecture, and the siting of security institutions and agencies dominant in one region (the North), the Nigeria Defence Academy (NDA), Nigeria Security and Civil Defense (NSCD), Academy, the Nigerian Police Force Academy, the State Security Services, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Staff Administrative College etc, are clear examples of ethnic and religious hegemony and is counterproductive for National

cohesion because it demonstrates alienation, marginalization and suppression of other nationalities.

In the same vein kidnapping, banditry, killer herdsmen, terrorism and criminal activities are seen and carried out on ethnic and religious lines. These activities are exponentially increasing in geometrical rate on daily basis in magnitude and intensity. The inability of the Government to tamp down the problems is increasing the fear, marginalization, suspicion and mistrust of the citizenry, thus stalling the development efforts of the nation. Considering the complexities in the structure and economy of the state, ethnic and religious violence makes national cohesion difficult as each nation state or ethnic group is constantly promoting and advancing their regional interest. These regional interest if not met by government are usually seen as marginalization and exclusion from national patrimony. Ihejiamaizu & Egbe (2001), noted that ethnicity is at the root of the problem of lack of national integration and cohesion because diverse cultural, linguistic and social factors whose synthesis and harmonization into unified political process and consciousness has fundamentally remained a herculean task. Also Otite (1989) noted that the contextual discrimination by members of one group against another on the basis of differentiated system of sociocultural symbols is the product of ethnicity. This position is corroborated by Bogdanor (1987) that sentiments of loyalty to one's ethnic group and culture or place of origin may prove more important in group mobilization when political divisions and decision are thought or considered.

Discussing on the recent heightened insecurity in Nigeria, Governor Samuel Ortom on Thursday 23rd September 2021, at Enugu during the Radio Nigeria Chapel of the Nigeria Union of Journalists, accused the Federal Government of trying to silence every dissenting voice and playing double standard in handling of the security situation as it effects some regions especially the South East, South South, North Central and South West as the government of the day is promoting marginalization, injustice and impunity, and if not checked will result to conflicts and ethnic crises.

National cohesion and sustainable Development

The dysfunctional theses of religion and ethnicity presupposes that national cohesion and sustainable development are hindered by the forces and determinants of ethnicity and religion. The activities of terrorists, Fulani jihadists, herdsmen menace, banditry, criminal activities and regional agitations have a negative impacts on the socioeconomic life of the country and are also fueling ethnic and religious tensions and secessionist agitations. The agitations in the East, (IPOB), South (Niger Delta), West (O'odwua), the North (Miyetti Allah and the Fulani National Movement (FUNAM) are as a result of the injustice and lack of

fairness in the allocation and distribution of resources. Abdulsalam Aburbaka, former Head of State in his 1st October, 2021 Independence Day Anniversary message noted that, only equity, justice, fair-play and good governance can silence secessionist agitations and promote inclusive integration and cohesion through appointment and distribution of common wealth, (Punch Newspaper 1st October, 2021).

National cohesion - is when all the diverse religions and ethnic nationalities can unite, interact fully and complement each other vertically and horizontally without sentiments, bias and prejudices. It is when egalitarian, equity and fair play are made the primary objective of engagement and delivery of services. Otite (1990), observed that ethnicity is not only a cultural phenomenon but it is also structural, that is an instrument of social organization which has induced striking change of focus and attention. Ethnicity and religion are potent manipulating tools in the hands of the elites for the furtherance and protection of their interest, but also as the main channel through which competition, control of or access to and distribution of the national resources has accorded it a new global prominence.

Development theorists believed that with the advances in modernization and creating new patterns of behavior can submerge ethnic tensions. However, this gave rise to detribalization theories to eliminate ethnic cleavages and chauvinism, and as an approach to enthrone development, national cohesion and integration as well as political and economic stability. The continued dominance and adherence to religious patterns and ethnicity has further exacerbated the problem of integration and cohesion. This has giving rise to a detribalization theories to promote ethnic tolerance and accommodation of ethnicity through cooperative and inclusiveness, and participation of all ethnic interest in the affairs of the state as a panacea for development and national cohesion and integration; by guaranteeing access to societal resources and the participation by all multi ethnic and religious groups.

Aetiology of Ethno-Religious crises in Nigeria

The aetiology of ethno-religious crises are asymmetric and multifaceted. There is no one factor that can be singled out as the root cause of ethno-religious crises. These asymmetric causative factors are at the root base militating against national integration and cohesion. Amongst these factors are ethnic groups, religious intolerance, structural and cultural factors, class, territory, politics, and unemployment, and distribution of societal resources.

Major factors that also fuel ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria has to do with allegations of neglect, deprivation, marginalization, alienation, accusations, oppression and subjugation, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, bigotry, domination, nepotism and gross abuse of

power. Religious discrimination is also strongly linked to the formation of grievances that produce conflicts. These factors are perquisite factors responsible for the lopsided appointments and distribution of resources and sharing of Nigerian wealth to the individuals, groups and communities. Where a community or group does not have a voice to represent their interest such communities and group are neglected and deprived. This divisive interplay of politics, economic and religious savagery produce and escalate ethnicism and tensions that readily result to violent conflicts.

The growth and uncoordinated expansion of (though not unique) phenomenon and growth of independent or separatist churches; the new wave of industrial Christianity or Pentecostalism and the abuse of ATR are at the root cause of ethno-religious violence in Nigeria. The participation and separatist dogmas are in itself a problem, as it result to the shock unbelievable “ours and theirs”. There are on the average small sects that have broken from mission churches and from one another. Almost every day a new church, sect or denomination is formed and with titles like General Overseer (GO), President and founder (PF), Papa, Daddy etc. The sudden upsurge and proliferation of churches especially, Pentecostalism has turned the church into a business venture and often with severe rivalry among them. Competition for space, size of church, beautification, and style of preaching, the exoticness of the pastors or priests as the case may be has turned some of them to constant fury with each other. This is also true of the Islam faith and African traditional Religions. The religious institutions are not playing their expected roles and are sometime involve and cut up in the web of this crises.

The missionary or ecclesiastical paternalism and over domination have led many African and Nigerian Christians to seek local independence and sever their organization ties with missionary led churches. The clashes of personality interest and leadership tussle between the set, churches, etc. have precipitated the breakaway of churches and religious fundamentalist groups of both Christian, Moslem and ATR; like the Boko Haram, Miyetti Allah and religious extremism of the Pentecostal bloc are no spared.

Changes in religious practices: Men are deeply religious beings, living in a religious universe. The sense of estrangement and modern changes in doctrines, religious and cultural practices has equally contributed to disturb traditional solidarity, thus living a number of people with little or no foundation. The independent church movements are attempts to establish new foundations which may perhaps form a substitute for the disintegrating traditional solidarity. Independence is chiefly in terms of organization leadership, decision, finance and direction. Any attempt to offset the changes can result to violence.

Abandonment of Cultural Beliefs: African converts who profess Christianity are often too eager to embrace as much of it as possible. These converts forget that Christianity is deeply rooted in Euro, American culture thus drawing African from their religious and traditional life and beliefs to what the Christians call civilized and Christian expression of new faith. Many traditions were forgotten and abandoned thus creating a cultural vacuum which could at large be attributed to evangelism. Also Islam, Muslim have their infractions. Any attempt to alter or remold their cultural belief patterns can result to violence.

Traditional Africa societies and Nigeria indeed are known to have a matrix of systems of social control and institutions; the family, law, cultural ties, religion and political system. The breakdown of these social vehicles and control affects the wellbeing of the society especially the borrowing of western cultures that are alien to the African soil. On the other hand the law enforcement agents are further compounding the issue by their abuse of duty, extra judicial killings, bribery, and collection of illegal levies from motorist and road users and high handedness. The high handedness of some security agencies especially the police resulted to the October, 2020 EndSARS protest across the country which eventually maimed and claimed many lives and properties.

The Nigerian government and leaders are not perturbed, are defiant and indifferent to the drowning plight of the people. These gross failure by government to satisfactorily forge a national cohesion and integration through positive policies, economic progress and to address unemployment and ethnic militia and youth restiveness are actually increasing ethnic tensions, fear and conflicts. Ortom noted that unemployment in the 2020 reports the unemployment rate of the country stood at 9.01 per cent but in 2021, unemployment rate is estimated at 32,5 percent, this shows that if there is job creation and unemployment tackled then insecurities would have been reduced to the barest minimum.

Appointments of Strategic Government functionaries- the nature and lopsided federal appointments since 2015, nepotism and other acts of sectionalism have further divided Nigeria more than any other time in the country's history.

Salawu (2010) and Agi(2008) maintained that the long military rule and the intervention in politics encourages and legitimizes the use of coercion, force and violence as an instrument of social control and attainment of set goals. Most often government approach in achieving peace is counterproductive and further exacerbate and compound the problem because of the use of force and violence.

Bureaucratic red-tapism and delay in response by the federal, state or local government response teams, especially the police who are expected to take directions from the above

further exacerbate crisis. There are many instances, where government controlled silence and delay to address the issue, are seen as deliberate attempt to exacerbate the problem.

Foreign interest and global politics- most of the ethno-religious crises are financed and sponsored by foreign countries for self-serving interest and global political economy; to destabilize the sitting government or a diversionary measures to exploit their human and natural resources as well as to carry out illicit trade especially, the sale of weapons of mass destruction; creating chaotic situations that will generate war and conflict and eventually many people displaced (IDPs) and refugees may be available as cheap labour in the foreign lands. The current increase in the incidence of terrorism, banditry and other gruesome activities are related to this. The activities of Boko Haram, Islamic State of West African (ISWA), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Middle East, Al-shabaab (Harakat al-shabaab al-Mujahideen) in East Africa- Somalia, Kenya and Yemen, Al-Qaeda and other militias are driven on ethnicity and religious fundamentalism, and linked to the new ideology of Islamism. However, this can explain why there are incessant religious violence in northern Nigeria. Global interest by some countries exacerbate our differences and plant seeds of disabling fissiparity that hold us back all for their contrived conveniences and are epicurean with zero emotional investment in the country.

Ethnicity and religious factors perpetuate ethno-religious crises. There appears to be conflicting debates between Karl Marx 'opiate paradigm' and Durkheim's functionalist dimension of ethnicity and religion (religion produces ammonic state). The two approaches are correlates because at one point it is ethnicity and religion that are used for political mobilization and at the other end it the same factors that produces violence born out of marginalization, neglect, oppression, inadequate distribution of resources, suspicion and fear. Finally the consistency at which government uses violence to tamp down legitimate expression of dissent in the form of peaceful protests and the profound sense of alienation, loss of faith in government promises as well as systemic exclusion of some nationalities and groups from the orbit of governance produces conflict and tension in the country.

Theoretical synthesis

Religion and ethnicity are more generally a collective conscience and no particular existing theory is definite and sufficient to explain Ethno-religious crises and conflicts. Durkheim (1858-1917), in his "Elementary Forms of Religious Life and Society" and functionalist perspective noted that, religion is an integration force and form part of each individual and society (Ritzer 2008, & Giddens 2003). The functionalist believe that religion is no connected primarily to social inequalities or power but relates it to the overall institution of

society. Ethno-religious conflicts are said to be derived or a combination of relative deprivation as explained by Ted Gurr in his book *Why Men Rebel* with group mobilization approach. Discussing further Marx maintained that ethno-religious conflicts stem from discrimination, grievance and class structure, political action towards the minorities which is easily done through the mobilization of the ethnic minorities to engage on violence, riot and rebellion. The Kanomaite crises, the Zamfara Sharia protest and others are classic examples as previously discussed above. Today Africa and Nigeria inclusive is laced with many obstinate conflicts, most of these conflicts are constructed from differences in religion and ethnic identities (Canci, 2016). Ethnic and religious nationalism has led to crises about control of state power, unequal allocation and distribution of resources, citizenship issues, state collapse, economic decline and ethnic clashes. This position is as canvassed by Karl Marx that capitalism and religion are two opposing paradigms, on the one hand capitalism is the spirit of competition which breeds conflict on the long run and on the other hand religion is an opium that has a calming effect which can as well be exploited for pecuniary gains. Nigeria like other countries like Somalia, Mauritius, Syria, Sudan, Libya etc. has witnessed recurrent crises illegitimately and often impairing efforts at economic transformation, democratization and national stability and cohesion, (Osagehae & Suberu 2005). Religion plays a critical role in Nigeria's society's identity and has expressed itself as a potent force in the geopolitical development of the country. As Weber argued that, there is connection between religion and social change and Durkheim functionalist perspective argued that religion and ethnicity place both positive and negative roles. The same religion and ethnicity were used to unite Nigeria and at the same time serve as the force that has led to numerous conflicts in the country. This contentious view of religion as Marx argue produces violent conflict based on doctrinal ideologies. Religion has a strong hold over the lives of human beings for thousands of years and there are archeological evidence and traces of religious symbols and ceremonies. Sociologists therefore look at religion as a major source of social solidarity. Ludwig Feuerbach in his work "Essence of Christianity" religion consist of ideas and values produced by human beings in their course of cultural development. From Feuerbach's perspective Marx asserts that it is this human beings concern that inhibits cohesion and alienation because religion and by extension ethnicity is in the heart of heartless society. This manipulative society can to a large extent suffers from the hands of the few who are in authority. Though Marx was dismissive of religion, but far from it, he contend that positive values embedded in religion can become guiding ideals for improving the lot of humanity not because these ideals and values themselves are mistakes but when misapplied can generate

conflict. It is this state that Marx considers very important because when attentions, resources, inequalities, injustice and fair play are lost and social order is not maintained there is bound to be crises this is so because religion often has ideological implications and is serving to justify the interest of the ruling group at the expense of the other. Marx and Durkheim however agrees that religion can generate conflict and state of anomie. In his "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1976)" Weber maintained that religion is not necessarily a conservative force, but it is inspired movement that have produced dramatic social transformation some of which are dysfunctional or and otherwise in social and economic life of various cultures. At one point Marx and weber identified important general characteristics of religion as complementing one another and influencing social change. Hence religion and ethnicity has divisive influence and causes most conflicts and wars because of its intricate characteristics.

Effect of ethno-religious crises

Just as Ethno-religious crises and conflicts has asymmetric causes their effect are also asymmetric and dynamic. However the resultant effects are usually wide spread disruption of economic and social activities with negative impact on productivity. People are killed and maimed and there is wide scaledestruction of life and properties worth millions of the naira. Ethnic and Religious fanaticism, bigotry, intolerance and violence are obstacles to the achievement or attainment of social, political and economic harmony and integration as business and investment climatesare hampered and no investor want to invest in state where there are insecurities and crises, this invariable kills the spirit of enterprise.

These crises and conflicts resultin the displacement of people and communities, as many people are rendered refugees in their father's land. The displacement of people affect their source of daily livelihood and poverty becomes their tag. There are momentary losses of human capital and material resources as a result of the crises. Generally, Mosques, churches, hotels and other related businesses as well asprivate vehicles, private homes etc. are been destroyed and affect the growth and development of communities and economic activities.

There is food insecurity and insufficiency as a result of these ethno-religious conflicts as many farmers no longer engage in farming and production activities, farmers abandon their farming because of ceaseless attacks by bandits, kidnappers, militants and herders increasing brazenness with which cattle destroy farmcrops without any consequences. Farmers are afraid and no longer see farming lucrative because they might be kidnapped or killed.

The new wave of brazen insecurities occasioned by Boko Haram and Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria especially in Benue, Taraba, Zamfara, Gombe, Bauchi, Niger, Kaduna, Plateau, Adamawa states etc. is sparking fears of genocide.

The pervasive and continued insecurity have indeed resulted to high and increase in budgetary allocation and resources to expand the National security architecture in Nigeria to address the problems of ethno-religious conflicts. These vault of allocations would have been channeled to agriculture, social and economic infrastructural development and food security and sufficiency.

Foreign and global interest uses ethnicity and religious crises exacerbates our differences and plants seeds of disabling fissi-parity that holds us back conveniences, they are epicurean with zero emotional investment in the country.

Government crisis management slogan and syndrome in Nigeria

The new government crises management slogan and syndrome is known as “Government are on top of the matter”. This slogan has continued to be a leading expression of government whenever there is eruption of violence in the country to the point that, one can rightly consider it a new lexicon concept in the management of violence in Nigerian. Whenever there is any ethnic or religious crises the twist way and approach is to draft armed forces to the spot and thereafter issue a statement that “*Government are on top of the matter,*” to identify and immediate and remote causes of the violence. Perhaps to quell tensions further. Panels upon panels and commission of enquiries are setup but whose reports will never be implemented at the end. In 1996 a young man was bravely beheaded in Kano State prison and his lifeless body spiked and paraded around the streets of Kano, in 2015 a lady was killed in Marraba near Abuja city for carrying morning street evangelism by angry Muslim youths; in 2020 and 2021 there has been series of kidnappings, abduction of people and school children in Nigeria and more than 40 attacks in many states; Kaduna, Niger, Benue, Zamfara, Katsina Bauchi, Maiduguri, Abuja, Gombe, Enugu, Abia Cross River, Ebonyi, AkwaIbom, Plateau and many other states. In fact we have lost count of the attacks across the country as there is hardly a day without attacks and gruesome killing of innocent citizens and noting had been done about it and the reports of the panels and commissions of enquiry are not known. The 2020 End SARS protest across the country is a classic example as state government are continuously dragging feet for the completion and implementation of the enquiries reports. The only thing one hears is Government are on top of the matter where the poor masses are killed and properties worth millions of the naira destroyed.

The Unknown gunmen and banditry phenomenon in Nigeria; the unknown militia

The 21st century present with high and sophisticated technological innovation and advancement in telecommunications to wit, yet terrorism, banditry, kidnapping for ransom, rituals and criminal activities and silent ethnic cleansing has continued unabated in Nigeria. More worrisome is the new concept and phenomenon of the “unknown gunmen” or the “unknown ethnic militia”. When violence erupts in most instances government officials come up with hasty utterances and assigning blame or failure to some other person or other things without confronting the realities. This government actions in the face of violence according to Agi (1999), is often superficial, simplistic and at times contradictory and therefore confusing. Most perpetrators of such violence hide under ethnic and religious canopy to wreak havoc on the society.

The lack luster attitude of government is worsening the situation, the most devastating and humiliating attack by the unknown gunmen and bandits was the breaking into, and abduction and killing of military officers in the Nigeria Defense Academy (NDA) in Kaduna in August 2021. As usual government is yet to unravel the perpetrators. This approach in crime management undoubtedly yields conflict, suspicion, bigotry and disharmony. Various sociological assumptions suggest that these unknown gunmen are a branded underdogs and ethnic militia to cleanse certain ethnic groups judging from the attacks and killings.

Previous efforts by government to curb ethno-religious crises in Nigeria

The setting up of inter faith council and dialogue between the two dominant groups in Nigeria Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) IN 1996 and Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (SCIA) in 1977, by Obasenjo regime was intended to promote conversation by creating channels for interfaith discussions for religious tolerance and harmony.

The Advisory Council on Religious Affairs (ACRA) by the IBB regime 1985 to promote religion and ethnic harmony and create peaceful atmosphere for investment to strive.

Inter Faith Based Organizations/NGOs to encourage ethnic and religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence.

Strengthening National Orientation Agency to deliver on its mandate.

Setting up of a National Centre for Propagation of Religious and Ethnic Tolerance (CENPRETO) in 1992 by the IBB regime. The idea is to provide a regulatory framework for the checking of religious beliefs and ethnic fundamentalism.

The Aimajiras and the Yan Dada (thugs) phenomenon and such children rehabilitated and psychosocial support and counselling provided for them. Because these innocent teenagers and youth are easily brainwashed and used for religious and ethnic crises at the slightest provocation, and usually their activities are lethal. They constitute and represent a keg of time

bomb and ready instruments that can be used or employed to promote ethnic and religious violence.

Wayforward

1. Even spread and distribution of resources- this would promote inclusiveness and widen opportunities to all ethnic groups and nationalities.
2. Regular training of security personnel on contemporary approaches in security monitoring and management as well as ensure profiling of security personnel and applicants before engagement.
3. Promote and ensure security personnel welfare and remunerations` are promptly paid and delivered. Where possible institute a robust approach in the care of families of officers who lost their lives while in active service to the nation.
4. Enhance community policing participation and partnership to complement efforts of security agencies in intelligence gathering and crime surveillance. This can be achieved if security agencies and personnel can manage the whistle blowing and volunteered information without exposing the informant to avoid repercussions.
5. Government policies and programme should be people centered, while being committed to deliver on campaign promises and constitutionally promoting public interest and avoid self-serving indulgence, ethnic and religious aggrandizement.
6. Government must be seen and be committed to facilitating the implementation of reports of panels of enquiries and commissions and avoid scapegoatism, parochialism, nepotism and punish culprits and offenders appropriately and in accordance with the law. This will serve as a deterrent to others.
7. Compulsory access to primary and basic education, especially the almagirais, and other hard to reach individuals and groups.
8. Commit to structural social and economic development that would engender unity and cohesion as well as reduce unemployment, inequality and religio-political subjugation.
9. Development of a workable and commensurate taxation method for mosques, churches and their leaders to monitor and profile their expenditure. This will seemingly reduce the rivalry and competition among them thereby reduce religious tensions and flagrant abuse of extant financial regulations and laws.
10. Search for a more participatory and cost effective political and social order.

Conclusion

Nigeria is a plural nation that has witnessed a number of violent ethno-religious violence and crises that had destroyed lives and properties worth millions of the Naira. These conflict affect the national cohesion and integration as most investors are afraid to invest in an unsafe business environments. No meaningful socio economic development can take place and thrive where there are tensions and conflicts. The development of any nation can only be delivered in a peaceful atmosphere where there is absolute opportunities to expand and explore frontiers for social and economic growth. Government must ensure reliable and equitable resource distribution and inclusiveness in governance as well as promote ethnic and religious tolerance.

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**POWER CONTEST: IMPEDIMENT TO MEANINGFUL ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS
AND POLITICAL DIALOGUE IN NIGERIA**

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Abstract

This work examined Power Contest as one of the numerous Impediments to Meaningful Ethnic Religious and Political Dialogue in Nigeria. It employed qualitative research methodology which helps in reviewing some literatures relevant for this paper. Nigeria is a multicultural society, comprising of almost 150 ethnic groups, each agitating for superiority and supremacy, these also transgress to politics and religion. Meaningful dialogue is often very difficult to achieve, as a result of these strive for superiority. It is against this backdrop that this paper highlights the use of power in politics, ethnic and religious arena. The effects of the use of power and abuse of power in politics, ethnic and religious domain, it further suggests that exercising superiority over the people's religious, politics and ethnic standard may adversely hampered meaningful dialogue. The work recommends that, for peace and tranquility to be experienced, in this country, dialogue and respect for each other's religious, political, and ethnic peculiarities should be encouraged. Creation of job opportunity and provision of workable security system for all citizens in this country is strongly advised. Researchers are also urged to carry out more research in a similar work such as this to proffer additional ways of curbing this situation.

Key Words: Ethnic, Political and Religious Conflict, Power contest, Multicultural society, Power and Superiority, Dialogue.

Introduction

The situation where needs of citizenry are not met in Nigeria structure of governance is said to be the real reasons why there is political instability in the country. In Nigeria, there is no gain saying that the country is homogeneous, as it has a multicultural, multi ethnic and multi-linguistic as well as religions diversity. All these groups seek to be recognized as an entity. This seriously affects the unity of the country as every ethnic group seeks to be recognized as the sole owner of the countries resource and manpower.

In this vein, power contest arises among different ethics, political and religious group with each desiring to be the sole controller of the human and economic resource of the country. The end result of all these, is the tension and restiveness experience in the country.

Following this backdrop, Kwuelum (2014) asserted that Nigeria a political entity, is faced with the contest of perspective regarding its birth of national journey to democratic governance, and the goal of democracy is embraced with conflicting notions and worsened by the lingering violent conflict. Also, the question of whether there is an ownership of the national unity process and citizen driven participation by the people unfolds in terms of efficiency/responsibility in relation to governance is seriously a problem to meaningful dialogue. In this vein, the paper is set to analyze the level at which ethno-religious and political sovereignty in Nigeria hinders meaningful dialogue. It further showcase the level at which different ethics, religious and political parties get to put themselves above other group, it also discuss the contending issues involve in dialogue, as well as analyze the fact that agitation for supremacy among different ethics religious and political groups only succeeds in hindering meaningful dialogue.

Ethno-Religious and Political Sovereignty in Nigeria

Nigeria as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society is prone to competition for power and authority. It has been established that the elite manipulates ethnic loyalties in Nigeria in order to realize political and other ambitions.

According to Oladoyin (2001) ethnicity seems to be detaching itself from being a cultural group symbol. It is new being shaped by political economics consideration. Cultural factors are not irrelevant, but they are secondary, this reveals the compelling motives around which ethno-communal consciousness is built. Oladoyin (2001) further stressed that ethno-communal violence in Nigeria results from either a contest for power and influence at all level of the society or a contest over economics resources.

Sociologically, Nigeria is a multiethnic society with population that are sharply divided along racial, cultural, linguistic, religious and similar cleavages. Guenther Roth in Alazieuwa (2015) noted that divided plural society is an impediment to the realization of modern, rational-legal institutions. Therefore, the Nigeria rather than being a public force tends to be privatized that is appropriated to the service of private interest by the dominate factors of the elite, which is consequences upon the influence of the political contest and influence since after colonilization and post-colonial influence. Every ethnic background tends to seek its superiority and preference.

More so, in the current trend of insurgency in Nigeria, it is the issues of superiority and sovereignty that gives rise to Boko-Haram threat. According to Alazieuwa (2015), politically though Muslim may want to disassociate themselves from it activities, it remains an Islamic movement. It is also occurring in a multi-religious, and political settings in which religious itself is a major factor in determining the distribution of political power in Nigeria (Kukah in Alazieuwa (2015). On this premised Alazieuwa (2015) explains that politically, the contest for power in Nigeria between the north and south attributes largely to the insurgency experience in Nigeria. It therefore, requires detail exposition.

The political feud perspective is premised primarily on the argument that power distribution within Northern part of Nigeria itself has continually perpetuated the Boko-Haram.

According to Alaziewua (2014), analysis the political feud in North between the Kanuri and the North-East, in his words, a closer examination of the Boko-Haram terror movement thus reveals clearly, a Kanuri revolt – it is dominantly by Kaunri boys, despite the recruitment of volunteers from areas outside Borno and Yobe State (Tribune, online June 27, 2012). Also, a statement by Ishiaka Mohammed Bawa the chief whip of the house of representative of the Nigeria national assembly and leader of the North-East caucus in the house, further underscore a general North-East revolution. According to him, “we felt that over the years, the North-East region has been marginalized in all aspect of life in this country, (and) Marginalization is responsible for insecurity in the North-East” (Sunday trust, online, February 12, 2012).

This statement aptly portrays the definition of politics by Midlarsky (1975), who defines political violence as the result of an attempted or actual injury (ordinarily not sanctioned by law or custom) perpetuated on person or properly with the actual or intended consequence of effecting transformation either within structures of political authority or within economics and/or social system. In this vein. Joseph (1991) and Sklar (1998)

maintained that the stake for the control of political power can be quite high and loss of central power could prompt a “highly placed, highly disgruntled, and thus highly motivated individuals” or groups towards bringing the country “under a specific kind of fundamentalist strain.

It is against this backdrop, that some scholars. Stake holders in government and philosophers are of the view that, ethnic militia in Nigeria is a propaganda machinery to acquire power position or a call towards the actualization of political power.

For instance, the statement by Chukwumerije and professor Bolaji, Akinyemi suffice. According to Chukwumerije:

Jonathan accession to power from the vice-president in 2007 to the elected President in 2011, to the Niger Delta militancy spear headed by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) from the late 1990s. Obasanjo’s emergence as Nigeria’s president in 1999 to him also owed to the militancy by the Yoruba ethnic militia, the Odua people’s congress, OPC as an aftermath of the 1993 presidential election annulment. Thus his suggestion to his ethnic Igbo nationality to mobilize its own militia, Movement for the sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB).

He therefore, proposed a device or means of constructive engagement with the youth. Chukwumerije called for the mobilization of the Igbo militia within the context of the mobilization of ethnic militia for political ascendancy in Nigeria (Vanguard, online, 20th January, 2015).

Professor Bolaji Akinyemi supported Chukwumerije when he said, the appropriation of the Nigerian military as northern and or Hausa Fulani militia was perpetuated by monopolization. Thus, the loss of such monopoly has obviously removed the appropriation of the Nigeria army as the ethnic militia by the north and/or Hausa-Fulani. Significantly, in 1999, retired army captain and former military intelligence operative, Sager Mohammed, formed a northern militia, the Arewa people’s congress (APC) to protect and safeguard the interest of the North. In this vein, Akinyemi maintained that in the general context of northern angst over the loss of central power, Boko-Haram may be conceived of as a resurgent Northern ethnic militia or in the specific context of the Kanuri sense of marginalization, an emergent militia for that ethnic group (Alozieuwa, 2015).

Religiously, the struggle for sovereignty stems from the rivalry between the two major religions in Nigeria, that is, the Islamic and the Christian religion. Each seeking prominent recognition and ascendancy. However, it is difficult or impossible to totally separate religious crisis from political, economic, social/ethnic crisis. This is why Ajibola

(2015) noted that in Nigeria, three things are intertwined; religion, politics and ethnicity and the three are be clouded with corruption, poverty and insecurity. It is therefore, difficult to solve one without considering all other underpinning factors.

In specific respect, religious sovereignty in Nigeria constitutes such problems as the inadequate depth of understanding of both Christianity and Islam within and without these two religions, lack of knowledge and information on a popular level, particularly in local languages of the scriptural-based condemnations of violence and terrorism in both Christianity and Islam (Report on the Inter-religious tensions and crisis in Nigeria). More so, statement and actions of a number of religious leaders, both Muslim and Christianity which could be understood as condoning or encouraging violence can engender violence this portrays the extends to which religions Nigeria strived to show sovereignty over the other. In the same vein, tension arising from well-funded and organized foreign Christian missionary activity and well funded and organized foreign Muslim missionary works towards the exhibition of superiority.

Contending Issues in Dialogue

An understanding of dialogue begins first of all with a good knowledge of its definition. There are various aspect of dialogue which ranges from religious, cultural, social, economic, political and even up to geographical aspects. As these are all aspect of human endeavour, each aspect of dialogue is contextually situated with partners. This means therefore, that the first thing we should know about the nature of dialogue is that it is an activity of duality and happens between more than one person, it happens within specific contexts with specific partners.

In the words of Omerie (2001) dialogue leads to the partners involved to reason and to sharpen their conscience thereby overcoming their differences and obstacle. It could also help them to tolerate and reject each other, rather than resorting to violence at the least provocation. Dialogue is therefore, an avenue where different group or individual share the same dynamic process and ideologies from one another how to resolve their problem towards mutual understanding and cooperation. This type of approach, according to Omerie (2001) gives room for groups involve to discover one another beyond inaccurate perceptions and distorted images which had hitherto characterized their relationship. Dialogue embraces all facets of life, religion, politics, economic, social and ethnic world view.

In today's Nigeria, politics, governance and religion are intertwined and twisted by political players which makes inter and intra ethnic relationships more complicated than imagined. Political parties have become glorified or secularized religious and ethnic groups.

The pattern of Nigerian political economy is characterized by instability, conflicting social, religious, regional and ethnic interests; and a preoccupation with unequal distribution of resources, rather than creation of wealth. These factors tend to portray irreconcilable differences in Nigeria's federalism and it is on such that a common platform for dialogue is regarded as a fashionable political theory – sovereign national conference.

According to Adler and Calico (2003) policy dialogues are carefully constructed, deliberative meetings that address both politically controversial and technically complex aspects of an issue in a dispute. Generally speaking, policy dialogues seek to exchange information and build consensus recommendations between the public, private, and civic sectors through leaders who are in a position to forge alliances, make decisions, or strongly influence the trajectory of a possible solution to a challenging issue. Policy dialogues go by many names. Some call them “Roundtables” or “Issue Workshops”. Others take the form of specialized committees, commissions, regulatory negotiations (“reg.negs”) or working groups. Regardless of their name, all policy dialogues includes:

- bring diverse interest groups to the table
- focus on a regulatory, policy or planning issue that is of common interest
- have a life cycle with a beginning middle and end and
- seek to formulate practical solutions to complex problems

While there is no fixed and formal format, most policy dialogues usually involve (a) an emerging or ripe dispute; (b) multiple stakeholders, not all of whom may have standing in an existing or prospective lawsuit; (c) contending values or ideologies; (d) complex scientific and technical issues; and (d) challenging substantive, procedural and psychological dynamics (Adler and Calico, 2003). Policy dialogue usually have a convener or sponsor (sometimes, multiple co-conveners and sponsors), a negotiated mission or goal, stakeholders who are willing to sit in council on a tough issue and address it in a disciplined manner; and facilitators to help organize and moderate proceedings.

The Need for Policy Dialogue

The idea of democracy is founded on the persistent belief that citizens can, through effective deliberation, govern themselves. Not only can they, they should. Democracy (from the Greek *demos*, “people”, and *kratos*, “rule”) assumes that ordinary people have the capacity, the means, and the will to participate in the shaping of key decisions that affect their own welfare. They do this through both elected representation in

formal bodies and participation and effective deliberation in informal decision-making mechanisms that influence formal processes (Alder and Calico, 2003).

The idea of discussion and problem solving is fundamental. Unfortunately, “effective deliberation” – particularly in the face of a potent and highly controversial issue is often problematic. In everyday parlance, deliberation is the act of thinking about a difficult or complex subject. In formally constituted bodies governed by parliamentary procedures, deliberation requires an on-the-record discussion of the reasons for or against passage of a measure. In court settings, deliberation is an off-the record procedural requirement placed on juries considering the fate of civil or criminal defendants. In policy, dialogues aimed at grappling with a stubborn problem, deliberation has more extorted meanings and nuanced applications. It is aimed at combating impatience, intolerance, and incivility and in furtherance of constructive and feasible solutions.

Too frequently, discussions on important civic and public interest matters are defeated for the wrong reasons. In some cases, groups have difficulty getting organized. In other settings, there is no shared or accepted process for dialogue. Sometimes, lack of a clear deliberation process leads to a premature push for decisions. Communication breakdowns often trigger an escalating spiral of suspicion with increased tension and confusion between procedural, substantive, and relationship issues. In the most extreme situations, people of normal integrity and good will actively seek to defeat each other (Alder and Calico, 2003).

Some Dialogical Experiences in Nigeria

Police handling of many aspects of the problem of minorities and many other subjects together with the Bill of Parliament for Independence (1960). The dialogue strengthened Nigeria’s diversities at the embryonic stage of nationhood. Worthy of note is the fact that Nigeria’s constitution has undergone several reviews via national conferences such as 1978, 2005 and 1994/95 conferences. There was also a Truth Commission (1999-2001) and the most recent national conference (2014). This national dialogue was saddled with the aim of realistically examining and genuinely resolving, long-standing impediments to our cohesion and harmonious development as a truly Federal State. According to President Jonathan Goodluck “our sole motivation for convening this Conference is the patriotic desire for a better and greater nation; we are determine that things must be done in a way and manner that will positively advance that objective”. The conference had these Recommendations; Creation of 18 New States, Resource Control/Derivation Principle/Fiscal Federalism, Public Finance/Revenue Allocation, Forms of government Legislature, Power Sharing/Rotation,

local Government, Immunity Clauses, Independent Candidacy, Governance, Anti-corruption, Land Tenure Act, National Anthem and Religion (Kwuelum, 2014).

Agitation for Supremacy: Impediment to Meaningful Dialogue

Ethnic and political supremacy in Nigeria today is no longer a hidden issues, hence it is widely accepted that different ethnic groups especially, the two major political parties in Nigeria, the People Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC) are now at each other neck for who would take over power. More so, agitation for supremacy interplays in the area of religion as the two main religious in Nigeria are always at each other neck.

In this vein, Alazeiuwa (2015) explain that these contests for supremacy always throw a state or nation to become prone to economic dislocation and political instability, all which are indices of state failure. Rotberg (2002) also affirms that agitation for supremacy guarantees that economics sphere is characterized by deteriorated standard of living, a lack of public goods and services, the flourishing of corruption and rent – seeking, and a pervasive, economic stagnation. In this sense, the paper argues that the trend at which people within different ethnic affiliation agitation for supremacy hinders seriously on the process of dialogue.

Again, in the political sphere, some leaders and their allies readily work to subvert prevailing democratic norms by coercing legislatures and bureaucracies into subservice, compromising judicial independence, stifling the emergence of civil society or space, and abusing security and defence force for parochial end (Alozeuwa, 2015). To this earn, power tussle and context continues to persists, which does not in any sense, give room for meaningful dialogue. Alozieuwa (2015) rightfully noted that political sphere is dotted with ethnic discrimination, acrimony and resultant discord. Because of this ethnic discrimination in the Nigerian context, government which was supposed to be built for the wellbeing of the general public, inspite of ethnic patrimony, tends to be operate for the fit of all the nation's citizens are perceived to have become partisan, which in real sense does not give room for meaningful dialogue,

Similarly, the socio-political and ethno-religious experience of Nigeria, comprising of multi ethnic, cultural and lingual, with its vast populations distributed among over 300 ethnic groups and equally between two major religious – Islam and Christianity along geographical demarcation of North and South, it faces the challenges that come with diversity. Therefore, when there is inadequate representation; and interests with positions seen as insignificant and irrelevant, then the struggle/quest for identify and recognition is visible as an exercise of

‘agency’ (Kwuelum, 2014). This phenomenon results to militia group formations, which is a clear indication of the focus of this paper that ethnic religious and political contest leads to lack of meaningful dialogue.

Recommendations

Nigeria’s scenario is built around a cycle of repeated factors/causes, and militarization of national life. Conflict does not end with an accord; hence there is a need for a sustained engagement and a constantly renewed strategy (Lederach, 2012). This will naturally lead to violence prevention, despite the fact that it is extremely difficult to turn the imagination from the effects of massacre to the imaginably tasks of rebuilding (Pouligny *et al.*, 2007). Such a dialogue – engagement would enable people treat each other with dignity become more connected and able to create more meaningful relationships thereby leading to a sustainable development and wellbeing.

The provision of sound social security system for all citizens is long overdue in this country. It is necessary to provide for the social needs of the aged, the unemployed and destitute who as citizens of this country should be guaranteed at least a minimum standard of living as well as provision of Protection of Fundamental Rights to all Citizens Irrespective of One’s Social Status for this will go a long way to bring peace.

It is imperative to have a dialogical exchange between insider and outsider knowledge and practice, thereby enhancing the elements of human dignity. This is because when dignity is violated, the reaction is possibly an aroused aggression, even violence, hatred and vengeance.

Effective dialogue is not only of representation, but also of inclusiveness and participation. It should be accessible and at the micro and macro levels. It begins with the individual to the other/community and so entails trust building, transparency and transformation.

It involves education, because it is about changes in worldviews/perspectives. Good leadership/governance is synonymous to good followership/citizenry. Motivation towards transparent and acceptable dialogue is drawn from all forms of leadership (political, communal family, religious, secular, nongovernmental, traditional etc) within a context. A national unity/interest oriented leadership strives to formulate and execute policies that interpret the recommendations of such conferences. The recommendations and implementations must be for the Common Good.

Truth commissions and accords are not end products of dialogue. Holistic mechanics for peace building should be integrated for a just peace and sustainable human, structural

development, healing and wellbeing. Probably, National conferences/dialogues are invariably limited in what they can do psychologically because they are often shaped by political compromise, and also impose limits on victim interaction with the process because of time and resources (Hamber, 2010).

There are varying perceptions regarding citizenship between states and at national level. The autonomy, which states/governors enjoy sometimes opportunities for clustered ambiguity regarding citizenship as birthright or indigene-ship being distinguished from citizenship. National conferences/dialogues should be for long and short-term nation/state building and peace building in Nigeria, the agitation for restructuring of Nigeria's federalism should also be considered for a peaceful co-existence (Clerk, 123).

Mass literacy is sine qua non for development anywhere for all countries that are developed in the world have a high level of literacy. To achieve mass literacy in Nigeria, it is suggested that all levels of the educational system be made tuition free, with primary education made compulsory, while adult literacy should be taken to our citizens in the rural areas.

Employment generation is one social need our leaders cannot afford to ignore in all future development planning. And therefore, effort should be made towards the generation of employment for youths.

Conclusion

The relevance of dialogue cannot be overemphasized as it is necessary for amelioration of the deplorable state of economic, political resources of the country, therefore, the paper emphasize that dialogue is a reasonable means in attaining development and long envisage peace in the country and not power contest or ethnic militia.

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The Politics of Media Reportage in the Herder-Farmer Conflict in Nigeria

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Abstract

The farmers- herders conflict in Nigeria is a burning issue that has attracted heated discourse in the media, the discourse of farmers-herders conflict characteristically assumes discordant tunes anchored on claims of rights and arguments of ownership but the politics of the reportage in the various media channels has complicated the issue and called for a clearer picture of the reality of the situation. The thrust of this study is to examine the politics of media reportage on the farmers-herders conflict; how the media have presented or represented the issues surrounding the conflict to the public. Using the analytical research method, the paper randomly refers to newspapers editorials and feature articles, print and electronic media news reports, discussions, interviews and press conferences on the farmers-herders conflict as units of analysis. Key research questions are: what information did the media reports give out to the public on the farmers-herders conflicts in Nigeria? How political are the media reports on the herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria? What is the way forward, if necessary, for media reportage of ethno-religions conflicts in Nigeria? This study finds out that a number of Nigerian Media gave out information on the number of casualties from the herders-farmers' crises in Nigeria, pictures of herders with guns, history of the herders-farmers conflict, causes of the herders-farmer conflict, pictures of victims of herder-farmer crises with injuries and pictures of attacked farm lands and burnt houses. Others include pictures of refugees fleeing the herder-farmer conflict zones and the refugee camps on the front pages of their papers. The study concludes that the media adopted a mix of politics of sensationalism, blame, rhetoric and provocation, while other media adopted a mix politics of investigation, reconciliation and peace in their reportages.

The paper recommends that media in Nigeria should play the politics of media reportages developmentally and socially responsibly so as to avoid inciting further violence but encouraging peaceful co-existence between herders and farmers.

Key words: Conflict, Farmer-Herder, Media, Politics Reporta

Introduction

For centuries, Fulani herders have lived in relative harmony with settled farming communities. These two groups have benefited historically from symbolic partnership to keep crop land fertile and cattle well nourished (Bagu & Smith, 2017: 4). This peaceful co-existence had enabled most disputes between the two groups to be resolved amicably, through traditional mediation mechanisms. However, this cordial rapport has increasingly deteriorated due to the scramble for limited natural resources for survival between farmers and herders (Kaja & Smith, 2020, P-9). The conflict between herdsman and farming communities in Nigeria has evolved into a deadly dimension with many lives lost and property destroyed across the country.

A report shows that from 2001 to 2016, about 60,000 deaths resulted from Fulani militia attacks in Nigeria (IEP, 2016). In 2014, the Fulani herdsman were ranked the 4th deadliest terrorist group in the globe for killing 1,229 people in 2014 up from 63 in 2013 (IEP, 2015). In 2016, the Fulani herdsman killed more people than Boko Haram in Nigeria. The Amnesty international claimed that in January 2018 alone the Fulani herdsman claimed the lives of 168 people, in April, 19 people including two Catholic Priests in Benue and in June, more than 86 people in Jos, Plateau State, (Nwankwo, Ayadiuno, Ali & Madu, 2020:191-192).

Several studies validated media's contribution to violence, instability and fragmentation of Yugoslavia (Robertson, 2004, as cited in Ciboh, 2017:2). Many blamed the media for inciting the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. In Nigeria, media are known to sensationalize crises situations, promote prejudicial stereotypes about groups and individuals, and even instigate and sustain violent conflict (Yusuf, 2002, Ahmed, 2002, Pate, 2011 as cited in Ciboh, 2017:2). Media are strong forces in constructing social reality of conflicts and selectively representing these realities through practices and reportage. Thus, depending on specific interpretations or selective representation, media reportage of conflict can have escalatory or de-escalatory consequences (Ciboh, 2017:3).

Studies have found that the way a news story is presented suggest the expected reactions or behaviour from the recipients. Adisa and Abdulraheem (2017:11) have observed that the incessant unrest between herders and farmers arising from the reprisal killings are

attributed to media frames and sensational electoral comments. A study carried out by Onyebuchi, Obayi and Nwagu (2019) report that the coverage of the herdsmen and farmers conflicts is mostly unfavourable and argued that media reportage should rather support the de-escalation of the dispute via the use of soft words and objective coverage and reportage of the conflict devoid of political and ethnic-religious sentiments (Nwankwo et al, 2020:193). Shehu (2017) contends that newspaper portrayal of Fulani people, including the Fulani herders as conflict mongers increases the sensitivity of Fulani-phobia which hinders the resolution of conflict (Nwankwo et al 2020:193).

Several researches have been conducted by scholars on the herders and farmers conflict in Nigeria. A study by Gever and Essien (2019) focused on the two critical issues namely the newspaper level of attention and the language of reportage. Odunlami (2017) has analyzed the main themes and essential speakers in newspapers narratives of the conflict while Shehu (2017) investigated newspapers' reportage of the conflict mongers. Ciboh (2017) also conducted a content analytical study of newspaper framing of the armed attacks. Notwithstanding all these, studies on the politics of the media reportage of the farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria are almost non-existent. This study is therefore, apt to fill this research gap by examining the inherent politics in the media reportage of the conflict: how the media have presented or represented the issues surrounding the conflict.

Statement of the Problem

As a result of media reportage which has assumed sensationalism, clashes between cattle herder and farmers over scarce resources have reached crisis level in Nigeria as death toll escalates astronomically on the daily basis. Many studies have been conducted by scholars on the herders-farmers crisis however there is an existing research gap as none of the studies have investigated the inherent media politics in the reportage of the conflicts (Sambe, 2005:206). Several studies have confirmed media influence on fueling violence, instability and fragmentation in Nigeria. Generally, the media are known to sensationalize crisis situation, promote prejudicial stereo-types about groups and individuals and even instigate violent conflicts (Yusuf, 2002; Pate, 2011 as cited in Ciboh, 2017:3).

The sensational role of the media has underscored the precepts of Kukah (1999) who opines that "next to God is perhaps the media that legitimized what Nigerians consider to be the truth in any given situation" (Collins, 2018, Para, 1). Idowu (2017) submits that the political nature of media reportage is partly responsible for the escalation of conflict between herdsmen and farmers which has displaced more than 100,000 people in Benue and Enugu

States, and left them under the care of relatives or makeshift internally Displaced Person (IDPS) camps while many are still struggling to rebuild their lives (Okoro, 2018:2). This study therefore seeks to examine how the media have politically presented or represented the issues that are escalating the conflict.

Objectives of the Study

This study sets out to achieve the following objectives:

- i. To find out information that a select media reports' decided to give out on the herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria?
- ii. To examine the politics of the media reports on the herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria?

Research Questions

- i. What information did a select media reports decide to give out to the public on the farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria?
- ii. How political are the media reports on the farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria?

Contextual Definition of Concepts

Conflict: Conflict refers to the clashes and disagreement between farmers and herders over farming and grazing rights which has resulted in the several losses of lives in the affected areas. In many case crops are destroyed, properties destroyed and victims who are survivors thrown into famine, economic, social and psychological distress.

Farmers- Herders: these are the two groups at the center of the conflict over farming and grazing right. The farmers are into tilling and cultivation of the land, either for subsistence or large scale agriculture, while the herders are the nomadic, pastoralists who roam about for the purpose of feeding their livestock. Both groups contest for land to achieve their desired objective. But then the land is static while human population keeps growing astronomically as the duo keep competing over it.

Media: the scope of media comprises the press, broadcast, social media, films videos and any published material that discusses the conflict between the herders and farmers in Nigeria.

Politics: Media reasons, decisions and appeals that determine the final action of publishing a news story.

Reportage: the act of sourcing, gathering and reporting of news about herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria; the reporting of news about herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria by the

press and the broadcasting media or the activity or the style of reporting events about herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria in newspapers or broadcasting them on television or radio. Iyorza (2021: 30) states that a reportage should be accurate and should give credit to the source when reported as news; it should be balanced and fair, it should be brief enough to give out the necessary information, and must be clear on the human interest; it must be objective above all while the facts must be subject to verification. News is an account of recent happening as gathered and processed by the news reporter while reportage is a packed report involving the perspective of the news reporter, the editor and features of the newsmakers.

Review of Literature

Concept of Media Politics

This is a broad concept which time and place will hardly permit us to do justice to it. Nevertheless, the study will take an incursion into the subject briefly for the sake of clarity. Media politics is an enormous challenge that faces Nigeria as a country. It seems this problem is common among non-western democracies where primordial politics dominate almost every face of our lives with no exception in media practice. Today, journalists find it difficult to practice what is referred to as autonomous reportage (Waishbord, 2013:235). The autonomous reportage being emphasized here according to Odiegwu-Enwerem, Oso, & Amodu (2020:182) is reporting with limited external influence which include but not limited to cultural, political, social, economic and religious ties. Thus, it is instructive to emulate the western democratic societies where objectivity, fairness, truth, independence and objectivity remain dominant values such that the adversarial relationship heightens between sources and journalists.

In keeping with the above, Siebert, Peterson & Schram (1963) maintain that the role of the media in the modern societies includes upholding the tenets of social responsibility through professional standards of truth, accuracy, and fairness in reporting. Owolabi (2017) (in Odiegwu, Enwerem, Oso, & Amodu 2020:282) argues that the media should report in a way to reflect and respect society and its diversity and plurality while avoiding actions that could cause violence and anarchy.

Conversely, the mass media have thrown over-board professionalism either for economic gains or to satisfy their conies. Media bias and slanting have replaced good journalistic practices. According to Usigbe & Ilo (2019:09) bias in the media takes place when a news medium's reportage is perceived to be unfair and unbalanced. Slanting on the other hand is the presentation of news reports from a stand pint or angle that reflects the biases of the medium. In his study Lichter (2014:2) says journalism is always measured against some

standards of dispassionate information- based reportage, which exhibits a concern for fairness, balance, and impartiality. The author further contends that bias and slanting are variously used to refer to distortions of reality, favouritism or one-sidedness in presenting conflicts through close-minded or partisan attitudes.

In Nigeria, Media ownership is closely tied to ethnicity and by extension the pattern of media reportage brazenly takes ethnic colouration. This anomaly predates the independence of Nigeria where newspapers that were published before and after the formation of NUJ towed the line of their proprietors and remained partisan. We could refer to the role played by the record (1891-1930)of Thomas Horatio Jackson, *LagosDaily* news of Herbet Macaulay (both men founded first Nigerian political parties).They however, used their newspapers to beat drums of division for them (Omu, 1978, cited in Daramola, 2013:44). Dahl (1961) and Pols-by (1963),(Cited in Onoa 2005:82) concurs that the mass media are part of the machinery through which rival pressure and policy proposal are expressed, made known, brought to arbitration in a multiple contest that makes for shifting equilibrium of influence. In the words of Amenaghawon (2015), (cited in Odiegwu-Enwerem. Oso& Amodu 2020:287):

...the origin and growth of Nigerian press evolved along the lines from the missionary days, through anti-colonialism, anti-military, regional or tribal press and thus created an impression for the emergence of what is commonly referred to as Lagos-Ibadan and Abuja-Kaduna (i.e, south-north) axis a template that virtually defines media practice along those seemingly innocuous but potent lines- providing a lens through which press activities in the country are viewed.

Similarly, the country is highly polarized along ethnic, religious, and geographical lines, which make analyses of issues sometimes, becloud emotions (Canci & Odukoya, 2016 &Osaghae & Suberu, 2005).In the contemporary days, the aforementioned may not be clearly demonstrated, but instead, the presentation and representation of news stories in a special way to achieve their sole objective can never be ruled out. It is in the light of above that Ahmed (2008), Odunlami (2017) Omenugha, Uzuegbunam, & omemnugha (2019) (as cited in Odiegwu-Enwerem, Oso & Amodu (2020:283) that the media have been accused of sensationalizing crises, promoting prejudicial stereotypes about groups and individuals, and indeed instigating and sustaining violent conflict in Nigeria. This has obviously exhibited media politics in Nigeria.

Review of Empirical Studies

Abdulbaqi & Ariemu (2017) carried out a study on newspapers Framing of Herdsmen- Farmers conflicts in Nigeria and its implication on the peace- oriented journalism. The study content analysed 100 samples of news stories on herdsmen-farmers conflict in selected newspapers, but focused attention on the dominant framer used in the conflict and the implications on peace- oriented journalism. The study revealed that situation oriented framers are mostly featured. Reports on herders-farmers conflicts are ignored. Reports on Herders-farmers conflicts are more violent, specific and narrowed featuring words like ‘killer herdsmen’ and ‘gun-carrying herdsmen’, ‘Jihadists herdsmen’, ‘greedy farmers’ ‘intolerable farmers’ and so on. The study maintained that such words cannot help in building peace between those in the center of the conflict. The authors therefore, recommends that the media operators should be more conscious in their choice of words in reporting herdsmen – farmers conflicts rather than employing words that are more divisive, stereotypic and conflict inciting. The study further advocates mass- newspaper of social happenings.

Odiegwu-Enwderem, Oso&Amodu (2020) did a study on News sourcing, positioning and thematic focus Examining Newspaper portrayal of Herdsmen – Farmers conflict in Nigeria. The study analysed the contents of six newspapers to explore the primary sources, The prominence accorded the conflict reports, and the themes focused on their reportage. Finding are that out of the 139 strives considered for the study, newspapers relied mostly on their correspondents and herdsmen representatives as primary news sources.

Public condemnation / protests and government / public intervention were the dominant thematic focus. The north- south media axis phenomenon in Nigeria re-echoed in the coverage as the frame of herdsmen- against- farmers, is indicated more in the southern-based newspapers consistent with the prevailing public option. The study in conclusion suggests that the media in Nigeria relied mainly on third party sources with the consequence their reports on the issue could be subject to source of credibility deficiency.

Nwankwo (2021) looks at the discursive construction of the farmer-pastoralist conflict in Nigeria which the paper analyses the media representation of the conflict. Data were newspaper editorials and regular columnists’ stories and supplemented by government that newspaper are agents of popular culture, they play a critical role in the propagation of various discourses of the conflict which such interpellation and are also contested. The paper further shows that the discourse is dichotomous on conflict between ecological reasoning and ethnic or regional as well as religions inclinations.

Onyebuchi, Obayi and Nwagy (2019) wrote on the newspapers' coverage of herdsmen attacks on host communities in Nigeria to find out the frequency of news coverage, its level of prominence depth of coverage as well as direction of herdsmen attacks on host communities. The study reveals that the coverage is most often unfavorable and posits that newspapers should support the de-escalation of the dispute through the use of soft words and objective coverage and reportage of the conflict bereft of political and ethno-religious sentiments.

Gever and Essien (2019) investigate newspaper coverage of the conflict between farmers and herdsmen in central Tiv land, Benue State, Nigeria, with specific emphasis on text format, frequency, prominences, depth of coverage, language of reports and audience assessment of the newspapers only covered the conflict as it happened but little attention was paid to victims of the conflict in the reportage. The study therefore suggests that Nigerian newspapers should refrain from episodic reportage and set a proper agenda for the Nigerian public on conflicts.

Usigbe&Ilo (2019) study bias and conflict reportage in Nigerian media, the case of Tiv Fulani herdsmen which the study sought to know whether group affiliation can cause perception of Bias in news and if so, what are the possible consequences on the media involved. The media outlet among those who perceived its news story as bias the paper further argues that reports maybe, partisans with the pre-existing notions will expect that the media will be biased against them because they do not perceive it as representative enough of their position. The study however, suggests that the media can do more in de-escalating of crisis by refraining from using words and phrase that can stereotype parties in a conflict

Chukwuma, Diri and Oginibo (2015) wrote on an exploration of the role of the mass media in crisis management, in which the writers express the power of the mass media to escalate or de-escalate conflict situation. They point out clearly instances the mass media have been able to escalate crisis by agenda setting influence of framing the news to incite the members of the public. This corroborated what Obot (2004 p.103) that the mass media are by themselves social structures and can either serve as tool for conflict exacerbation or vehicle for conflict resolution. This the study concludes that, in building peace, the mass media should be considered an integral part of the strategy of combatants, with acts designed to intimidate and terrify or appeal to the wider international community. Control over local media is an important objective of all parties in conflict resolution. Thus building an independent pluralist media must therefore be an objection of peacemakers. Therefore, ignoring the media in conflict situations can endanger all other peace building efforts.

The above reviews dealt with herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria at different perspective but none of the studies considered the issue of media politics in the reportage of the conflict between herders-and farmers in the country. Thus, the study however, wants to fill the lacuna that exists as a result of the aforesaid.

Theoretical frame work

The study argument is based on the two media theories, framing and social responsible theories to support and explain the anticipated roles as well as contribution of the mass media in building peace between the herders- farmers conflict in Nigeria. Framing as a concept is known in media studies as an extension of agenda setting theory. Framing describes the supposed effect that media reportage has on people's opinions regarding the issues more salient in domain, by making same issues in the public audience, readers and the viewer's mind. The mass media could also shape the consideration that people take into account when making judgments on issues relating to conflict and peace building among communities in Nigeria.

According to Entman (1993), Iyenger (1996) framing is, therefore, based on the assumption that the way an issue is characterized in the media reportage-positively, negatively or even neutral – could influence people's perception regarding that particular issue. As Entman (1993) noted, "to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation ,moral evaluation, and for treatment recommendation for the item described". For this reason, the media could over-colour, could escalate or de-escalate, raise panic and could be seen in the herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria where prominence is given to headlines, pictures and layout in newspapers, magazines, films, graphics or timing on radio and television (Gever,2013,P.110).

Social responsible theory is an outcome of a commission of media experts known as the Hutchins commission of inquiry of 1947. These media gurus emphasized the notion of social responsibility and pointed out the key journalistic standards of practice to be maintained by the press. The assumptions of the theory are, that freedom carries with it corresponding responsibility which, the media must not compromise (Macquail,2005,p.171). the details of this theory de-emphasize media politics, slanting and bias reportage thus, they provides support for the study as it shows that media practitioners have a responsibility to present, represent an unbiased account of herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria without slanting to any region or state.

Analyses of Selected Media Reports

Title: Is the media fuelling herder vs. farmer clashes?

Media Source: News African Magazine

Website: <https://newsafricamagazine.com>

Date: 31st July 2018

Reporter: Tom Collins

This news magazine's headline assumes a rhetorical dimension and uses the politics of sensationalism the essence is to provoke discourse on the role of the media in the herder-farmer crises in Nigeria. The summary of the report is that the media has politicized the herder-farmer crises through inciting reports that have escalated the conflict. The media outfit itself made comments like: "The issue is being portrayed as a land-grab by Muslims who are trying to Islamicise parts of Nigeria". With such remarks, the magazine became political, intentionally or otherwise, but the aim is to provoke parties (farmers, herders Association or politicians) to the conflict to approach the magazine outfit with the view to correcting wrong impressions. For example, at the end of the report, a line reads: "With politicians and the media intent on using the conflict to fit their own agenda, the mantle now falls to religious leaders around the country to instill a sense of calm in their communities and resist exporting the unrest outside the middle belt."

Title: Nigeria loses 8,343 persons to farmers-herders conflict, says Report

...As Benue, Plateau top states with most attacks

Media Source: Vanguard

Website: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/>

Date: 30th August, 2021

Reporter: Dirisu Yakubu

This report also employs sensationalism and fear by casting the headline to reflect such a high figure of persons who have lost their lives to herder-farmer crises, especially in Benue and Plateau States of Nigeria from 2005 to date according to findings by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, ACLED. The report further enumerates close to 900 attacks between the herders and the farmers. The emphases on high figures of victims of herder-farmer and number of attacks is not out of place but have been deliberately positioned by the editor, perhaps to draw attention to the media outfit.

Title: Various dimensions to farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria

Media Source: Premium Times Nigeria

Website: <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/>

Date: 18th May, 2020

Reporter: Taiwo-Hassan Adebayo

This report uses the politics of reason; itemizing reasons why a course of action happened and setting the agenda for the media audience to view the causes of a phenomenon. The report from this newspaper identifies various dimensions to the causes of herder-farmer conflict to include climate change, proliferation of small and light arms, demographic explosion, Jihadi infiltration, and weak governance, poorly secured international boundary among others, as exacerbating the violence.

Title: Nigeria: Livestock reform is key to solving farmer-herder conflict

Media Source: The Africa Report

Website: <https://www.theafricareport.com/>

Date: 9th June 2021

Reporter: Comfort Ero

This reportage adopts the approach of reconciliation, seeking to find solution to the herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria. The paper describes as insufficient, the Nigerian Government's response of deploying Nigerian authorities to the affected areas to deal with the conflict but stresses the need for the Government to seek solution to the main cause of herder-farmer conflict: competition over land and water. Part of the report's suggestion is that Nigerian authorities should work with donors and private sector partners to urgently address the conflict. Abuja and supportive state governments should display stronger political backing for the new plan, improve public communication and win the support of herders and farmers by assuaging their concerns and dispelling misperceptions about NLTP's purpose, while the federal and state governments should engage with donors and investors to ease funding shortfalls. The paper also suggests that the Federal Government should also increase efforts to build up expertise and train people on how to manage ranches and grazing reserves.

Title: Herders-farmers clash: In search of lasting solution to age-long conflict

Media Source: The Guardian

Website: <https://guardian.ng/saturday-magazine/>

Date: 24th July, 2021

Reporters: Lawrence Njoku (Enugu), Onyedika Agbedo (Lagos), Charles Ogugbuaja (Owerri), Joseph Wantu (Makurdi), Isa Abdulsalami Ahovi (Jos) and Ahmadu Baba Idris (Birnin Kebbi)

This report also adopts the politics of solution in the reportage. State Governments' regular meetings with herders and farmers could be recognised as efforts towards de-escalating the crisis between the two parties, the replacement of open grazing with ranching in the country and establishment of ranches, Periodic provision of information, education and strategic communication on the development of grazing reserves in the frontline states.

Title: Fulani Herdsmen Are Not Under Attack in Ebonyi, Says Police

Media Source: Channels Television

Website: <https://www.channelstv.com/2021>

Date: 4th January, 2021

This report adopts the politics of refute for the purpose of promoting peace. One of the responsibilities of the media is to promote peace in reports and encourage national development. Channel Television began with a sensational approach by reporting on March 31st 2021 that “At Least 15 Killed as Suspected Herdsmen Attack Communities in Ebonyi”. This was capable of evoking emotions of fear of reprisals among the Fulani herders within Ebonyi State and other states. The report also introduced agitations among members of Ebonyi community. This politics of refute was necessary to avert further crises. To refute this report, the spokesperson for the Ebonyi State Command, DSP Odah Loveth Obianuju warned the public to beware of distorted and misleading videos in circulation all over social media and said there was no record of threat to the life of the peace-loving herders or their cows, neither to those residing in the said camp or in the entire State. The Commissioner of Police Ebonyi State, CP Philip Sule Maku also reassured the general public particularly the Fulani Herdsmen and their host community in Ebonyi State of the command's continued commitment to ensuring the safety and security of their lives and properties. The Deputy Governor of Ebonyi State, Barr Eric Kelechi Igwe swiftly reacted on 12th April, 2021 in a report tagged “Attack On Ngbo Community Not Done By Fulani Herdsmen, Says Ebonyi Govt” that the government is in touch with the leadership of the Fulani herdsmen (Miyetti Allah) who have denied involvement in the attack, adding that the herding community has sworn that they will not on any account perpetrate an attack on any party of Ebonyi State. This was extended to also politics of peace in the reportage.

Findings and Discussions

Findings show that media reportage on the herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria is quite rhetorical, sensational and provocative enough to increasingly fan the embers of hatred between the Fulani herdsmen and farmers in the country. The Media's theory of Corporate

Social Responsibility demands that the media should be responsible in their reports while transmitting information in a manner that will promote healthy and social and infrastructural development in the society. Sensationalism brings about palpable fear among media audience. The media, as findings reveal, used high rate of death figures of victims of herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria to show the seriousness of the crises. In addition, most of the media used pictures of victims with severe machete cuts and bullet wounds on their bodies, some in their pool of blood, while some media have reflected the burial ceremonies of the victims. This is found to be quite provocative and capable of fueling the crises the more. The media's inciting reports is therefore a deviation from these theories and such media reportages could be termed "politics of sensationalism".

In another development, findings also reveal that media reportage on herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria attempted to strive on the promotion of peace between the parties in conflict by adopting a historical approach into how, when and why the herder-farmer conflict has come into existence in Nigeria. This approach is more tilted towards living up to the Corporate Social Responsibility expectation of the media. Thus the media have engaged the "politics of reasons" in their reports by explaining the causes of the herder-farmer conflict and itemizing reasons why the conflict happened thereby setting the agenda for the government to know and proffer solutions to the herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria.

Findings from the above analysis also show that media reportage on herder-farmer conflict in Nigeria seeks to reconcile and bring peace between the herders and the farmers. The quality and thrust of some of the media reportage shows that the intent to expose the areas of weakness of the government and authorities, including the security agencies in combating the crises and to make suggestions on alternatives to bringing lasting peace in Nigeria. Most of the media reportages analysed above also tilt towards promoting peace between the herders and the farmer. Findings showed a report of a state government refuting circulated rumour on the herder-farmer clash with the intent to avoiding the escalation of further crisis in the state. This is called the "politics of refute".

The media's adoption of sensationalism, reasons and appeals for solutions to the end of the herder-farmer conflict and reconciliation as well as promotion of peace indicates the plurality of Nigeria's media approach to reporting conflict while the reasons for adopting specific approaches makes the Nigerian media political. This is also a justification of the framing theory which gives the media audience a picture of the narrative between herders and farmers without any colouration. The major shortcoming of adopting the media framing theory in some of the media approaches to reporting is the fact that a true representation of

issues involving ethnic, religious or tribal conflict is capable of inciting violence among the warring parties. Also the viability of the Social Responsibility Theory is tested in the findings of this study. The theory is found to be utilized and seems to be adopted in a manner that is capable of watering down the tensions generated by the herders-farmers conflict.

Conclusion

Politics in this context has been used to refer to appeals and techniques adopted by the media to communicate to their audience with particular intent for the media's gains. From the foregoing, two research questions were raised in this study: what information did the media reports decide to give out to the public on the farmers-herders conflicts in Nigeria and how political are the media reports on the farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria? This study concludes that a number of Nigerian Media gave out information on the number of casualties from the herders-farmers' crises in Nigeria, pictures of herders with guns, history of the herders-farmers conflict, causes of the herders-farmer conflict, pictures of victims of herder-farmer crises with injuries and pictures of attacked farm lands and burnt houses. Others include pictures of refugees fleeing the herder-farmer conflict zones and the refugee camps on the front pages of their papers.

Also the media reports were political in nature; with motives and appeals behind them. Thus, the media channels reportages characteristically traded blames and sensationalized their audience with the nature of their reports while others were investigative and reconciliatory in nature with the aim of promoting peace between parties to the conflict. Others media channels featured newsmakers such as the leaders of the *Meyitti Allah*, Governors of states in the conflict zones and expert views by incorporating their voices into their reportages. In conclusion, the media adopted a mix of politics of sensationalism, blame, rhetoric and provocation, while other media adopted a mix politics of investigation, reconciliation and peace in their reportages.

This study considers politicking in media reportages as normal but recommends that media in Nigeria should play the politics of media reportages developmentally and socially responsibly so as to avoid inciting further violence but encouraging peaceful co-existence between herders and farmers. This study also recommends that media reporters should be positively minded in their reports on the herder-farmer conflict and should detach their sentiments from such reportages even if they come from the same region with any of the parties to the conflict.

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THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 2007-
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ABSTRACT

The Boko Haram insurgency has raged on for close to 12 years and incidentally seemed to pick up in intensity not long after the significant disarmament and demobilization of the Niger Delta militants. However, unlike the Niger Delta militants who agitated over injustice in the geographical spread of indices of development especially when the massive contribution to the national coffers and devastating environmental degradation of the region are considered, the Boko Haram Insurgency is fundamentally rooted in religion. The insurgents and their disciples advocate a strict adherence to the tenets of Sharia Law. What is disturbing and discomfiting however is the resort to violence in a bid to enshrine their religious beliefs. A lot of the attacks, kidnaps and raids have been unreasonable but this has drawn the attention of the Nigerian government to the plight of the people readily available to be used as Boko Haram Insurgents. Due to the intensity of the attacks, the Federal Government's efforts to establish rural grazing areas for the violent herdsmen and in a bid to quell the spate of attacks and clashes between herdsmen and farmers was fiercely resisted and dubbed by many on social media platforms as an Islamization agenda. The federal government in a bid to mitigate the devastation in the Nigerian North East proposed a Ministry of the North East and has embarked on developmental programmes in the region. The thinking behind this is a realization that violence and civil unrest is often an indication of discontent. More often than not when the root issues have been properly addressed the tide of violence is usually stemmed. In the case of Boko Haram, some scholars have argued that deep poverty and illiteracy are fundamental reasons why people would readily resort to violence as a way of expressing their religious grievances. There are also others who have argued that the insurgency was a political tool when the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was not of Northern extraction. This paper will attempt to look at the correlation between ethno religious violence in Northern Nigeria and good governance.

Keywords: **Boko Haram, Islam, Terrorism, Jihad, Governance, Sharia**

Introduction

According to Newson, C (2011) starting in mid-2009, the international community watched as the Niger Delta took a break from violence. The decision to cease hostilities was shared. Militia leaders were taken aback by government raids on the camp of Tompolo, a powerful rebel commander. The Nigerian government was losing billions of dollars in oil revenues to militia attacks. Community sympathies for militancy were waning as battle fatigue and the costs of conflict grew. By October, most of the major militia leaders accepted an amnesty offered by the federal government, which guaranteed fighters freedom from prosecution and a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process with monthly stipend payments. Soon, however, it seemed all was not well. The personal involvement of then president Umaru Musa Yar'adua gave the process an early boost, but political attention to the amnesty dropped off significantly and was dealt a further blow after illness took the president to Saudi Arabia for treatment. In the six-month political crisis caused by his absence, progress largely stalled. A presidential amnesty committee was constituted, but it accomplished little beyond establishing procedures to pay 20,192 registered former militants their monthly stipends of \$430.

In one of his first speeches after taking office in May 2010 following Yar'adua's death, President Goodluck Jonathan named the strife in the Niger Delta as one of his administration's three top priorities. A new amnesty coordinator, TimiAlaibe, was appointed and eventually set up a camp offering two weeks of militant "reorientation training" conducted by a U.S. organization and a Nigerian partner nongovernmental organization (NGO).Alaibe had claimed "graduates" will be matched to suitable further study and jobs, but evidence of this is slight so far. Attacks on oil installations dropped close to zero after the 2009amnesty was announced, and somewhat normalized economic activity resumed in the delta. Yet the government still has not produced a credible work plan to address the many complex and holistic issues of demobilization and development needed to achieve peace.

Newson adds that few practitioners would defend a two-week course as likely to reorient armed group members, particularly if follow-up remains in doubt. And apart from early token handovers, there has been no serious effort at disarmament, nor any real acceptance that militias have handed in a significant portion of their arsenals.

Lessons from the Amnesty Programme

Since 2009 the chances for converting the amnesty into something more than a temporary cease-fire have largely eroded. The kidnapping industry in the delta persists, with a broadening of targets crossing new social and geographic divides on a monthly basis. An uptick in sea piracy since August 2010 and a series of armed raids on offshore oil platforms in November 2010 suggest some armed groups feel it is time to return to their previous activities. Incentives for violence in the region have not changed fundamentally, and profitable pursuits such as crude oil theft have not dried up. Mounting rumors talk of a large arms buildup like those seen ahead of the 2003 and 2007 elections, even as, starting in latesummer 2010, elections have drawn political attention away from the Niger Delta yet again (though the October 1 car bombings in Abuja forced a brief return to the limelight).

Most signs suggest a fresh crop of militants are likely to emerge within the next twelve months to demand their share of the resources being tapped from the region—unsurprisingly, when the amnesty process has not addressed root conflict issues or the region’s persisting economy of violence.

The international community has found it difficult to key into the sketchily defined amnesty process effectively. Several of Nigeria’s strategic partners made appropriately cautious early offers of technical assistance, such as with the DDR process. Diplomatic actors also genuinely tried to understand the amnesty’s evolving actors and dynamics, though many had complicated briefs that limited the time they could spend on them. But when the Nigerian government rejected outside help, international engagement on the delta was left struggling. To their credit, foreign governments have so far refused to back the amnesty with blank checks; limited support remains open through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Yet there may not be much for them to do until greater political will emerges, which has led some to adopt a wait-and-see approach, effectively treating the amnesty as reason to keep their distance from the delta. As the amnesty appears to be slowly deteriorating, the challenge for international actors is to make plans for two distinct scenarios: a late recourse to action by the Nigerian government or another surge in violence, which must be navigated and followed by the next opportunity for a lasting peace.

The Boko Haram Insurgence

The conflict in the Niger Delta cannot rightly be described as an ethno religious conflict. It was more of an uprising and violent insurgence against injustice towards the goose that lays the golden egg. What it showed however as regards this study is that violence can often be an

indication of some of inequity or injustice in the society. It is hence important that government always takes the effort to determine the root source of a conflict in its efforts to bring a lasting solution.

According to Campbell, J (2014) Boko Haram is a radical Islamist movement shaped by its Nigerian context and reflecting Nigeria's history of poor governance and extreme poverty in the north. The movement is unique in that it combines a sectarian, radical Islamic agenda with violence. Its stated goal is the establishment of a sharia state, but it shows little interest in actually governing or implementing economic development. It is based on the fundamentalist Wahhabi theological system and opposes the Islam of the traditional northern Nigerian establishment, which is broadly tolerant. Boko Haram and its more radical splinter, Ansaru, are steadily expanding their area of operations.

Kidnapping has become a major source of revenue and is widespread, while attacks have occurred in Lagos and Kano. The government's response has been to treat Boko Haram as a part of the international al-Qaeda movement. Security service abuses are likely a driver of some popular support for or acquiescence to Boko Haram. The struggle between the government and Boko Haram has dire humanitarian consequences. Many people have been internally displaced in northern Nigeria and many refugees have fled to neighbouring countries. The international community may be asked to help provide humanitarian assistance in what is one of the poorest parts of the world.

Expanding Territorial Control and Military Setbacks

In 2013, the Nigerian military intensified its campaign against Boko Haram. Yet its indiscriminate tactics failed to degrade the group's capacity and deeply alienated the region's civilian population. A state of emergency imposed on Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States only deepened the cycle of violence. In high-level statements and meetings, both the U.S. and European governments stressed the need to improve civilian protection and address the root causes of violence.

Despite these warnings, Jonathan pushed for more security assistance while downplaying the degree of dysfunction within the Nigerian military and the worsening humanitarian crisis. As a result, the bilateral relationship between the United States and Nigeria deteriorated. In April 2014, Boko Haram's kidnapping of 276 female students from the town of Chibok made worldwide headlines, drawing greater policy attention to the crisis. Several Western governments—including the United States—offered technical assistance and intelligence-sharing to help find the girls.

The U.S. State Department formed a Nigeria Planning and Operations Group that brought together technical and regional experts as well as a military liaison to plan and coordinate rapid responses to the crisis. However, concerns over human rights abuses by Nigerian security forces hampered greater cooperation, even as Boko Haram expanded its control of the northeastern countryside. Increasingly concerned about Boko Haram's threat to regional stability, the United States as well as France and the UK began shifting their focus to Nigeria's neighbors. Various U.S. agencies began pushing for greater military cooperation between the Lake Chad countries, and the United States leveraged the Global Security Cooperation Fund and the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund to increase security assistance to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

This shift allowed the U.S. government to support military efforts against Boko Haram while circumventing the policy hurdles associated with direct aid to the Nigerian government. In parallel, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) launched several smaller-scale stabilization efforts aimed at increasing community resilience to violent extremism in the wider Lake Chad region.

REGIONALIZATION AND RETURN TO CLANDESTINE TACTICS (2015-PRESENT)

In early 2015, in the midst of Nigeria's election season, a renewed military offensive began making headway against the group. After repeated delays, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF)—a loose coalition of troops from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria—seized back most of the territory previously held by Boko Haram. Counterinsurgency operations triggered new waves of displacement as civilians were pushed from the countryside into military-controlled camps in urban centers. Yet the involvement of neighboring countries also sparked an increasing regionalization of the crisis and further militarization of the conflict response. With Buhari's inauguration in May 2015, relations between the Nigerian government and Western partners improved, opening the door to increases in Western security assistance—including the deployment of U.S. and British military advisers and the sale of light attack aircraft in 2017.

Over the past three years, Boko Haram's decline has been uneven. As the insurgents were pushed back into more remote rural areas, they reverted to earlier tactics, relying on guerilla-style attacks and suicide bombings. Nigerian security forces have struggled to consolidate control over rural areas and protect urban centers from sporadic attacks. While the number of fatalities associated with the group has declined, the number of attacks has fluctuated, and patterns of violence have remained largely consistent since 2014. The group has splintered

into two main factions or cells: a larger faction led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi now brands itself as the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), while AbubakarShekau still commands a group of militants under the group's previous name, Jama'atuAhliSunnaLidda'awatiwal-Jihad (JAS). Over the course of 2018, ISWAP appears to have expanded its reach in northern Borno, reportedly even recapturing a number of towns near Lake Chad previously controlled by the Nigerian military. While some areas—particularly in Adamawa State, Yobe State, and southern Borno—have thus seen greater security and the return of displaced populations, other parts of Borno State still struggle with ongoing military operations and humanitarian crisis conditions.

The International Response Comes Late

The donor community on the ground in Nigeria was late to acknowledge the severity of the crisis, and slow to scale up its response. Several factors explain this pattern. First, in the early years of the crisis, international partners were hesitant to push back against Nigerian authorities' assurances that the conflict response was under their control. In contrast to other conflict-affected states, the Nigerian government wields significant resources and regional power, resulting in a greater stature vis-a-vis international partners. Donor governments thus prioritized working through Nigerian government structures rather than sidestepping local authority, even as bureaucratic obstruction, a lack of committed interlocutors, and in-fighting between different levels of government slowed down the response.

Second, donor states and the United Nations (UN) had little political interest in declaring the region a large-scale emergency, which would have required additional commitments of resources in an already crisis-ridden international context. For example, in 2014–2015, the UN leadership in the country did little to press for greater international involvement, despite evidence of worsening conditions in the northeast. Western capitals, already preoccupied with crises in Iraq, South Sudan, and Syria, in turn saw Nigeria as a resource-rich country with less need for international aid. Those donors already present in Nigeria prior to the crisis had mostly specialized in development programs in areas such as health and education, which often relied on close collaboration with Nigerian authorities. Few had a direct presence in the northeast, and those that did worked via partnerships with smaller local groups. However, the scale of these efforts was far below the level of need.

Thesedynamics further delayed the transition to a comprehensive conflict response.

Lastly, the deteriorating security situation and lack of communication lines with Boko Haram limited access and made it difficult to obtain accurate assessments of the rapidly evolving crisis.

Beginning in 2013, the state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States severely restricted mobility and communication flows in the region. Even as the military began pushing Boko Haram into retreat in 2015, continued insecurity prevented the return of civilian administration, and access beyond Maiduguri remained tightly controlled by the Nigerian military. Despite this difficult context, several donors launched small-scale peacebuilding and countering violent extremism (CVE) programs in the northeast, generally centered on Maiduguri. Yet persistent security concerns and access restrictions prevented a rapid scale-up. Only in mid-2016 did reporting on widespread starvation in Bama, a town in northeastern Borno, trigger a radical increase in the overall donor response. International aid organizations thus reached many areas more than a year after they had been retaken by Nigerian military forces. They found people living in devastating conditions, with little access to food or basic supplies. Most initial efforts prioritized delivering emergency humanitarian assistance to the newly accessible areas. For example, USAID ramped up humanitarian assistance in Nigeria “from virtually nothing in 2014 to \$291 million committed for fiscal year (FY) 2017.”

A Contested Shift toward Stabilization and Early Recovery

As security conditions improved in late 2016 and early 2017, the discourse of both the Nigerian government and its international partners began shifting toward stabilization. The Nigerian government released the so-called Buhari Plan, which outlines its postconflict recovery priorities in the northeast that range from emergency assistance to stabilization and early recovery. A regional stabilization strategy—developed by the African Union and Lake Chad Basin Commission—followed in 2018. Programs aimed at setting the ground for a transition to longer-term development and governance activities began to take shape. For example, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) rolled out initial assessments to learn about people’s perceptions of governance in the northeast and displaced communities’ willingness to return to their home communities, which served as a basis to inform their programming. In March 2017, the U.S. government finalized a strategy for countering Boko Haram and ISWAP, which states that the United States seeks to ensure that the Lake Chad basin countries, together with local authorities and international partners, are “able to address specific regional and community-level conditions that are drivers of conflict and that make communities vulnerable to violent extremist groups.”

Yet this shift toward stabilization has also provoked resistance. Humanitarian aid organizations working in Nigeria have argued that it comes too soon, noting that the conflict is still ongoing and hundreds of thousands of people remain beyond the reach of basic emergency assistance. They fear that the language of stabilization is playing into the hands of Nigerian authorities who are eager to emphasize a return to normality and a shift to long-term development assistance while downplaying ongoing crisis conditions. Over the past year, for example, Nigerian authorities have pushed aggressively for displaced civilians to return to their home communities, while Buhari has repeatedly declared that Boko Haram has been “technically defeated.” Humanitarian actors warn that a change in donor priorities may lead to aid being allocated based on the Nigerian government’s political priorities rather than civilian needs, thereby leaving vulnerable groups without assistance.

The Boko Haram Conflict and Good governance

Although the bone of contention of religious insurgents is enshrinement of Sharia law, good governance and sensitivity by the Nigerian government can go a long way in dissuading a young population from enlisting as terrorists. According to Uguanyi, B.I (2014) et al the Niger Delta Militancy is a consequence of the failure of the Nigerian state to deliver basic services and development in the region. An effective and sustainable control of the militancy in the region requires, therefore, an accelerated and holistic development of the region to compliment the successes of the amnesty policy. Achieving this development basically requires a positive attitudinal change on the part of the state and national political leaderships in the direction of using effectively the available resources for socio-economic development. Such is not only necessary for the control of the existing Niger Delta Militancy but for forestalling future ones that may be induced by similar neglect of development needs of people in the other parts or regions of Nigeria.

A similar approach must also be adopted in Northern Nigeria. The conflict with Boko Haram is essentially ideological. Apart from covert and overt Military operations to stamp out the activities of armed militants the population must be persuaded to continually act in the interest of the nation. An individual that is gainfully employed or occupied will not be readily susceptible to be recruited as an insurgent. Quality education, good infrastructure and opportunities to be gainfully employed are hence an imperative in stemming the tide of insurgency in Northern Nigeria.

According to Peacebuilders (2017), bad governance leads to corruption, poor service delivery, lack of education, conflict, poverty and lack of infrastructure. Economic factors including poverty, need for money, and employment constituted the third most likely reason

for people to join Boko Haram (26%). This was equalled by the proportion of respondents who felt that the urge to belong to a group also played a significant role in influencing people's membership of Boko Haram (26%). Also not to be ignored is the influence of peer pressure (22%), the need for prestige or to be feared (22%) and lack of education (20%), which respondents felt also had marked influence on people's decision to become members. Only a very marginal sample of the peacebuilders thought that frustration with life (8%) and family pressure (4%) were accountable for membership in Boko Haram.

The overwhelming impression among the peacebuilders that religion and political factors were responsible for membership seems to detract slightly from the widespread theoretical view that poverty plays a major influence in terrorist recruitment. According to the findings of this study, poverty is one of the major factors but not the primary influence. The strongest appeal of the poverty thesis resonates in the fact that Boko Haram is said to lure recruits with offers of cash, loans and donations to poor traders.

The group is also believed to make cash payments to locals in return for information on movements of security forces. Peacebuilders' views in the qualitative interviews confirmed that in some cases people were promised a loan or job and were so desperate that they failed to consider the consequences of joining. In the words of one peacebuilder, 'they are frustrated; they either have no education and no job or they have a degree but cannot find a job. They see the successful and rich people and resent them. They want to kill them. Peacebuilder's perspectives on the link between 'the need to belong' and joining Boko Haram in the quantitative survey is in line with psychopathological analysis, which posits that at an individual level psychological or mental factors are important in understanding why people join violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram. Contrary to the findings from the literature review, only a marginal sample of the peacebuilders (2%) believed that coercive recruitment was a major factor influencing Boko Haram membership. Joining Boko Haram based on fear accounted for merely 2% of the reasons peacebuilders gave.

The qualitative interviews with peacebuilders showed a strong perception that lack of purpose in life or aimlessness caused by unemployment was a major factor influencing decisions to join Boko Haram. The qualitative interviews stressed that these individuals had nothing to do, felt vulnerable and were easily recruited to a perceived 'cause' as a result. Here the promise of a role, as well as that of money to support family members, held the strongest appeal. There was also a general perception that some people join Boko Haram without realizing what they were signing up for.

Conclusion

It can hence be stated that good governance in any country can go a long way in stemming the tide of ethno religious conflict. When government provides a healthy and secure environment for people to thrive and prosper the atmosphere is less charged and disagreements between people of different religions are less likely to disintegrate into violent conflict. The Nigerian government must also take decisive steps to crush the agents of radicalization and encourage peaceful coexistence in all parts of the country. The bodies governing the different religions in Nigeria must also be accountable to the government and their member constantly instructed to promote tolerance and peaceful coexistence. Inciting statements must be discouraged and persistent offenders promptly dealt with.

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Socio-economic Status and Health of the children: A Comparative Study of Urban and Rural Areas of Ikot Ekpene Local Government Area, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria

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Abstract

Recent studies have focused on the relationship between the socio-economic background of parents and the health implication of children. This study examined the effect of socio-economic status on the health of children in urban and rural areas of Ikot Ekpene Local Government Area of Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria using parent's educational level and family size as major indicators. Political economic theory was applied to explain the context of the study. The study adopted both quantitative and qualitative data collection instrument. A total of 500 respondents were drawn through a stratified random sampling method. The sample comprised children below 5 years of age who attended the five health instructions used for the study to seek health services from 2006 to 2010. The field data on parents' education and health of children were tested using the chi-square analysis at $\chi^2_{cal}=15.03$, $df=12$ at 0.005 level of significance; while data on family size and health of children were tested with the following results; $\chi^2_{cal}= 22.47$, $df=8$ at 0-05 level of significance. The result showed a positive relationship between parent's education, and family size and the health of children in urban areas, but a negative relationship among children in the rural areas. The study therefore concluded that parent's educational level and family size have great influence on the health of children in Ikot Ekpene urban while in the rural area, parents' educational level, and family size had no influence on health of children.

Keywords: socio-economic, health status, educational level, family size.

Introduction and Research Problem

Children within the age of 0-5 years are usually prone to disease attack. The level at which these infants are predisposed to disease as well as the type of disease or infections are dependent on certain social factors. Park (2009) classified childhood into the following

categories; Infancy (up to 1 year of age) (a) Neonatal period (first 38 days of life) (b) Post neonatal period 28th day to 1 year); School age (5-14 years)

According to Lucas and Giles (2003), infant mortality rate is accepted as a major index in the consideration of health status of members of a community. Infant and child mortality provides major indices for measuring the overall wellbeing and health status of children in most societies in a certain period, usually on the base of per 1,000 live birth (WHO, 2003). Creighton-Zollar (1993) defined child mortality as the rate of death of children from (0 – 14) years of age. This is usually expressed in a scale of per thousand of the population, while child morbidity refers to the rate of disease infection among children in a given population.

According to UNICEF (2018), Nigeria with a record of 9% of all infant mortality in the world ranked third in infant mortality rate in 2017, after India (24%) in first position and parkinstan (10%) taking second position. Lucas (2003) posits that child mortality risk in Nigeria is higher in the first year of the child's life and child mortality is lower among older children. The Nigerian Demographic and Health Survey showed that under five morbidity rate which resulted in mortality was estimated at 201 1000 live births while infant mortality rate is at 100 per 1000 live births. The figure when compared to those from other developing countries such as Mauritania, Tanzania, and Ethiopia which have an average of 100-189 per 1000 live births is quite high.

Gupta (2007) observed that early childhood disease usually occur between birth and the first year of life and this may be attributed to prevailing poor economic situation and ignorance by parent and caregivers. He maintained that disease such as malaria, pneumonia, measles, and malnutrition are common in sub-Saharan and Asian countries. To this extent, Nigerian government and some Non-governmental agencies have consistently paid attention to Primary Health Care services with focus in Childhood Health Promotional services such as regular immunization programmes against the major killer diseases such as yellow fever nutrition education, oral rehydration therapy as well as training of health personnel. Organizations such as UNICEF and WHO are concerned about the low impact of their healthcare interventions on the health status of children in Nigeria, especially as the country is still ranked very high in under five morbidity/mortality rate in the world.

There have been attempts to determine variables for measuring socio-economic status of individual in the society. Park (2009) adopted parent's education and family size in this study as variables to measure the socio-economic status and health of families. Epidemiological studies have supported that health and diseases are not equally distributed in

social classes. The implication is that individuals in the upper social classes tend to have longer life expectancy and better health and nutritional status than those in the lower social classes. Park (2009) stated that some of the important socio-economic variables affecting infant mortality rates both directly and indirectly are parents' income level, occupation, level of education and residential localities.

Bhatia's (1995) study in Bangladesh revealed that characteristics in the family as well as family size play significant role in the state of health of members especially the under five years old. He noted that health status of children particularly 0 – 5 years is a function of certain socio-economic factors as earlier noted. It was therefore the concern of this study to understand the influence some of the parents' educational status and family size on the health of children under five years in rural and urban settings in the study area.

Infant Mortality and Morbidity (in Nigeria): Views and Perspectives

Neonatal mortality and morbidity is still a major source of challenge to health personnel, parents, care givers and stakeholder in child welfare services as well as the generality of people in several societies. This challenge is seen to be more prevalent in developing nations of the world due to the relative deficiency in modern health care facilities, shortage of trained personnel and other socio-economic, cultural and environmental practices that are detrimental to the health of children. Aliyu, Agwu and Okoye (2018) reports that the health of children and women in rural and urban communities in Nigeria is a major public health concern due to the incidence of maternal and child mortality.

Education is a prominent determinant of the socio-economic status of an individual or group and is sometimes accepted as an influential factor in health. Hornby (2001) conceptualized education as a process of teaching, training and learning especially in schools, or colleges to improve knowledge and develop skill captures the major perspectives of the concept of education as applied in the study.

Haralambos (2008) further emphasized that the gap in educational attainment between the top and bottom classes remains significant. Educational attainment is a major socio-economic variable that influences the health status of members of the society. Park (2009) views education as a crucial element in economic and social development. This is because the levels of education and literacy directly relate to the level of awareness and contribute to improvement of economic conditions which determine the level of awareness, access to health care facilities. The utility of education in women shows in their child bearing and rearing practices. Educated women are less likely to engage in early pregnancies. They rather space their children and make better use of health care services.

Mothers' Education and Child Health

Fotulile (2009) maintained that maternal health is important component of family health status which itself is a function of the educational level of both parents. Educational status of parents is also a major predictor of the health of their offspring and health care utilization. According to Olori (2004), the risk of children morbidity and decreases as maternal education increases while Chowbury (2003) posited that the level of education of parents has influence on the rate of prevalence of childhood diseases more than any other factor. For instance, educated mothers are more likely to practice exclusive breastfeeding which is an effective way of reducing the risk of prevalence of infant/child morbidity and mortality. Achu, Okorie, Omang and Nwankwo (2020) believe that multiple child birth constitutes a challenge to security system and also has direct or indirect implications on the crime rate in every society

Park (2009) emphasized that illiteracy is the greatest barrier to health, and that educated women are more likely to marry later and practice family planning. Chen (2003) strongly argued that higher education has a higher likelihood of attracting higher economic situation which will increase the capacity to afford better health care services, as well as better nutrition for the pregnant women. Education obviously increases the awareness of available alternatives.

WHO (2017) reported that Nigeria ranks the third in infant mortality rate, while India and Pakistan ranked first and second position respectively. Reacting to WHO (2008) report that 1.4million children die yearly from diarrhea caused by unclean water and poor sanitation, Nwokeome (2009) asserted that the solution to the problem in addition to the provision of good water, improved sanitation and good governance is sound maternal education. He concluded that educated women explore techniques of purifying their water for consumption and also ensure greater hygiene.

In separate remark, Lukas (2003) noted that education makes people to attach high value to their health as a worthwhile asset with a desire to live long and feed well, as well as to seek information from health personnel on modern health support services. In addition, a number of high impact preventive and curative interventions such as the use of Insecticide Treated Net (ITN) and home based care of diarrheal diseases such as Oral Dehydration Therapy (ORT) use are supported by education. In a study by Ekanem and Asindi (1999), it was observed that malaria induced mortality/morbidity was very high among illiterate mothers. This was attributed to poor knowledge, unhealthy environment and poor utilization of available health services by the illiterate mothers. It is the illiteracy of mothers that make

them religiously hold unto taboos and food fads that are detrimental to the health of growing children. The belief of mothers that children should not be given egg and meat, deprive these children of adequate nutritional requirement for their healthy growth and development. It is only educated mothers that can reject this anti-nutritional health cultural belief (Ekong, 1999). Education enables people to identify and resist cultural practices and beliefs that are contrary to recommended modern lifestyles for healthy living.

Family Size and Child Health

Family size is a critical element in demographic and developmental studies. Family size records are usefully applied in the planning and projection for the socio-economic wellbeing of citizens. Family size refers to the total number of persons in a family which is dependent on factors such as duration of marriage, education of the couple, and the number of live births.

Goody (1986) believes that the more children there are in the family, the greater, the financial pressure on the couples' income. This weakens the couples' capacity to cater for the educational needs, health and general up-keep of the family. The study carried out in 1999 and reported by NDHS in 2003 revealed that estimated chronic childhood malnutrition of 44-50% was observed in the Northeast and Northwest Nigeria where family sizes were usually large. The researcher's view therefore is that children whose mother has five children or more has a risk of malnutrition five times greater than those with one or two children.

UNCEF (2005) report indicates that health outcome depends on a variety of household determinants such as income, education, number of children and environment. The report also corroborates the report of NDHS (2003) that the northern region of Nigeria is experiencing much higher child malnutrition and mortality than in the South. Mokere (2003) also observed that women with large number of children under-utilize available health care services because too many demands on their time force them to skip health care.

Similarly, the prevalence rate of cases, infections, diarrhea, malnutrition and severe respiratory infection are found to increase with family sizes (Bar-Joseph, 1999). Also, the duration of such diseases is also found to be longer in families with 3 or more children. It is here assumed that mothers with many children have a higher tendency of depriving her children of maternal care, and fewer children would mean better maternal care, better share of family resources less morbidity and reduced infant mortality. Excessive child bearing is also a result of certain cultural beliefs that children are gifts from God and are not meant to be numbered. This belief is more common in the rural areas where the size of an individual family is a measure of wealth and there is little or no effort to regulate or control the supply

of children. Similar to that, some cultures also recommend large number of children for families in order to increase the chances of survival of a certain number as consolation should mortality sets in. In such situations, child rearing is perceived as a very risky process with a very high risk of mortality and morbidity. This cultural load leads to increased child births amidst depleted resources. Existing literature therefore tends to confirm that family size has great influence on the health of children and large family size is common among poor and illiterate parents.

Theoretical Framework: Political Economy Theory and Ecological Systems Theory are used to explain capitalist and social work orientation to health. Political economy theory is derived from Marxism/Capitalist orientation. Adherents of the theory argue that medicine is closely related to the concept of social control and is used to punish deviance, define normality and that it operates on behalf of a privileged few in the society. Accordingly medicine ensures that the population remains healthy enough to contribute to the economic system by working to produce profit for the privileged class (Navaro, 1986). Hence, the capitalist's definition of health and illness are critically linked to the ability to produce goods and services by the family. Medicine as an ideology, functions by masking the difference in health by social class, gender and ethnicity which are caused by differences in wealth, income, living and working conditions. The medical profession does this by providing an explanation of ill-health as the result of lack of healthy living, or of the individual engaging in activities that put health at risk.

Political economy theory is believed to make a significant contribution to public health issues, research and policy. It provides perspective on a key set of public health concerns demonstrating the efficacy of the theoretical framework. It centers on social capital and effect on health. This provides also further understanding of the relationship in relatively affluent societies between income inequality and mortality patterns. Social capital has been empirically linked to, among other things, improved child health, development, adolescent well-being, increased mental health, rates and youth delinquency, and reduced mortality, among others etc.

Doyal (1979) posits that political economy is a body of analysis and a perspective to explain on health policy which seeks to understand the conditions which shape population health and health services development within the wider macro economic and political contexts. The relationship between economic development and health development are complex and can be analyzed in terms of a range of different linkages namely; that economic growth leads to increase resources for health, improved living conditions and better health;

health improvement contributes to economic growth, people's health is exchanged for economic growth and the disease burden associate with these is the price of economic growth, stagnation damages health and leads to negative health outcomes (Doyal, 1979). Political economy theory provides an understanding between income inequality and mortality patterns. The theory shows also that inequality in health are always fundamentally noted in differences of access to material resources including housing and relevant neighborhood amenities, poverty also provides health inequalities.

Political economy theory is considered suitable for explaining social-economic statuses and health of children because it takes into consideration the social-economic factors like educational level, income and family size. It also argues that wider factors causing ill-health are direct results of capitalism- including poverty, illiteracy, poor residents among others. The political economy provides understanding of the effects of social-economic status on health.

Ecological Systems Theory: Ecological Systems theory was developed by Urie Bronfenbrenner. The model believes that environmental factors largely influence functioning, and the manner in which persons respond to social stimulus. This model presents a framework that can enable the individual who is constrained in certain ways to influence his environment with a view to achieving positive environmental outcomes and change in the individual's social, economic or psychological status. This social work model focuses on the person-in-environment influence on human functioning.

In other to further explain the context of medical/healthcare practice and the individual response patterns in both the urban and rural areas, it is important to explore the content of the ecological systems perspective. The model clearly states that the satisfaction of human needs requires adequate resources in the environment and positive transaction between people and their environments. In this instance, effective healthcare facilities, parents/caregivers capacity to access the available healthcare services as well as a positive relationship between the healthcare providers and those seeking their services give a healthy interface between the consumers of healthcare and the environment of health (Charles, 2011). Any gaps in the environmental resources and limitation on the individuals who need to utilize these resources could lead to increased morbidity and mortality rates. Social workers therefore analyze the systems that reinforce human behaviour and activities in the social environment.

Methodology

The study adopted the survey design. The population comprised all under – 5

patients who attended the five health institutions used for the study in Ikot Ekpen Local Government Area, Akwa-Ibom State, Nigeria. Two institutions, Government General Hospital and Maternal and Child Health (MCH) in the urban and three in the rural areas; (Health Center Amayom, Health Center Ikot Udoe and Health Post Ikot Inyang) were used. A sample of 500 respondents was drawn from the five hospital records from 2006 to 2010 comprising both male and female under – 5 children. A stratified sampling procedure was used to draw this sample from all under 5 patients who were diagnosed and treated for any of the five diseases conditions used in this study, namely; malaria, diarrhea, measles, respiratory tract infectious (RTI) and protein energy malnutrition (PEM) had equal opportunity of being selected. Questionnaire, in-depth interview, and personal observation of each health care center were used in the study.

In addition, twenty-five health care providers, (five from each of the institutions) and twenty-five, parents from each of the health institutions were also interviewed, while a total of fifty respondents participated in the in-depth interviews.

Findings and Discussions

Table I: Level of Education and Health Status of Children (0-5 years): (Urban & Rural)

Disease	Non- formal		Primary		Secondary		Tertiary		Total	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
(Malaria)	21	47	26	41	11	21	10	12	68	122
(Diarrhea)	13	20	19	26	7	11	4	9	43	65
(Measles)	3	7	5	8	0	2	0	2	8	19
Upper respiratory Tract infection	12	21	21	27	6	11	4	7	43	66
Protein Energy Malnutrition	11	17	11	17	2	4	1	3	25	41
Sub-Total	60(12)	112	82(16.4)	119(23.8)	26(5.2)	49(9.8)	19(3.8)	33(6.6)	187(37.4)	313(62.6)
Sum total	172(34.4)		201(40.2)			75(15)		52(10.4)		500– 100%

Source; Field Survey

Table 1; percentage Analysis of parents’ Education level and influence on children health (0 – 5 years), in both urban and rural areas in Ikot Ekpen Local Government Area. The data in table 1 shows that Morbidity level of each of the five early children diseases used in the study was much lower in parents with tertiary level of education, 3.8% in the urban and 6.6% in the rural area. The total in this category was 10.4%. Secondary education category ranked higher than tertiary with percentage of 15%, urban area had 5.2% while those in the rural communities had 9.8%. In the primary education level, a total of 40.2% was recorded.

16.4% in the urban and 23.8% in the rural area. This educational category ranked the highest in the prevalence rate.

Those whose parents had no formal education had lower prevalence rate than those with primary education with a percentage of 34.4%, 12% in the urban area and 22.4% in the rural area. This shows that, the highly educated parents had less prevalence of diseases mobility caused by under study among their children. Equally those in the urban areas had less morbidity than those in the rural area.

Table I calculations show that;

$$X^2 \text{ cal} = 28.17$$

$$X^2 \text{ crit} = 21.03$$

df= 12 at 0.05 level of significance

The result in the table showed that the calculated x^2 value of 28.17 was higher than the critical x^2 value of 21.03 with regards to parents' education level and influence on the health of children (0.5years) in urban area of Ikot Ekpene Local Government Area was rejected at 0.05 level of significance and 12df. This indicates that there exists statistical significant influence on parents' education on children health based on the five diseases used in the study in urban area of Ikot Ekpene Local Government Area.

The knowledge factor on engendering the health of children was emphasized by urban respondents.

A respondent, a 31 years old mother of 3 children from the urban area averred; Education has helped me to care for the children. As a working class mother, I use my salary to support my husband to provide for the family. I am also aware of government health programmes through the media and interactions with colleagues. As a local adage states, '*nan enyiniwang*' which means anybody without education is blind even though the eye is open.

Women in the rural areas seemed to have a different view of education in improving the health of their children. For instance; a mother of 5, aged 26 from the rural area asserted that:

Education is a very important asset; it is associated with wealth and dignity, but it has nothing to do with child care and health because as a woman, it is a natural endowment to bear and care for children.

Family Size and Health of Children (0-5Years).

Disease	1-2		3-4		5 and above		Total	
	Children	Children	Children	Children	Children	Children	Children	Children
	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1
A	9	14	23	35	41	78	73	127
B	5	9	9	17	27	34	41	60
C	-	-	2	5	3	6	5	11
D	4	6	11	18	24	33	39	57
E	3	6	10	17	22	29	35	52
Total 01	21(4.2)		55(11)		117(23.4)		193(38.6)	
	35(7.0)		92(18.4)		180(36)		307(61.4)	
Sum total	56(11.2)		147(29.4)		29.7(59.4)		500-100%	

Source: Field Survey

χ^2 cal =13.747

χ^2 crit =15.51

df = 8 at 0.05 level of significance

Decision and conclusion: The calculated value 13.747 is less than the critical value of 15.51. This implies that there is no statistical relationship between family size and health of children (0- 5 years) in the rural area of Ikot Ekpene Local Government Area.

A health care provider, (a nurse) in the urban area confirmed thus;

Through my years of experience, we record fewer cases from family size of 1-3 children. Morbidity rate is very low in this group while those with larger family size get sick more frequently and their recovery rate is very slow. Further, it is observed that the poor have more children than the rich.

A mother of 7 aged 36 and lives in the rural area side;

To have many children is good, but to take care of them is a problem. It is not from my heart to have this number, but because of the desire for male children, lack of knowledge of family planning and to maintain good relationship with my husband has made it to be like this.

The data in the table shows the morbidity level of children under five years were influenced by Family size. The family with 1-2 was lowest with 11.2%, (4.2% in the urban area and 7% in rural area). The family with 3-4 children had the morbidity rate higher than family with 1-2 children with the total percentage of 29.4%, the higher rate was in the rural area with a

percentage of 18.4% in rural and 11.2% in the urban area. The family with 5 and above children had the highest morbidity rate with overall of 59.4%, (23.4% in the urban and 36% in the rural area). This gave the calculation as follows;

$$\chi^2 \text{ cal} = 15.03$$

$$\chi^2 \text{ crit} = 21.03$$

df = 12 at 0.05 level of significance. With the calculated value of 15.03 being less than the critical χ^2 value of 21.03, it implies that education level had influence on the health of children (0-5years) in the rural area of Ikot Ekpene Local Government Area.

Table IV:present chi-square analysis.....

Name of disease	Non-formal	Primary	secondary	Tertiary	Total
Malaria	47	41	21	12	121
Diarrheal	20	26	11	9	66
Measles	7	8	2	2	19
Respiratory Tract Infection	21	27	11	7	66
Protein Energy Malnutrition	17	17	4	3	41
Total	112	119	49	33	313

$X^2_{cal} = 15.03$

$X^2_{crit} = 21.03$

df = 12 at 0.05 level of significance

Decision and conclusion: since the calculated value of 15.03 were less than the critical x^2 value of 21.03, it implies that education level influences the health of children (0-5years) in the rural area of Ikot Ekpene Local Government Area.

Table v: present chi-square

Family size and influence on health of children (0-5years) (urban)

Name of disease	1-2 children	3-4 children	5 above	Total
Malaria	9	23	41	73
Diarrheal	5	9	27	41
Measles	7	8	2	19
Respiratory Tract Infection	4	11	24	39
Protein Energy Malnutrition	3	10	22	35
Total	21	55	117	193

$X^2_{cal} = 22.47$

$X^2_{crit} = 15.51$

df=8 at 0.05 level of significance

Decision and conclusion: The calculated x^2 value was 22.47 greater than the critical x^2 value of 15.51 null hypothesis that there is no statistical significant relationship between family size and health of children (0-5years) in rural area of Ikot Ekpene Local Government Area is rejected at 0.05 level of significance and 8df. This showed that family size has a significant influence on health of children in urban area of Ikot Ekpene Local Government Area

Table v: show chi-square analysis

Name of disease	1-2 children	3-4 children	5 above	Total
Malaria	14	35	78	127
Diarrheal	9	17	34	60
Measles	0	5	6	11
Respiratory Tract Infection	4	18	33	57
Protein Energy Malnutrition	6	17	29	52
Total	35	92	180	307

Conclusion

and Recommendation

The study concludes that education level of parents is crucial in economic and social developed and health of children. The higher the education level, the better the economic conditions. Education attainment enables parents to make better use of health facilities in the urban area. The chi-square test showed significant influence on parent education and family size on the health of children (0-5 years), while same test showed no significant influence in

the rural areas. Therefore, the social-economic status of parents influences the health of children in urban and rural communities independently.

The study however, recommends that there should be serious efforts by the government to enforce free and compulsory education programme especially for the girl child in both urban and rural societies. Also parent should be taught on how to discipline themselves on the utilization of family planning programmes in order to have only desired number of children that can be catered for.

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